mikegriffith1
Mike Griffith
If I had been president of the Confederacy, instead of Jefferson Davis, here is what I would have done differently:
-- I would have vetoed the Confederate congressional bill in early March 1861 that set CSA tariff rates at 10%. This low tariff posed a direct threat to Northern economic interests. Many Northern newspapers noted the threat that the lower CSA tariff posed to the Northern economy. It was too early to be passing such a provocative tariff bill. I would have worked to ensure that the initial CSA tariff rates were comparable to the U.S. rates, if not identical to them. I would not have considered lowering Confederate tariff rates until months after it was clear there would be no war with the U.S.
-- I would have ordered a halt to the seizure of federal installations in the South.
-- I would have publicly expressed regret for the seizures that had already occurred and would have explained that they were done before the Confederacy was formed.
-- I would have repeatedly made it clear in public statements that the Confederacy was willing to pay compensation for federal installations in the South.
-- I would have repudiated the obnoxious, ridiculous statements regarding slavery in Alexander Stephens' "cornerstone speech."
-- I would have ensured that the provision of food to the Fort Sumter garrison was continued. This would have enabled Lincoln to avoid having to send a federal naval convoy to provide food to the garrison.
-- If Lincoln had still sent a convoy to Sumter to provide additional food, I would have done nothing to prevent the operation.
-- Regarding the whole Sumter question, I would have issued a public statement along these lines:
"I realize that for many of our Northern brethren, Fort Sumter is still federal property and cannot be relinquished. I know there are some elements in the North who hope that we will attack Fort Sumter if it is not evacuated in the next few weeks, and who plan on using such an attack as a pretext for an invasion of the Confederacy. I declare that we will not attack Fort Sumter as long as the fort does not fire on us and does not fire on ships entering and leaving Charleston Harbor. We will leave Fort Sumter unmolested even if the federal garrison remains there for years to come--again, as long as the garrison takes no hostile action against us or against shipping in the harbor. The same applies to Fort Pickens."
This would have put the onus on Northern hardliners to fire the first shot. It would have led many more Northerners to conclude that it made no sense to leave the garrison on Sumter given that the fort was now in another nation's harbor and could no good for the U.S. there. This, couple with a repeated Confederate offer of compensation for all federal installations in the South, would have caused a majority of Northerners to see Sumter as a non-issue and to support its sale to the Confederacy.
-- I would have publicly called for a gradual, compensated emancipation program in my first message to the Confederate Congress in early 1861.
-- By no later than mid-1862, I would have called for enlisting slaves as soldiers in exchange for freedom for themselves and their families. Some states and individual commanders were already doing this, persuading 3,000 to 7,000 slaves to serve as soldiers in their armies, but this was a drop in the bucket. A call for such enlistments sanctioned by the national government from the Confederate president would have been a great PR move and would have provided much-needed reinforcements for the army.
-- If the Confederate Congress still had not begun a gradual emancipation program by the time Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862, I would have used the proclamation as another occasion to call for a Confederate emancipation program.
-- In response to the Emancipation Proclamation issued in January 1863, I would not have threatened to treat ex-Southern slaves serving in the Union army and their officers as criminals who would be handed over to the states for prosecution. Instead, I would have announced that such soldiers and officers would be treated just like any other captured Union soldiers and officers.
-- I would have used the occasion of the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation to again call for a Confederate emancipation program.
-- I would not have refused to include captured black Union soldiers in prisoner exchanges.
-- I would have accepted the huge loans that European nations offered in early 1861, as opposed to the much smaller loans that Jefferson Davis agreed to accept.
-- I would have made no effort to seize New Mexico Territory. The Confederacy had no right to that territory. If you leave the Union, then you forfeit any right to a "fair distribution of the territories."
-- I would have vetoed the Confederate congressional bill in early March 1861 that set CSA tariff rates at 10%. This low tariff posed a direct threat to Northern economic interests. Many Northern newspapers noted the threat that the lower CSA tariff posed to the Northern economy. It was too early to be passing such a provocative tariff bill. I would have worked to ensure that the initial CSA tariff rates were comparable to the U.S. rates, if not identical to them. I would not have considered lowering Confederate tariff rates until months after it was clear there would be no war with the U.S.
-- I would have ordered a halt to the seizure of federal installations in the South.
-- I would have publicly expressed regret for the seizures that had already occurred and would have explained that they were done before the Confederacy was formed.
-- I would have repeatedly made it clear in public statements that the Confederacy was willing to pay compensation for federal installations in the South.
-- I would have repudiated the obnoxious, ridiculous statements regarding slavery in Alexander Stephens' "cornerstone speech."
-- I would have ensured that the provision of food to the Fort Sumter garrison was continued. This would have enabled Lincoln to avoid having to send a federal naval convoy to provide food to the garrison.
-- If Lincoln had still sent a convoy to Sumter to provide additional food, I would have done nothing to prevent the operation.
-- Regarding the whole Sumter question, I would have issued a public statement along these lines:
"I realize that for many of our Northern brethren, Fort Sumter is still federal property and cannot be relinquished. I know there are some elements in the North who hope that we will attack Fort Sumter if it is not evacuated in the next few weeks, and who plan on using such an attack as a pretext for an invasion of the Confederacy. I declare that we will not attack Fort Sumter as long as the fort does not fire on us and does not fire on ships entering and leaving Charleston Harbor. We will leave Fort Sumter unmolested even if the federal garrison remains there for years to come--again, as long as the garrison takes no hostile action against us or against shipping in the harbor. The same applies to Fort Pickens."
This would have put the onus on Northern hardliners to fire the first shot. It would have led many more Northerners to conclude that it made no sense to leave the garrison on Sumter given that the fort was now in another nation's harbor and could no good for the U.S. there. This, couple with a repeated Confederate offer of compensation for all federal installations in the South, would have caused a majority of Northerners to see Sumter as a non-issue and to support its sale to the Confederacy.
-- I would have publicly called for a gradual, compensated emancipation program in my first message to the Confederate Congress in early 1861.
-- By no later than mid-1862, I would have called for enlisting slaves as soldiers in exchange for freedom for themselves and their families. Some states and individual commanders were already doing this, persuading 3,000 to 7,000 slaves to serve as soldiers in their armies, but this was a drop in the bucket. A call for such enlistments sanctioned by the national government from the Confederate president would have been a great PR move and would have provided much-needed reinforcements for the army.
-- If the Confederate Congress still had not begun a gradual emancipation program by the time Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862, I would have used the proclamation as another occasion to call for a Confederate emancipation program.
-- In response to the Emancipation Proclamation issued in January 1863, I would not have threatened to treat ex-Southern slaves serving in the Union army and their officers as criminals who would be handed over to the states for prosecution. Instead, I would have announced that such soldiers and officers would be treated just like any other captured Union soldiers and officers.
-- I would have used the occasion of the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation to again call for a Confederate emancipation program.
-- I would not have refused to include captured black Union soldiers in prisoner exchanges.
-- I would have accepted the huge loans that European nations offered in early 1861, as opposed to the much smaller loans that Jefferson Davis agreed to accept.
-- I would have made no effort to seize New Mexico Territory. The Confederacy had no right to that territory. If you leave the Union, then you forfeit any right to a "fair distribution of the territories."
