A recent INSS study details how Hezbollah uses diaspora networks, hawala brokers, trade-based laundering, and shell-company structures to sustain a financial system that extends far beyond Lebanon
The water crisis is not necessarily due to a lack of resources, but how those resources are allocated. Based on Iran’s FY1404 (2025-2026) public budget, significant funding is still directed toward religious and ideological institutions, amounting to roughly $750 to $860 million annually, depending on exchange rates.
At the same time, Iran’s regional activities, including support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, and allied militias, are widely estimated, based on publicly reported figures, to cost an additional $1.1 to $1.5 billion each year.
These estimates reflect direct financial transfers and likely understate total support, which also includes substantial non-cash assistance such as weapons, equipment, and logistical backing.
Iran’s water crisis is not only about scarcity or drought. It is also about where the Islamic Republic chooses to spend the country’s money, and what it leaves unfunded at home.