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Gold Member
Neil Gorsuch: Neil Gorsuch - Wikipedia
On May 10, 2006, Gorsuch was nominated by President George W. Bush to the seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated by Judge David M. Ebel when he took senior status.[6] Like Gorsuch, Ebel was also a former clerk of Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White. Just over two months later, on July 20, 2006, Gorsuch was confirmed by voice vote in the U.S. Senate.[13][6] Gorsuch was President Bush's fifth appointment to the Tenth Circuit.
Since he took office, Gorsuch has sent some of his law clerks on to become Supreme Court clerks, and he is sometimes regarded as a "feeder judge".[14]
Freedom of religion
Gorsuch is a believer in a broad definition of religious freedom and sided with Christian employers and religious organizations in the cases of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Little Sisters of the Poor. In the Hobby Lobby case, Gorsuch held that the requirement in the Affordable Care Act that employers provide insurance coverage for contraceptives without a co-pay violated the rights of those employers that object to use of contraceptives on religious grounds.[15] He wrote: "The ACA’s mandate requires them to violate their religious faith by forcing them to lend an impermissible degree of assistance to conduct their religion teaches to be gravely wrong.”[5]
In his dissent of the 2007 case Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, Gorsuch took the view that displaying a religious monument, such as the Ten Commandments, did not obligate a governmental authority to display other offered monuments, such as those from other religions.[16]
Authority of federal agencies
In writing his opinion for Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, Gorsuch postulated that the 1984 case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., which gives federal agencies (and not the courts) the authority to interpret ambiguous laws and regulations, should be reconsidered.[17] In his opinion, Gorsuch wrote that the practice of administrative deference established by the Chevron case is “more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”[18] The impact of an overturn of the Chevron case would be to shift power from federal agencies to the courts.[18]
Interstate commerce
Gorsuch has been an opponent of the dormant commerce clause, which allows state laws to be declared unconstitutional if they are interpreted to violate the commerce clause with respect to interstate commerce. In his opinion for the 2015 case of Energy and Environmental Legal Institute v. Epel, Gorsuch opined that Colorado's mandates for renewable energy did not violate the commerce clause by putting out-of-state coal companies at a disadvantage. Gorsuch wrote that the Colorado renewable energy law “isn’t a price-control statute, it doesn’t link prices paid in Colorado with those paid out of state, and it does not discriminate against out-of-staters”.[19]
Criminal law
In the 2012 case of United States v. Games-Perez, Gorsuch ruled on a case where a felon owned a gun in a jurisdiction where gun ownership by felons is illegal; however, the felon did not know that he was a felon at the time. Gorsuch concurred with the opinion that "The only statutory element separating innocent (even constitutionally protected) gun possession from criminal conduct in §§ 922(g) and 924(a) is a prior felony conviction. So the presumption that the government must prove mens rea here applies with full force."[20]
Death penalty
Gorsuch denied requests of death-row inmates seeking to escape executions.[21]
Legal philosophy
Gorsuch is a proponent of originalism, the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted as the Founding Fathers would have interpreted it, and of textualism, the idea that statutes should be interpreted literally, without considering the legislative history and underlying purpose of the law.[3][4]
In a 2005 speech at Case Western Reserve University, Gorsuch said that judges should strive "to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be -- not to decide cases based on their own moral convictions or the policy consequences they believe might serve society best."[24]
In a 2005 article published by National Review, Gorsuch argued that “American liberals have become addicted to the courtroom, relying on judges and lawyers rather than elected leaders and the ballot box, as the primary means of effecting their social agenda" and that they are "failing to reach out and persuade the public". Gorsuch wrote that, by relying on judges instead of elected officials and the ballot box to enact their agenda, American liberals are circumventing the democratic process on issues like gay marriage, school vouchers, and assisted suicide, and this has led to a compromised judiciary, which is no longer independent. Gorsuch wrote that American liberals' "overweening addiction" to using the courts for social debate is "bad for the nation and bad for the judiciary".[25][13]
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William H. Pryor Jr.: William H. Pryor Jr. - Wikipedia.
William Holcombe "Bill" Pryor Jr. (born April 26, 1962) is a United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and a Commissioner on the United States Sentencing Commission.[1] Previously, he was the Attorney General of the State of Alabama from 1997 to 2004.
Notable opinions
United States v. Phillips (11th Cir. 2016). Judge Pryor wrote an opinion for a unanimous panel, affirming the denial of Ted Phillips's motion to suppress. The police caught Phillips, a convicted felon, with a firearm while they were arresting him on a civil writ of bodily attachment for his failure to pay child support. The Court's opinion explored the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the history of civil writs to conclude that the writ for unpaid child support gave the police the authority to arrest Phillips and to conduct a search incident to arrest.[11]
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (11th Cir. 2014). In a unanimous order, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit enjoined the Secretary of HHS from enforcing the contraception mandate against Catholic television network EWTN. Judge Pryor specially concurred, explaining why, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, EWTN had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The concurrence is particularly notable because Judge Pryor noted that he parted ways with decisions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits on the subject "because the decisions of those courts are wholly unpersuasive."[12]
Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (11th Cir. 2013). On behalf of a unanimous panel, Pryor rejected the due process challenge brought by R.J. Reynolds to the application, as res judicata, of the previous determinations on liability made by a Florida jury in an unorthodox class action against the tobacco companies in the 1990s. The panel concluded that it was required to give full faith and credit to the decision of the Florida trial court, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court and that the application of full faith and credit did not violate the tobacco company's due process rights because R.J. Reynolds had been given notice and an opportunity to be heard throughout the litigation. The opinion is particularly notable for a colorful paragraph at its conclusion discussing the intractable problem of tobacco litigation.[13]
Day v. Persels & Associates (11th Cir. 2013). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion vacating a settlement award in a class action relating to debt-settlement services. The court concluded that the magistrate judge had subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement because unnamed class members are not parties whose consent is required for adjudication by a magistrate judge. But the court also concluded that the magistrate judge had abused its discretion when it approved a settlement that provided no monetary relief to the class members because he found that the defendants could not pay such monetary relief, but no evidence supported that finding.[14]
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado (11th Cir. 2012). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion reversing the convictions of four defendants for drug-trafficking in the territorial waters of Panama because the Act that criminalized their behavior exceeded the authority of Congress under the Offences against the Law of Nations Clause of the Constitution. The opinion is the first in-depth interpretation of the constitutional provision by a federal circuit court. Judge Rosemary Barkett specially concurred in the judgment.[15]
United States v. Shaygan (11th Cir. 2011). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion vacating an award of over $600,000 in attorney's fees and costs against the United States and the public reprimand of two federal prosecutors. The court explained that the prosecution was objectively reasonable and did not warrant sanctions under the Hyde Amendment. The court also concluded that the district court had violated the due process rights of the federal prosecutors when it denied them notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard.[16] Pryor later wrote a statement respecting the denial of rehearing en banc of this opinion in United States v. Shaygan (11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012).[17]
First Vagabonds Church of God v. Orlando (11th Cir. 2011). Writing for a unanimous en banc court, Pryor rejected an as-applied challenge by Orlando Food Not Bombs to a municipal ordinance that restricted the frequency of its feedings of homeless persons in parks located within a 2-mile radius of the Orlando City Hall. The court assumed, without deciding, that the feeding of homeless persons constituted expressive conduct and determined that the ordinance, as applied to Orlando Food Not Bombs, constituted a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction and a reasonable regulation of expressive conduct.[18]
In re United States (11th Cir. 2010). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion granting a writ of mandamus to substitute an Assistant Administrator of the EPA for the appearance of the Administrator in a case about the ecology of the Everglades. The panel explained that the district court had abused its discretion in ordering the appearance of the agency head and encroached on the separation of powers.[19]
Scott v. Roberts (11th Cir. 2010). Pryor wrote for a unanimous panel reversing the district court and preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a Florida law that provided a dollar-for-dollar subsidy to a candidate's opponent once that candidate exceeded a statutory expenditure limit. The panel concluded that Rick Scott, then-candidate in the Republican primary for the Governor of Florida, had made a substantial showing of likelihood of success on the merits because, even if the law served compelling state interests, the law was not the least restrictive means of serving those interests. Scott went on to win the Republican primary and the general election.[20]
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (11th Cir. 2009). Pryor wrote for a unanimous panel upholding a Georgia law that required all registered voters in Georgia to present a government-issued photo identification to be allowed to vote in person. The law also required Georgia to issue, free of charge, a "Georgia voter identification card" to any registered Georgia voter who lacked an acceptable form of identification. The panel concluded that the NAACP and voters had standing to challenge the law, but that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to enjoin the law because the burdens on voters from the law were insignificant and the state had legitimate interests in preventing voter fraud.[21]
Pelphrey v. Cobb County (11th Cir. 2008). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion, joined by Judge Charles R. Wilson, affirming the district court ruling that sectarian prayers used to open commission meetings did not violate the Establishment Clause as long as the prayer opportunity was not exploited to proselytize or to advance or disparage any particular faith or belief. U.S. District Court Judge Donald Middlebrooks dissented.[22]
United States v. Campa, (11th Cir. 2008). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion, joined by Judge Birch, upholding the convictions of five Cuban spies ("The Cuban Five") for espionage.[23]
Zibtluda LLC v. Gwinnett County, Georgia, (11th Cir. 2005). Opinion affirmed district court ruling that a local ordinance limiting the placement of adult entertainment establishments was constitutional. The opinion was notable for Pryor's quote of a line from The B-52's hit song "Love Shack" in describing the proposed establishment.[24]
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Thomas Hardiman: Thomas Hardiman - Wikipedia
Thomas Michael Hardiman (born July 8, 1965) is a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. He was previously a United States district judge. He maintains chambers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Since 1994, he has been a registered Republican.[1]
Notable rulings
Police and prison powers
In the 2012 case of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, Hardiman held that a jail policy of strip-searching everyone who was arrested does not violate the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[17]
In the 2014 case of Karen Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., et al., Hardiman dissented from the ruling of the Third Circuit that two Delaware prison officials could be sued for failing to provide adequate suicide prevention protocols after a mentally ill inmate committed suicide. The Supreme Court agreed and unanimously reversed in Taylor v. Barkes.[18]
Criminal sentencing
In the 2010 case of United States v. Abbott, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, Hardiman held that a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence is not affected by the imposition of another mandatory minimum for a different offense.
In the 2007 case of United States of America v. Tracy Lamar Fisher Hardiman ruled that a judge could find facts to enhance a criminal sentence according to the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.[19]
Religious freedom
In the 2008 case of Busch vs. Marple Newton School District, Hardiman held the minority opinion, ruling in favor of parents who described themselves as Evangelical Christians and were barred from reading from the Bible during a kindergarten "show and tell" presentation. Hardiman wrote that "the school went too far in this case in limiting participation in ‘All About Me’ week to nonreligious perspectives," which "plainly constituted" discrimination. Hardiman also wrote that "the majority’s desire to protect young children from potentially influential speech in the classroom is understandable" but that it cannot be used to bar the students from expressing "something about themselves, except what is most important to them."[20]
Gun rights
In the 2011 case of United States of America vs. James Francis Barton, Jr., Hardiman rejected a challenge to the federal law that bans felons from owning firearms.[21] However, in the 2016 case of Daniel Binderup v. Attorney General of United States of America and Director Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, he qualified such opinion to only include dangerous persons which were likely to use firearms for illicit purposes. He wrote "the most cogent principle that can be drawn from traditional limitations on the right to keep and bear arms is that dangerous persons likely to use firearms for illicit purposes were not understood to be protected by the Second Amendment".[22]
In the 2014 case of Drake v. Filko, Hardiman disagreed with the New Jersey requirement that gun owners must show a "justifiable need" to own a gun. Hardiman cited the case of District of Columbia v. Heller, writing that based on the Heller ruling, the Second Amendment "protects an inherent right to self-defense."[23]
Free speech
In the 2006 case of United States of America v. Robert J. Stevens, Hardiman struck down a federal law that criminalized videos depicting animal cruelty.[24]
In the 2010 case of Brian D. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, Hardiman ruled that a police officer had qualified immunity because there is no clearly established First Amendment right to videotape police officers during traffic stops.[25]
In the 2013 case of B.H. Hawk & Relatives v. Easton Area School District, Hardiman dissented from the court's holding that a public school violated the First Amendment by banning middle-school students from wearing bracelets inscribed "I [love] boobies!" that were sold by a breast cancer awareness group.[26]
In the 2014 case of Lodge No. 5 of Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, Hardiman struck down a city charter provision barring police officers from donating to their union's political action committee, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.[27]
Immigration
In the 2010 case of Mauricio Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of United States of America, Hardiman ruled in favor of a male from Honduras who was seeking asylum in the United States to avoid being recruited into a violent gang.[28]
In the 2015 case of Di Li Li v. Attorney General of United States of America, Hardiman opined that the Board of Immigration Appeals must re-open a case when an asylum seeker from China converted to Christianity and argued that "conditions have worsened over time" for Christians in China.[29]
Commerce
In the 2011 case of United States of America v. Thomas S. Pendleton, Hardiman ruled in the case of a man who sexually molested a 15-year old boy in Germany and was later sentenced in Delaware under the PROTECT Act of 2003. The defendant argued that the PROTECT Act was unconstitutional based on the Foreign Commerce Clause. Hardiman ruled that the PROTECT Act was valid because of an "express connection" to the channels of foreign commerce.[30]
Bankruptcy law
In the 2015 case of In re Jevic Holding Corp., Hardiman ruled that a "structured dismissal" of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy may, in rare circumstances, deviate from the priority system of the Bankruptcy Code.[31]
On May 10, 2006, Gorsuch was nominated by President George W. Bush to the seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated by Judge David M. Ebel when he took senior status.[6] Like Gorsuch, Ebel was also a former clerk of Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White. Just over two months later, on July 20, 2006, Gorsuch was confirmed by voice vote in the U.S. Senate.[13][6] Gorsuch was President Bush's fifth appointment to the Tenth Circuit.
Since he took office, Gorsuch has sent some of his law clerks on to become Supreme Court clerks, and he is sometimes regarded as a "feeder judge".[14]
Freedom of religion
Gorsuch is a believer in a broad definition of religious freedom and sided with Christian employers and religious organizations in the cases of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Little Sisters of the Poor. In the Hobby Lobby case, Gorsuch held that the requirement in the Affordable Care Act that employers provide insurance coverage for contraceptives without a co-pay violated the rights of those employers that object to use of contraceptives on religious grounds.[15] He wrote: "The ACA’s mandate requires them to violate their religious faith by forcing them to lend an impermissible degree of assistance to conduct their religion teaches to be gravely wrong.”[5]
In his dissent of the 2007 case Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, Gorsuch took the view that displaying a religious monument, such as the Ten Commandments, did not obligate a governmental authority to display other offered monuments, such as those from other religions.[16]
Authority of federal agencies
In writing his opinion for Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, Gorsuch postulated that the 1984 case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., which gives federal agencies (and not the courts) the authority to interpret ambiguous laws and regulations, should be reconsidered.[17] In his opinion, Gorsuch wrote that the practice of administrative deference established by the Chevron case is “more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”[18] The impact of an overturn of the Chevron case would be to shift power from federal agencies to the courts.[18]
Interstate commerce
Gorsuch has been an opponent of the dormant commerce clause, which allows state laws to be declared unconstitutional if they are interpreted to violate the commerce clause with respect to interstate commerce. In his opinion for the 2015 case of Energy and Environmental Legal Institute v. Epel, Gorsuch opined that Colorado's mandates for renewable energy did not violate the commerce clause by putting out-of-state coal companies at a disadvantage. Gorsuch wrote that the Colorado renewable energy law “isn’t a price-control statute, it doesn’t link prices paid in Colorado with those paid out of state, and it does not discriminate against out-of-staters”.[19]
Criminal law
In the 2012 case of United States v. Games-Perez, Gorsuch ruled on a case where a felon owned a gun in a jurisdiction where gun ownership by felons is illegal; however, the felon did not know that he was a felon at the time. Gorsuch concurred with the opinion that "The only statutory element separating innocent (even constitutionally protected) gun possession from criminal conduct in §§ 922(g) and 924(a) is a prior felony conviction. So the presumption that the government must prove mens rea here applies with full force."[20]
Death penalty
Gorsuch denied requests of death-row inmates seeking to escape executions.[21]
Legal philosophy
Gorsuch is a proponent of originalism, the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted as the Founding Fathers would have interpreted it, and of textualism, the idea that statutes should be interpreted literally, without considering the legislative history and underlying purpose of the law.[3][4]
In a 2005 speech at Case Western Reserve University, Gorsuch said that judges should strive "to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be -- not to decide cases based on their own moral convictions or the policy consequences they believe might serve society best."[24]
In a 2005 article published by National Review, Gorsuch argued that “American liberals have become addicted to the courtroom, relying on judges and lawyers rather than elected leaders and the ballot box, as the primary means of effecting their social agenda" and that they are "failing to reach out and persuade the public". Gorsuch wrote that, by relying on judges instead of elected officials and the ballot box to enact their agenda, American liberals are circumventing the democratic process on issues like gay marriage, school vouchers, and assisted suicide, and this has led to a compromised judiciary, which is no longer independent. Gorsuch wrote that American liberals' "overweening addiction" to using the courts for social debate is "bad for the nation and bad for the judiciary".[25][13]
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William H. Pryor Jr.: William H. Pryor Jr. - Wikipedia.
William Holcombe "Bill" Pryor Jr. (born April 26, 1962) is a United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and a Commissioner on the United States Sentencing Commission.[1] Previously, he was the Attorney General of the State of Alabama from 1997 to 2004.
Notable opinions
United States v. Phillips (11th Cir. 2016). Judge Pryor wrote an opinion for a unanimous panel, affirming the denial of Ted Phillips's motion to suppress. The police caught Phillips, a convicted felon, with a firearm while they were arresting him on a civil writ of bodily attachment for his failure to pay child support. The Court's opinion explored the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the history of civil writs to conclude that the writ for unpaid child support gave the police the authority to arrest Phillips and to conduct a search incident to arrest.[11]
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (11th Cir. 2014). In a unanimous order, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit enjoined the Secretary of HHS from enforcing the contraception mandate against Catholic television network EWTN. Judge Pryor specially concurred, explaining why, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, EWTN had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The concurrence is particularly notable because Judge Pryor noted that he parted ways with decisions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits on the subject "because the decisions of those courts are wholly unpersuasive."[12]
Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (11th Cir. 2013). On behalf of a unanimous panel, Pryor rejected the due process challenge brought by R.J. Reynolds to the application, as res judicata, of the previous determinations on liability made by a Florida jury in an unorthodox class action against the tobacco companies in the 1990s. The panel concluded that it was required to give full faith and credit to the decision of the Florida trial court, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court and that the application of full faith and credit did not violate the tobacco company's due process rights because R.J. Reynolds had been given notice and an opportunity to be heard throughout the litigation. The opinion is particularly notable for a colorful paragraph at its conclusion discussing the intractable problem of tobacco litigation.[13]
Day v. Persels & Associates (11th Cir. 2013). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion vacating a settlement award in a class action relating to debt-settlement services. The court concluded that the magistrate judge had subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement because unnamed class members are not parties whose consent is required for adjudication by a magistrate judge. But the court also concluded that the magistrate judge had abused its discretion when it approved a settlement that provided no monetary relief to the class members because he found that the defendants could not pay such monetary relief, but no evidence supported that finding.[14]
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado (11th Cir. 2012). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion reversing the convictions of four defendants for drug-trafficking in the territorial waters of Panama because the Act that criminalized their behavior exceeded the authority of Congress under the Offences against the Law of Nations Clause of the Constitution. The opinion is the first in-depth interpretation of the constitutional provision by a federal circuit court. Judge Rosemary Barkett specially concurred in the judgment.[15]
United States v. Shaygan (11th Cir. 2011). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion vacating an award of over $600,000 in attorney's fees and costs against the United States and the public reprimand of two federal prosecutors. The court explained that the prosecution was objectively reasonable and did not warrant sanctions under the Hyde Amendment. The court also concluded that the district court had violated the due process rights of the federal prosecutors when it denied them notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard.[16] Pryor later wrote a statement respecting the denial of rehearing en banc of this opinion in United States v. Shaygan (11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012).[17]
First Vagabonds Church of God v. Orlando (11th Cir. 2011). Writing for a unanimous en banc court, Pryor rejected an as-applied challenge by Orlando Food Not Bombs to a municipal ordinance that restricted the frequency of its feedings of homeless persons in parks located within a 2-mile radius of the Orlando City Hall. The court assumed, without deciding, that the feeding of homeless persons constituted expressive conduct and determined that the ordinance, as applied to Orlando Food Not Bombs, constituted a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction and a reasonable regulation of expressive conduct.[18]
In re United States (11th Cir. 2010). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion granting a writ of mandamus to substitute an Assistant Administrator of the EPA for the appearance of the Administrator in a case about the ecology of the Everglades. The panel explained that the district court had abused its discretion in ordering the appearance of the agency head and encroached on the separation of powers.[19]
Scott v. Roberts (11th Cir. 2010). Pryor wrote for a unanimous panel reversing the district court and preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a Florida law that provided a dollar-for-dollar subsidy to a candidate's opponent once that candidate exceeded a statutory expenditure limit. The panel concluded that Rick Scott, then-candidate in the Republican primary for the Governor of Florida, had made a substantial showing of likelihood of success on the merits because, even if the law served compelling state interests, the law was not the least restrictive means of serving those interests. Scott went on to win the Republican primary and the general election.[20]
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (11th Cir. 2009). Pryor wrote for a unanimous panel upholding a Georgia law that required all registered voters in Georgia to present a government-issued photo identification to be allowed to vote in person. The law also required Georgia to issue, free of charge, a "Georgia voter identification card" to any registered Georgia voter who lacked an acceptable form of identification. The panel concluded that the NAACP and voters had standing to challenge the law, but that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to enjoin the law because the burdens on voters from the law were insignificant and the state had legitimate interests in preventing voter fraud.[21]
Pelphrey v. Cobb County (11th Cir. 2008). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion, joined by Judge Charles R. Wilson, affirming the district court ruling that sectarian prayers used to open commission meetings did not violate the Establishment Clause as long as the prayer opportunity was not exploited to proselytize or to advance or disparage any particular faith or belief. U.S. District Court Judge Donald Middlebrooks dissented.[22]
United States v. Campa, (11th Cir. 2008). Pryor wrote the majority (2–1) opinion, joined by Judge Birch, upholding the convictions of five Cuban spies ("The Cuban Five") for espionage.[23]
Zibtluda LLC v. Gwinnett County, Georgia, (11th Cir. 2005). Opinion affirmed district court ruling that a local ordinance limiting the placement of adult entertainment establishments was constitutional. The opinion was notable for Pryor's quote of a line from The B-52's hit song "Love Shack" in describing the proposed establishment.[24]
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Thomas Hardiman: Thomas Hardiman - Wikipedia
Thomas Michael Hardiman (born July 8, 1965) is a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. He was previously a United States district judge. He maintains chambers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Since 1994, he has been a registered Republican.[1]
Notable rulings
Police and prison powers
In the 2012 case of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, Hardiman held that a jail policy of strip-searching everyone who was arrested does not violate the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[17]
In the 2014 case of Karen Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., et al., Hardiman dissented from the ruling of the Third Circuit that two Delaware prison officials could be sued for failing to provide adequate suicide prevention protocols after a mentally ill inmate committed suicide. The Supreme Court agreed and unanimously reversed in Taylor v. Barkes.[18]
Criminal sentencing
In the 2010 case of United States v. Abbott, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, Hardiman held that a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence is not affected by the imposition of another mandatory minimum for a different offense.
In the 2007 case of United States of America v. Tracy Lamar Fisher Hardiman ruled that a judge could find facts to enhance a criminal sentence according to the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.[19]
Religious freedom
In the 2008 case of Busch vs. Marple Newton School District, Hardiman held the minority opinion, ruling in favor of parents who described themselves as Evangelical Christians and were barred from reading from the Bible during a kindergarten "show and tell" presentation. Hardiman wrote that "the school went too far in this case in limiting participation in ‘All About Me’ week to nonreligious perspectives," which "plainly constituted" discrimination. Hardiman also wrote that "the majority’s desire to protect young children from potentially influential speech in the classroom is understandable" but that it cannot be used to bar the students from expressing "something about themselves, except what is most important to them."[20]
Gun rights
In the 2011 case of United States of America vs. James Francis Barton, Jr., Hardiman rejected a challenge to the federal law that bans felons from owning firearms.[21] However, in the 2016 case of Daniel Binderup v. Attorney General of United States of America and Director Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, he qualified such opinion to only include dangerous persons which were likely to use firearms for illicit purposes. He wrote "the most cogent principle that can be drawn from traditional limitations on the right to keep and bear arms is that dangerous persons likely to use firearms for illicit purposes were not understood to be protected by the Second Amendment".[22]
In the 2014 case of Drake v. Filko, Hardiman disagreed with the New Jersey requirement that gun owners must show a "justifiable need" to own a gun. Hardiman cited the case of District of Columbia v. Heller, writing that based on the Heller ruling, the Second Amendment "protects an inherent right to self-defense."[23]
Free speech
In the 2006 case of United States of America v. Robert J. Stevens, Hardiman struck down a federal law that criminalized videos depicting animal cruelty.[24]
In the 2010 case of Brian D. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, Hardiman ruled that a police officer had qualified immunity because there is no clearly established First Amendment right to videotape police officers during traffic stops.[25]
In the 2013 case of B.H. Hawk & Relatives v. Easton Area School District, Hardiman dissented from the court's holding that a public school violated the First Amendment by banning middle-school students from wearing bracelets inscribed "I [love] boobies!" that were sold by a breast cancer awareness group.[26]
In the 2014 case of Lodge No. 5 of Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, Hardiman struck down a city charter provision barring police officers from donating to their union's political action committee, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.[27]
Immigration
In the 2010 case of Mauricio Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of United States of America, Hardiman ruled in favor of a male from Honduras who was seeking asylum in the United States to avoid being recruited into a violent gang.[28]
In the 2015 case of Di Li Li v. Attorney General of United States of America, Hardiman opined that the Board of Immigration Appeals must re-open a case when an asylum seeker from China converted to Christianity and argued that "conditions have worsened over time" for Christians in China.[29]
Commerce
In the 2011 case of United States of America v. Thomas S. Pendleton, Hardiman ruled in the case of a man who sexually molested a 15-year old boy in Germany and was later sentenced in Delaware under the PROTECT Act of 2003. The defendant argued that the PROTECT Act was unconstitutional based on the Foreign Commerce Clause. Hardiman ruled that the PROTECT Act was valid because of an "express connection" to the channels of foreign commerce.[30]
Bankruptcy law
In the 2015 case of In re Jevic Holding Corp., Hardiman ruled that a "structured dismissal" of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy may, in rare circumstances, deviate from the priority system of the Bankruptcy Code.[31]
