SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 08–205. Argued March 24, 2009—Reargued September 9, 2009––Decided January 21, 2010
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(a) Although the First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” §441b’s prohibitionon corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the factthat a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is aseparate association from the corporation. Because speech is an es-sential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials ac-countable to the people—political speech must prevail against lawsthat would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Gov-ernment to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmentalpower, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor cer-tain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speak-ers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain
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CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in thepolitical speech context, the Government may impose restrictions oncertain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con-clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b)
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment appliesto corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of politicalspeech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address-ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U.
S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in-validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantialgovernmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi-tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc-trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con-stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi-viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf-firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks thepower to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up-held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest inpreventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to thepublic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c)
This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica-tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1)
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in politicalspeech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov-ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an associationwith a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
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making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speechcomes from a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin’s rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protec-tions do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were re-affirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that in-creased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy indi-viduals from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, in-cluding individuals and the media, use money amassed from the eco-nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Al-though currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth withthe help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth,and may express views “hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public’ssupport” for those views. Differential treatment of media corpora-tions and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amend-ment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corpora-tions’ political speech. Austin interferes with the “open marketplace”of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf