Most major battles have a significant degree of luck with it. Midway was not an exception.
The luck in this battle was the confusion the Jap commander had with deciding what to do between pursuing the attack on Midway, defending against a possible attack on his ships or launching a counter attack against the American ships.
He essentially made all the wrong decisions. Had he chose to just defend his ships or launch a counter attack against the American ships immediately the results could have been much different.
The timing of the American attack contributed to the confusion the Japs had and that was not planned.
The Japanese commander was following standard Japanese war tactics doctrine for air craft carrier operations. He was a by-the-book sort of fellow and we knew that.
Military wargaming - Wikipedia
Wargaming thus became a vital means of testing hypothetical strategies and tactics.
[38] Another problem was that by the time America entered
World War 2 in 1941, none of the Navy's senior officers had any meaningful combat experience, but almost all of them had participated in wargames at the Naval War College.
[39] The fact that America defeated Japan in
World War 2, despite these shortcomings, is strong evidence for the value of the wargaming.
After the war, Admiral Nimitz said that the wargames predicted every tactic the Japanese used except for the kamikazes (a somewhat hyperbolic assertion).
[40][41]
The
Naval War College organized two broad classes of wargames: "chart maneuvers", which were strategic-level games; and "board maneuvers", which were tactical-level games. The chart maneuvers were about fleet movements, scouting and screening operations, and supply lines.
[42] The board maneuvers simulated battles in detail, with the aid of model ships. Most of the wargames were played on the floors of lecture halls, as they needed more space than any table could provide.
The two most frequently played scenarios were a war with Japan and a war with Britain. Japan was code-named ORANGE, Britain was code-named RED, and America was code-named BLUE. Neither the students nor the staff at the Naval War College expected a war with Britain.
[43] It's possible that the US Navy didn't imagine getting into any sort of serious naval conflict in the Atlantic with anyone, and that it simulated wars against Britain simply because it saw the
Royal Navy as its role model.
[44] A war with Japan, on the other hand, was a real concern, and as the years passed the wargames were increasingly played against ORANGE.
In case of a war with Japan, the US Navy's grand strategy was to send an armada straight across the Pacific and quickly defeat the Japanese navy in one or two decisive battles.
[45] The wargamers at the College tested this strategy extensively, and it routinely failed. In 1933, the Navy's Research Department reviewed the wargames played from 1927 to 1933 and concluded that the fundamental problem was that the armada over-extended its supply lines.
The BLUE armada would exhaust itself, and ORANGE would recover and counter-attack.[46] After this, the wargamers at the College abandoned the old doctrine and instead developed a more progressive strategy, which involved building a logistics infrastructure in the western Pacific and making alliances with regional countries. By the mid-1930s, the wargames resembled very much what the Navy later experienced in the Pacific War.[47]
The wargames also produced tactical innovations, most notably the "circular formation". In this formation, as it was used in
World War 2, an aircraft carrier was surrounded by concentric circles of cruisers and destroyers. This formation concentrated anti-aircraft fire, and also was easier to maneuver than a
line of battle because all the ships could turn at once with a signal from the central ship. The circular formation was first proposed in September 1922 by
Commander Roscoe C. MacFall. Initially, the wargamers at the College used a battleship as the central ship, but this was eventually supplanted by the aircraft carrier.
Chester Nimitz, who was a fellow student that same year, was impressed by what the circular formation could do, and Nimitz played a pivotal role in making it Navy doctrine.
[48]
Naval Wargames and related stuff: Original Japanese Gaming of Midway, Pt 2 The Fixed Wargame Theory
we learn that Ugaki was concerned about the Nagumo forces plans to deal with the American carriers if they should sortie, which seem to have been dismissed with a content free expression of confidence (one touch of an armoured sleeve) by Genda, air staff officer of the Nagumo force. The naming of Genda here is an amplification of what is in [3] and is attributed to Genda himself. Also on page 35 we have the story about the hits on the AKAGI and KAGA from [3] repeated but with some ambiguity about what the nature of the strike was. On page 36 we learn that in the games the American fleet did not sortie, and this uncharacteristic behaviour was of concern to Genda. The second mention is in chapter 8, but refers only in passing to additional games on May 24th of which there is no real detail (which again mirrors [3]). The final mention is in chapter 40 where the games are referred to as rigged. So in conclusion we find Prange adds very little to Fuchida and Okumiya's account other than the name and exact words of the staff officer who was off hand about how the Nagumo force would cope if the American Carriers appeared on the battle field (the account in Fuchida and Okumiya is not reproduced in the quote above)...
Parshall and Tully begin the narrative on the wargames with a description of an initial run, in the series that started on May 1st, where the American carriers sortied early and hit three of the Japanese Carriers. This initial round was ruled impossible (presumably because the Americans sortied before they could have on the basis of reconnaissance from Midway) see note 1.
Through repeated simulations both we and the Japanese found that an early sorte by American carriers would ruin the Japanese battle plan and cause a catastrophic loss of carriers for the Japanese. Retrofitting the Yorktown to be sea worthy post haste just sealed the deal.
All of this was not only very predictable but was predicted recurring outcomes IF our carriers left harbor early, and we did because the Japanese had no idea that we broke their code and knew what they planned to do with fairly accurate prognostics.
None of this has a damned thing to do with luck. Winners plan for the unexpected and go into confrontations with lots of 'hole cards' to play, while losers go in with predetermined outcomes and ignore bad signals that should cause them to revise their plans.
The US Navy was a winner back then, but the Pink Mafia has probably changed all that.