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George Washington University Department of Computer Science has helped develop over the past five years more secure paper ballot technology. Their newest method, called Scantegrity, combines the optical scan technology that more than half of the country will use in November with the option for voters to verify that their ballot was counted.
The university is now trying to market the system.
GWU doctoral student Stefan Popoveniuc, who wrote most of the code for Scantegrity, explained how the technology worked.
Voters use a familiar paper ballot to cast their vote, but they mark their choice with a special invisible ink pen. The pen darkens the bubble next to the chosen candidate so that the ballot can be read by the optical scan machine, but reveals a random two-letter code.
At the bottom of the ballot is a detachable receipt on which the voter can write in the codes of their choices, which are unique to their ballot.
Each receipt has a confirmation number on it, and to verify that the ballot counted, voters log onto a Web site and input the confirmation number. They can also compare their two-letter codes to make sure that their vote was counted in the way that they intended.
"If one of those is wrong, you raise hell. That's your job," said GWU assistant professor of computer science Poorvi Vora.
A highlight of Scantegrity technology is that it allows voters to be a check on the system as well as giving them peace of mind because they can still obtain a manual recount. Voters checking how their votes were counted would help prevent fraud and tabulation errors.
"This is a total paradigm shift from today," Mr. Popoveniuc said. Now, states purchase electronic voting machines, make sure they are certified and implement them, but something could still go wrong.
One of the fiscal benefits of Scantegrity is that it uses technology that many voting districts already have.
"We're not saying 'Out with the old, in with the new.' Keep the old," Mr. Popoveniuc said. Instead of purchasing costly machines, states spend some additional money for the special pens and see almost no increase in paper costs for the ballots.
I like the idea of being able to verify how my vote was counted, later.
I wonder if there is still a way for a crook to change the tabulation.
Washington Times - Electronic voting faces a backlash
"If one of those is wrong, you raise hell. That's your job,"
At the bottom of the ballot is a detachable receipt on which the voter can write in the codes of their choices, which are unique to their ballot. Each receipt has a confirmation number on it, and to verify that the ballot counted, voters log onto a Web site and input the confirmation number.
Good point xsited.
Hmmm. I wonder if that is addressed by the fact that you don't have to check your ballot results, up to you, and of course computer savvy people can put up firewalls before checking their vote etc ....
Dillo - are you saying that raising hell should be someone else's job?
Brazil has the best electronic election system in the world .. open source software .. Linux-based .. cost efficient .. everybody gets to inspect it .. secure .. auditable .. and it's being replicated all over the world.
Brazil migrates voting machines to GNU/Linux - The INQUIRER
Good point xsited.
Hmmm. I wonder if that is addressed by the fact that you don't have to check your ballot results, up to you, and of course computer savvy people can put up firewalls before checking their vote etc ....
Dillo - are you saying that raising hell should be someone else's job?
Linux was my first OS. What they're doing is good, but it can still be hacked. There is no way to make it completely secure, especially if you have access to the box. They also didn't say anything about a paper trail which makes me wonder if it's truly auditable.
