ScreamingEagle
Gold Member
- Jul 5, 2004
- 13,399
- 1,707
- 245
One of the main proposals in the regulatory reforms outlined by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner yesterday would give the Treasury, FDIC and the Fed authority to take control when investment banks or other financial institutions (hedge funds, etc.) appear troubled, just as the FDIC presently does with deposit-taking banks.
The proposal is being offered as a clever political solution to the turf war that might have erupted if the Treasury or FDIC alone were given this quasi-nationalization authority, with no input from the Fed. But the real issue is whether this expansion of regulators' powers is wise. It isn't.
Start with the FDIC's performance in practice. One would suspect that the government might not be a shrewd player in the banking business, and recent events confirm that suspicion. IndyMac, for example, was not taken over by the FDIC until long after it was obvious that it should be closed, and current estimates of the cost to taxpayers approach $10 billion. Shortly after the IndyMac failure, moreover, the FDIC brokered a deal to sell Wachovia to Citigroup at a lowball price and wound up with egg on its face when Wells Fargo emerged with a vastly superior offer. We could continue.
There's also significant room for principled skepticism based on economics and law. Indeed, the case for broadening regulators' oversight to include investment banks and other financial institutions is based on three flawed assumptions.
The first is that the same factors that justify expansive powers to close banks and take control of their assets are equally applicable to investment banks and other financial institutions.
....
The second flawed assumption is that our bankruptcy laws are not adequate for handling defaults by investment banks or other financial institutions.
....
The third flawed assumption is that financial firms flirting with distress are somehow worse decision makers than federal regulators.
Diebold and Skeel Say Timothy Geithner Is Overextending the Regulatory Power of the Fed, Treasury and FDIC - WSJ.com
The proposal is being offered as a clever political solution to the turf war that might have erupted if the Treasury or FDIC alone were given this quasi-nationalization authority, with no input from the Fed. But the real issue is whether this expansion of regulators' powers is wise. It isn't.
Start with the FDIC's performance in practice. One would suspect that the government might not be a shrewd player in the banking business, and recent events confirm that suspicion. IndyMac, for example, was not taken over by the FDIC until long after it was obvious that it should be closed, and current estimates of the cost to taxpayers approach $10 billion. Shortly after the IndyMac failure, moreover, the FDIC brokered a deal to sell Wachovia to Citigroup at a lowball price and wound up with egg on its face when Wells Fargo emerged with a vastly superior offer. We could continue.
There's also significant room for principled skepticism based on economics and law. Indeed, the case for broadening regulators' oversight to include investment banks and other financial institutions is based on three flawed assumptions.
The first is that the same factors that justify expansive powers to close banks and take control of their assets are equally applicable to investment banks and other financial institutions.
....
The second flawed assumption is that our bankruptcy laws are not adequate for handling defaults by investment banks or other financial institutions.
....
The third flawed assumption is that financial firms flirting with distress are somehow worse decision makers than federal regulators.
Diebold and Skeel Say Timothy Geithner Is Overextending the Regulatory Power of the Fed, Treasury and FDIC - WSJ.com