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I understand, Connery, but if even our choice to believe or not to believe is pre-determined by God, how can we say we have free will?
so the fuck what! fact is fact....Great copy/paste Daws
Any original thoughts lately?
The question of free will, moral liberty, or the liberum arbitrium of the Schoolmen, ranks amongst the three or four most important philosophical problems of all time.
I think it is THE prime philosophical topic. It is the reason that God (if It exists) created the natural, rational universe. What other purpose could it serve? What else could God not have done without it?
An interactive God providing revelations and making Itself known to exist would automatically negate any moral free will.
Yes, we are influenced by our genetic heritage, but any of that can be overridden by will....our free will, if that will is strong enough. Yes, any pedophile can summon the will to override his propensities. No, I'm not arguing that actual psychotic meltdowns don't occur.On the one hand, does man possess genuine moral freedom, power of real choice, true ability to determine the course of his thoughts and volitions, to decide which motives shall prevail within his mind, to modify and mould his own character? Or, on the other, are man's thoughts and volitions, his character and external actions, all merely the inevitable outcome of his circumstances? Are they all inexorably predetermined in every detail along rigid lines by events of the past, over which he himself has had no sort of control? This is the real import of the free-will problem.
Well, I believe God is omniscient and knows all, He is the Alpha and the Omega...therefore He knows the future, so He knows all, so He knows whose names will be in the book of Life, when all said and done, before we even think the first thing is done....Christianity teaches God gave us free will and yet at the same time it states God is omniscient/omnipotent. If our destiny or future has been predetermined by God, how can we have free will?
Theological DeterminismI understand, Connery, but if even our choice to believe or not to believe is pre-determined by God, how can we say we have free will?
Where do you get that notion from?
Theological determinism comes in two varieties. The first is based on the notion of foreknowledge: if God is an omniscient being, and if omniscience applies to the future (as well as to the past and present), then the future is known by God. But in that case, the future can only be what God knows it to be. No alternatives are possible. If God knows that it is going to rain tomorrow, then, regardless of what the weather forecast might be, it will definitely rain tomorrow. And if God knows that Jerry Falwell will decide to become an atheist sometime next week, then that is what inevitably must happen.
The second kind of theological determinism follows from the concept of divine preordination: if God is the ultimate cause behind everything, then He has preordained all that will ever occur, and once again there can be no deviation from the future's pre-set pattern. The preordination of the future is by definition a kind of determinism, so there is no arguing against it if one accepts the premise. (This is a type of causal determinism; the first kind of theological determinism is not.)
Theological determinism depends, of course, on whether or not God exists. Since there is no evidence for the existence of a supreme being, this kind of determinism is not logically compelling. And even if one accepts God's existence, it does not necessarily follow that God has preordained the future, or that He his omniscient, or that omniscience applies to the future. But for those with orthodox religious views things are not so simple. The notion of foreknowledge, at least, is essential to the orthodox concept of a supreme being. And yet the orthodox also wish to maintain the existence of free will, and thus reject determinism (though there are exceptions which are "orthodox" enough, e.g. Calvinism).
Now, some argue that knowledge of the future does not necessitate the future in any way: I may know that you are going to do x tomorrow, but that does not mean that you aren't freely choosing to do it. Whether or not this is right depends on how strongly we interpret what it means to have knowledge. If knowledge is supposed to imply certainty, then I cannot know that you are going to do x tomorrow unless I can somehow foretell the future. I may have very good reasons to believe that you will do x, and it may turn out that you will do x. But if it was the case that you might not have done x, then I did not really know.
One may of course use the term "knowledge" in a less strict sense in which the above would no longer apply. But when it comes to God's knowledge, as usually understood, there seems no doubt that it ought to be absolutely certain knowledge. God is after all supposed to be infallible.
Another common attempt to resolve the problem of foreknowledge is to claim that God exists outside of time. From this extra-temporal vantage point, God does not know the future beforehand. There is no "before" or "after" for God. Instead, He observes all of existence — past, present and future — as we observe the present. And as a result, His knowledge of the future is not foreknowledge, and so does not conflict with human freedom.
The "outside of time" argument is not easy to analyze because, so far as I can tell, no one knows what it really means to be outside of time. I believe the best way to tackle the argument is to consider how our situation is changed, if at all, on the supposition that God is in fact extra-temporal. God may be outside of time, but we're not. Now, for us the important thing is whether our future is something which is known. Wherever God is, if He knows our future, then from the vantage point of our present selves the future is in fact known. Our situation therefore has not changed in any way. The important thing is not how God possesses knowledge of the future, but that there is such knowledge. And if the future is in fact known, the conclusion that it is determined is unavoidable.
If the foregoing is not completely satisfactory (for as already mentioned the notion of extra-temporality is rather mysterious, so any discussion involving it is open to varying interpretations), there is another argument along the same lines. God, at least on most orthodox views, supposedly interacts with the world. But if there is such interaction with the world, then it must occur at particular points in time. And at those times, from our perspective, God certainly appears to have knowledge of our future.
Since I reject its premises, I do not accept theological determinism (the argument is valid, but not sound). Theological determinism is nevertheless important in that it reveals an inconsistency between the orthodox notions of foreknowledge and free will.
Theological Determinism
so the fuck what! fact is fact....Great copy/paste Daws
Any original thoughts lately?
My personal opinion is that we all have free will, within certain parameters, here on earth. We can make choices ... there are lessons to learn and it's up to us... otherwise we would be angels and be perfect.
Then again... what do I know![]()
My personal opinion is that we all have free will, within certain parameters, here on earth. We can make choices ... there are lessons to learn and it's up to us... otherwise we would be angels and be perfect.
Then again... what do I know![]()
And at other times it IS fun to watch "coincidences", where just the right people show up at just the right time
![]()
and as I told you before..what you believe is based on a false premise..also given the right motivation you would be willing to blow yourself up, so your point is meaningless.Theological DeterminismWhere do you get that notion from?
Theological determinism comes in two varieties. The first is based on the notion of foreknowledge: if God is an omniscient being, and if omniscience applies to the future (as well as to the past and present), then the future is known by God. But in that case, the future can only be what God knows it to be. No alternatives are possible. If God knows that it is going to rain tomorrow, then, regardless of what the weather forecast might be, it will definitely rain tomorrow. And if God knows that Jerry Falwell will decide to become an atheist sometime next week, then that is what inevitably must happen.
The second kind of theological determinism follows from the concept of divine preordination: if God is the ultimate cause behind everything, then He has preordained all that will ever occur, and once again there can be no deviation from the future's pre-set pattern. The preordination of the future is by definition a kind of determinism, so there is no arguing against it if one accepts the premise. (This is a type of causal determinism; the first kind of theological determinism is not.)
Theological determinism depends, of course, on whether or not God exists. Since there is no evidence for the existence of a supreme being, this kind of determinism is not logically compelling. And even if one accepts God's existence, it does not necessarily follow that God has preordained the future, or that He his omniscient, or that omniscience applies to the future. But for those with orthodox religious views things are not so simple. The notion of foreknowledge, at least, is essential to the orthodox concept of a supreme being. And yet the orthodox also wish to maintain the existence of free will, and thus reject determinism (though there are exceptions which are "orthodox" enough, e.g. Calvinism).
Now, some argue that knowledge of the future does not necessitate the future in any way: I may know that you are going to do x tomorrow, but that does not mean that you aren't freely choosing to do it. Whether or not this is right depends on how strongly we interpret what it means to have knowledge. If knowledge is supposed to imply certainty, then I cannot know that you are going to do x tomorrow unless I can somehow foretell the future. I may have very good reasons to believe that you will do x, and it may turn out that you will do x. But if it was the case that you might not have done x, then I did not really know.
One may of course use the term "knowledge" in a less strict sense in which the above would no longer apply. But when it comes to God's knowledge, as usually understood, there seems no doubt that it ought to be absolutely certain knowledge. God is after all supposed to be infallible.
Another common attempt to resolve the problem of foreknowledge is to claim that God exists outside of time. From this extra-temporal vantage point, God does not know the future beforehand. There is no "before" or "after" for God. Instead, He observes all of existence — past, present and future — as we observe the present. And as a result, His knowledge of the future is not foreknowledge, and so does not conflict with human freedom.
The "outside of time" argument is not easy to analyze because, so far as I can tell, no one knows what it really means to be outside of time. I believe the best way to tackle the argument is to consider how our situation is changed, if at all, on the supposition that God is in fact extra-temporal. God may be outside of time, but we're not. Now, for us the important thing is whether our future is something which is known. Wherever God is, if He knows our future, then from the vantage point of our present selves the future is in fact known. Our situation therefore has not changed in any way. The important thing is not how God possesses knowledge of the future, but that there is such knowledge. And if the future is in fact known, the conclusion that it is determined is unavoidable.
If the foregoing is not completely satisfactory (for as already mentioned the notion of extra-temporality is rather mysterious, so any discussion involving it is open to varying interpretations), there is another argument along the same lines. God, at least on most orthodox views, supposedly interacts with the world. But if there is such interaction with the world, then it must occur at particular points in time. And at those times, from our perspective, God certainly appears to have knowledge of our future.
Since I reject its premises, I do not accept theological determinism (the argument is valid, but not sound). Theological determinism is nevertheless important in that it reveals an inconsistency between the orthodox notions of foreknowledge and free will.
Theological Determinism
Which,as I told you before, is complete bunk, which is why the only people that believe in it are willing to blow themselves up.
My personal opinion is that we all have free will, within certain parameters, here on earth. We can make choices ... there are lessons to learn and it's up to us... otherwise we would be angels and be perfect.
Then again... what do I know![]()
and as I told you before..what you believe is based on a false premise..also given the right motivation you would be willing to blow yourself up, so your point is meaningless.Theological Determinism
Theological determinism comes in two varieties. The first is based on the notion of foreknowledge: if God is an omniscient being, and if omniscience applies to the future (as well as to the past and present), then the future is known by God. But in that case, the future can only be what God knows it to be. No alternatives are possible. If God knows that it is going to rain tomorrow, then, regardless of what the weather forecast might be, it will definitely rain tomorrow. And if God knows that Jerry Falwell will decide to become an atheist sometime next week, then that is what inevitably must happen.
The second kind of theological determinism follows from the concept of divine preordination: if God is the ultimate cause behind everything, then He has preordained all that will ever occur, and once again there can be no deviation from the future's pre-set pattern. The preordination of the future is by definition a kind of determinism, so there is no arguing against it if one accepts the premise. (This is a type of causal determinism; the first kind of theological determinism is not.)
Theological determinism depends, of course, on whether or not God exists. Since there is no evidence for the existence of a supreme being, this kind of determinism is not logically compelling. And even if one accepts God's existence, it does not necessarily follow that God has preordained the future, or that He his omniscient, or that omniscience applies to the future. But for those with orthodox religious views things are not so simple. The notion of foreknowledge, at least, is essential to the orthodox concept of a supreme being. And yet the orthodox also wish to maintain the existence of free will, and thus reject determinism (though there are exceptions which are "orthodox" enough, e.g. Calvinism).
Now, some argue that knowledge of the future does not necessitate the future in any way: I may know that you are going to do x tomorrow, but that does not mean that you aren't freely choosing to do it. Whether or not this is right depends on how strongly we interpret what it means to have knowledge. If knowledge is supposed to imply certainty, then I cannot know that you are going to do x tomorrow unless I can somehow foretell the future. I may have very good reasons to believe that you will do x, and it may turn out that you will do x. But if it was the case that you might not have done x, then I did not really know.
One may of course use the term "knowledge" in a less strict sense in which the above would no longer apply. But when it comes to God's knowledge, as usually understood, there seems no doubt that it ought to be absolutely certain knowledge. God is after all supposed to be infallible.
Another common attempt to resolve the problem of foreknowledge is to claim that God exists outside of time. From this extra-temporal vantage point, God does not know the future beforehand. There is no "before" or "after" for God. Instead, He observes all of existence — past, present and future — as we observe the present. And as a result, His knowledge of the future is not foreknowledge, and so does not conflict with human freedom.
The "outside of time" argument is not easy to analyze because, so far as I can tell, no one knows what it really means to be outside of time. I believe the best way to tackle the argument is to consider how our situation is changed, if at all, on the supposition that God is in fact extra-temporal. God may be outside of time, but we're not. Now, for us the important thing is whether our future is something which is known. Wherever God is, if He knows our future, then from the vantage point of our present selves the future is in fact known. Our situation therefore has not changed in any way. The important thing is not how God possesses knowledge of the future, but that there is such knowledge. And if the future is in fact known, the conclusion that it is determined is unavoidable.
If the foregoing is not completely satisfactory (for as already mentioned the notion of extra-temporality is rather mysterious, so any discussion involving it is open to varying interpretations), there is another argument along the same lines. God, at least on most orthodox views, supposedly interacts with the world. But if there is such interaction with the world, then it must occur at particular points in time. And at those times, from our perspective, God certainly appears to have knowledge of our future.
Since I reject its premises, I do not accept theological determinism (the argument is valid, but not sound). Theological determinism is nevertheless important in that it reveals an inconsistency between the orthodox notions of foreknowledge and free will.
Theological Determinism
Which,as I told you before, is complete bunk, which is why the only people that believe in it are willing to blow themselves up.
My personal opinion is that we all have free will, within certain parameters, here on earth. We can make choices ... there are lessons to learn and it's up to us... otherwise we would be angels and be perfect.
Then again... what do I know![]()
And at other times it IS fun to watch "coincidences", where just the right people show up at just the right time
![]()
What do you mean?
at one time you did breath liquid...My personal opinion is that we all have free will, within certain parameters, here on earth. We can make choices ... there are lessons to learn and it's up to us... otherwise we would be angels and be perfect.
Then again... what do I know![]()
I can't decide to fly without artificial aid, or breathe water, but those aren't really limits on my free will.
whatever you say dear..and as I told you before..what you believe is based on a false premise..also given the right motivation you would be willing to blow yourself up, so your point is meaningless.Which,as I told you before, is complete bunk, which is why the only people that believe in it are willing to blow themselves up.
I bet you couldn't come up with a motivation for me to blow myself up, which proves that all you have is empty words and no idea how to express your ideas.
And at other times it IS fun to watch "coincidences", where just the right people show up at just the right time
![]()
What do you mean?
You've never seen eerie coincidences like a car careening into a canal just as an experienced diver just happened to be coming down that same deserted stretch of road?
Or some such thing.
As a person of faith, I'm always in awe of (what I see as) Him putting people where they're needed at just the right time
then it would not be a coincidence...And at other times it IS fun to watch "coincidences", where just the right people show up at just the right time
![]()
What do you mean?
You've never seen eerie coincidences like a car careening into a canal just as an experienced diver just happened to be coming down that same deserted stretch of road?
Or some such thing.
As a person of faith, I'm always in awe of (what I see as) Him putting people where they're needed at just the right time