As the Accountability Review Board found, there were at least 20 security
incidents involving the Temporary Mission Facility, international organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and third-country nationals and diplomats in the
Benghazi area in the months leading up to the September 11, 20 12, attacks. 51
The 20 security incidents detailed in the unclassified report of the ARB on pages 15-16 are as follows:
o March 18, 2012-Anned robbery occurs at the British School in Benghazi.
• March 22, 2012-Members of a militia searching for a suspect fire their weapons near the U.S. Mission
and attempt to enter.
• April 2, 2012-A British armored diplomatic vehicle is attacked after driving into a local protest; the
vehicle was damaged but occupants uninjured.
• April6, 2012-A gelatina bomb or "fish bomb" (traditional homemade explosive device used for fishing)
is thrown over the Temporary Mission Facility's north wall.
• April 10, 2012-An lED (gelatina or dynamite stick) is thrown at the motorcade ofthe United Nations
(UN) Special Envoy to Libya in Benghazi.
o April26, 2012-The principal officer ofthe U.S. Mission is evacuated from the International Medical
University (IMU) after a fistfight escalated to gunfire between Tripoli-based trade delegation security
personnel and IMU security.
• April27, 2012-Two South African nationals in Libya as part of a U.S.-funded weapons abatement,
unexploded ordnance removal, and demining project are detained at gunpoint by militia, questioned, and
released.
• May 22, 2012-Benghazi-based International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) building is struck by
RPGs.
• May 28, 2012-A previously unknown organization, Omar Abdurrahman group, claims responsibility for
the ICRC attack and issues a threat against the United States on social media sites.
• June 6, 2012-IED attack on the Temporary Mission Facility; the lED detonates with no injuries but blows
a large hole.in the compound's exterior wall. Omar Abdurrahman group makes an unsubstantiated claim of
responsibility.
• June 8, 2012--=-Two hand grenades target a parked United Kingdom (UK) diplomatic vehicle in Sabha (800
km south of Benghazi).
• June 11, 2012-While in Benghazi, the British Ambassador's convoy is attacked with an RPG and possible AK-47s; two UK security officers are injured. The UK closes its mission in Benghazi the following day.
June 12, 2012-An RPG attack occurs on the ICRC compound in Misrata (400 km west of Benghazi).
• June 18, 20 12-Protestors storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi.
• July 29, 2012-An lED is found on grounds ofthe Tibesti Hotel in Benghazi.
• July 30, 2012-A Sudanese consul in Benghazi is carjacked and his driver is beaten.
• July 31, 2012-Seven Iranian-citizen ICRC workers are abducted in Benghazi. .
• AugustS, 2012-ICRC Misrata office is attacked with RPGs; ICRC withdraws its representatives from
Misrata and Benghazi.
• August 9, 2012-A Spanish-American dual national NGO worker is abducted from the Islamic Cultural
Center in Benghazi and released the same day.
• August 20, 2012-A small bomb is thrown at an Egyptian diplomat's vehicle parked outside ofthe
Egyptian consulate in Benghazi.
In the months prior to the attack, Ambassador Stevens and other State
Department officials in Libya outlined concerns via cables to State Department
headquarters about the security of the Mission compound in Benghazi and made
several requests for additional security resources. For example:
• On June6, 2012, Stevens recommended the creation of
~teams, made up of locally hired personnel, in Benghazi and
Tripoli. The State Department attempted to create a team in Tripoli, but
was unable to so because it was difficult to find and clear appropriate personnel.
A ---- team was never created in Benghazi, despite the Ambassador's recommendation. 60On July 9, 2012, Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters
requesting a minimum of 13 "Temporary Duty" (TDY) U.S. security
personnel for Libya, which he said could be made up of DS agents, DoD
Site Security Team (SST) personnel, or_some combination ofthe two.61
These TDY security personnel were needed to meet the requested
security posture in Tripoli and Benghazi. The State Department never
fulfilled this request and, according to Eric Nordstrom, State Department
headquarters never responded to the request with a cable.62
In an August 16, 2012, cable to State headquarters, Stevens raised
additional concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi
following an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting held on
August 15, 2012, in Benghazi. The EAC is an interagency group
convened periodically in U.S. embassies and other facilities in response
to emergencies or security matters. ~n this case, the head State
Department officer in Benghazi, ca11ed the Principal Officer, convened
the meeting "to evaluate Post's tripwires in light of the deteriorating
security situation in Benghazi." 63 The cable summarizing this EAC
included the following points:
( 1) The Principal Officer "remarked that the security situation in
Benghazi was 'trending negatively"' and "that this daily pattern of
violence would be the 'new normal' for the foreseeable future,
particularly given the minimal capabilities of organizations such as
the Supreme Security Council and local police."
(2) A CIA officer "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten
Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi."
(3) The Principal Officer and a CIA officer "expressed concerns with the
lack of host nation security to support the U.S. Mission [facility]."
(4)~ssed con.c~~s with.Post's r~lat.ionship with the
-[local mihtia], particularly m hght of some of the
actions taken by the brigade's subsidiary members."
(5) The Regional Security Officer "expressed concerns with the ability to
defend Post in the event of a coordinated attack due to limited
manpower, security me~sures, weapons_capabilities, host nation
support, and the overall size of the compound."
Despite the clearly deteriorating security si_tuation in Benghazi and requests
for additional security resources, few significant improvements were made by the
State Department to the security posture of the Temporary Mission Facility.
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