Synthaholic
Diamond Member
This is worrisome:
How Russia Dominates Your Twitter Feed to Promote Lies (And, Trump, Too)
.
In a sense, this is the return of an old game. From the 1950s through the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Soviet Union sought to use “the force of politics rather than the politics of force” to disrupt and defeat their adversaries from the inside out. As explained by the 1992 U.S. Information Agency report to Congress, “Active measures seek to use slogans, arguments, disinformation and selected true information to influence the attitudes and actions of foreign publics and governments.” Soviet propaganda pushed stories regarding the flaws of democracy, collapse of the world economy, environmental catastrophe, and global calamities like nuclear war.
Conduct of Soviet and Russian “Active Measures” before the internet proved challenging, particularly in the West. Soviet agents and paid communist supporters would need to reside in the countries they sought to influence, create a print or radio media outlet or gain a job working at an established platform and evade the scrutiny of Western counterintelligence. But these days, it’s as easy as setting up a Twitter account. Russia influence operations in social media represents a far more effective and efficient return to their “Active Measures” campaign of the Cold War.
And when combined with the alleged hacks of political actors, the promotion of these Incirlik-style stories through overt Russian media outlets and “grey” English speaking propagandists could make for a powerful one-two punch to disrupt the American election. The synchronization of hacking and social media information operations not only has the ability to promote a favored candidate, like Trump, but also has the potential to incite unrest amongst American communities.
Since Incirlik, Trump and Russian media have simultaneously pushed a new theme: the illegitimacy of U.S. elections. The Incirlik disinformation campaign, while a failure, raises the question of Russia’s ability to use social media “Active Measures” to destabilize the American public. #Incirlik wasn’t the first Russian influence effort on social media and it most certainly won’t be the last. To date, there’s been no public U.S. response to alleged Russian hacking or social media information operations. How much longer can the U.S. wait?
How Russia Dominates Your Twitter Feed to Promote Lies (And, Trump, Too)
.
In a sense, this is the return of an old game. From the 1950s through the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Soviet Union sought to use “the force of politics rather than the politics of force” to disrupt and defeat their adversaries from the inside out. As explained by the 1992 U.S. Information Agency report to Congress, “Active measures seek to use slogans, arguments, disinformation and selected true information to influence the attitudes and actions of foreign publics and governments.” Soviet propaganda pushed stories regarding the flaws of democracy, collapse of the world economy, environmental catastrophe, and global calamities like nuclear war.
Conduct of Soviet and Russian “Active Measures” before the internet proved challenging, particularly in the West. Soviet agents and paid communist supporters would need to reside in the countries they sought to influence, create a print or radio media outlet or gain a job working at an established platform and evade the scrutiny of Western counterintelligence. But these days, it’s as easy as setting up a Twitter account. Russia influence operations in social media represents a far more effective and efficient return to their “Active Measures” campaign of the Cold War.
And when combined with the alleged hacks of political actors, the promotion of these Incirlik-style stories through overt Russian media outlets and “grey” English speaking propagandists could make for a powerful one-two punch to disrupt the American election. The synchronization of hacking and social media information operations not only has the ability to promote a favored candidate, like Trump, but also has the potential to incite unrest amongst American communities.
Since Incirlik, Trump and Russian media have simultaneously pushed a new theme: the illegitimacy of U.S. elections. The Incirlik disinformation campaign, while a failure, raises the question of Russia’s ability to use social media “Active Measures” to destabilize the American public. #Incirlik wasn’t the first Russian influence effort on social media and it most certainly won’t be the last. To date, there’s been no public U.S. response to alleged Russian hacking or social media information operations. How much longer can the U.S. wait?
