https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/redistricting.htm
In safe districts, candidates of the minority party are often little more than sacrificial
lambs being led to the slaughter. But it gets worse. These safe districts are often so
one-sided that the disadvantaged party does not even bother to put up a candidate. There is no
contest at all. The number of uncontested U.S. House seats varies considerably from state to
state. Florida and Texas are two of the worst. In the 2000 U.S. House elections in Florida, 43
percent of the races were uncontested. That year in Texas, 30 percent of their House races were
uncontested. The existence of some many uncontested races is a political disgrace, but it is
also a perfectly understandable result in a winner-take-all system. Why should the smaller
party bother to compete in districts dominated by the larger party? It would be a waste of
valuable political resources. As the former head of the Republican campaign effort in the
House, Rep. John Linder of Georgia, explained: "The GOP did not recruit candidates in districts
where Democrats are shoo-ins for re-election." And according to his counter-part on the
Democratic side, Rep. Martin Frost of Texas: "Both parties, I believe, had made a decision to
concentrate on really competitive districts." So in an SMP system, it is a rational political
strategy for a party to no contest seats in many districts.
On the level of state legislative contests, the problem of unopposed candidates has reached
epidemic levels. In races for state legislatures in 2000, either the Democrats or the
Republicans refused to nominate a candidate in 40.6 percent of the districts. In 1998 that
figure as 41.1 percent. Thus in a large number of cases, the creation of safe seats for
incumbents means that voters literally have no choice on election day. These are not so much
races as prolonged victory laps by the preordained winners.
These safe districts created by gerrymandering not only deny voters a meaningful choice, they
contribute to other political problems as well. For one thing, safe districts clearly encourage
political apathy and low voter participation. Why bother to participate if the outcome has been
predetermined by how the district lines have been drawn. As one San Francisco resident
complained: "Vote? Why vote? I know whoÂ’s going to win, everybody knows whoÂ’s going to win.
Pelosi always wins, with 80 percent of the vote. Nobody else has a chance." Those who support
the party that always loses are not the only ones discouraged from voting in safe districts.
Even those who support the dominant party have little reason to vote because they know that
their candidate will win anyway.
The only sure way to eliminate gerrymandering – both intentional and unintentional – from
American elections is to abandon single-member plurality arrangements and adopt proportional
representation. Indeed, the whole purpose of PR is to minimize wasted votes and ensure that the
parties are represented in proportion to the votes they receive. This eliminates the
possibilities of unfair representation produced by gerrymandering. The key to eliminating
partisan gerrymandering is the large multimember districts used in PR systems. As numerous
studies have shown, as long as a PR system has at least five seats in every district, it is
effectively immune from gerrymandering. These districts largely eliminate the wasted votes that
make gerrymandering possible. In such districts, even small political minorities do not waste
their votes and are able to elect their fair share of representatives. Thus, under PR
arrangements, where voters live or how district lines are drawn makes no difference – fair
representation will result.
Imagine, for example, that we have a region in a state that is 60 percent Republican and 40
percent Democratic and that it must be divided into two ten-member PR election districts. No
matter how the district lines are drawn and no matter how party voters are distributed between
the districts, each party will be able to elect its fair share of representatives. If all the
Democrats are packed into one district, they will constitute 80 percent of the voters there and
elect eight of the ten representatives in that district and none in the other – 40 percent of
the total seats. If the Democratic voters are fragmented and make up 40 percent minorities in
the each of the two districts, they will be able to elect four representatives in each – and
still receive 40 percent of the total seats.
That gerrymandering and unfair representation can be truly eliminated only under PR
arrangements is so indisputable that even political scientists who continue to support our
single-member plurality system are forced to acknowledge it. Nelson Polsby of the University of
California at Berkeley is no supporter of proportional representation. Yet he testified in a
court case on gerrymandering that "proportionality cannot be guaranteed in a system of voting
in which the winner of the most votes wins the election regardless of how many candidates run
in each race. To ensure proportionality it is necessary to have a proportional representation
system of elections.''