Could George W. Bush Be Right?

[onedomino]

From a German commentator (he must not be too popular in the office):

SPIEGEL ONLINE - February 23, 2005, 06:39 PM
Bush in Germany
Could George W. Bush Be Right?
By Claus Christian Malzahn in Berlin

URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,343378,00.html

Germany loves to criticize US President George W. Bush's Middle East policies -- just like Germany loved to criticize former President Ronald Reagan. But Reagan, when he demanded that Gorbachev remove the Berlin Wall, turned out to be right. Could history repeat itself?

Many Germans don't like President George W. Bush and like to criticize his foreign policy. But could Bush be right?

Quick quiz. He was re-elected as president of the United States despite being largely disliked in the world -- particularly in Europe. The Europeans considered him to be a war-mongerer and liked to accuse him of allowing his deep religious beliefs to become the motor behind his foreign policy. Easy right?

Actually, the answer isn't as obvious as it might seem. President Ronald Reagan's visit to Berlin in 1987 was, in many respects, very similar to President George W. Bush's visit to Mainz on Wednesday. Like Bush's visit, Reagan's trip was likewise accompanied by unprecedented security precautions. A handpicked crowd cheered Reagan in front of the Brandenburg Gate while large parts of the Berlin subway system were shut down. And the Germany Reagan was traveling in, much like today's Germany, was very skeptical of the American president and his foreign policy. When Reagan stood before the Brandenburg Gate -- and the Berlin Wall -- and demanded that Gorbachev "tear down this Wall," he was lampooned the next day on the editorial pages. He is a dreamer, wrote commentators. Realpolitik looks different.

But history has shown that it wasn't Reagan who was the dreamer as he voiced his demand. Rather, it was German politicians who were lacking in imagination -- a group who in 1987 couldn't imagine that there might be an alternative to a divided Germany. Those who spoke of reunification were labelled as nationalists and the entire German left was completely uninterested in a unified Germany.

When George W. Bush requests that Chancellor Schroeder -- who, by the way, was also not entirely complimentary of Reagan's 1987 speech -- and Germany become more engaged in the Middle East, everybody on the German side will nod affably. But despite all of the sugar coating the trans-Atlantic relationship has received in recent days, Germany's foreign policy depends on differentiating itself from the United States. (There are other foreign policies like this: Canada, Spain, France, Greece, Belguim, to name a few other members of the club.) And when Bush leaves Europe, the differences will remain. Indeed, Bush's idea of a Middle Eastern democracy imported at the tip of a bayonet is, for Schroeder's Social Democratic Party and his coalition partner the Green Party, the hysterical offspring off the American neo-cons. Even German conservatives find the idea that Arabic countries could transform themselves into enlightened democracies somewhat absurd.

This, in fact, is likely the largest point of disagreement between Europe and the United States -- and one that a President John Kerry likely would not have made smaller: Europeans today -- just like the Europeans of 1987 -- cannot imagine that the world might change. Maybe we don't want the world to change, because change can, of course, be dangerous. But in a country of immigrants like the United States, one actually pushes for change. In Mainz today, the stagnant Europeans came face to face with the dynamic Americans. We Europeans always want to have the world from yesterday, whereas the Americans strive for the world of tomorrow.

During the Cold War, these differences were covered up by clearly shared security and political interests; now, the gaps are becoming visible. The two continents will continue to drift apart despite all of the smiles exchanged today in Mainz, yesterday in Brussels and tomorrow in Bratislava.

It was difficult not to cringe during Reagan's speech in 1987. He didn't leave a single Berlin cliché out of his script. At the end of it, most experts agreed that his demand for the removal of the Wall was inopportune, utopian and crazy.

Yet three years later, East Germany had disappeared from the map. Gorbachev had a lot to do with it, but it was the East Germans who played the larger role. When analysts are confronted by real people, amazing things can happen. And maybe history can repeat itself. Maybe the people of Syria, Iran or Jordan will get the idea in their heads to free themselves from their oppressive regimes just as the East Germans did. When the voter turnout in Iraq recently exceeded that of many Western nations, the chorus of critique from Iraq alarmists was, at least for a couple of days, quieted. Just as quiet as the chorus of Germany experts on the night of Nov. 9, 1989 when the Wall fell.

Just a thought for Old Europe to chew on: Bush might be right, just like Reagan was then.

 

[Annie]

onedomino, I think this is so right on. The whole problem with GW from the beginning is that what he said grated on all ears. Time after time he's been right, worse than that, he keeps getting things done-here and abroad. They are going into breakdown time.

 

[Annie]

Commentary and analysis on the Speigel article from WSJ:

http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006342

In Reagan's Footsteps
Europe decides that Bush may be right after all.

Friday, February 25, 2005 12:01 a.m.

Visits by U.S. Presidents to Europe tend to have a template-making quality: Wilson, the peace maker, in Paris, 1919; Truman, the victor, at Potsdam, 1945; Kennedy, the stalwart, in Berlin, 1963; Reagan, the visionary, in Berlin, 1987. If President Bush's trip this week has some kind of new theme, the word for it is probably conciliation. But our sense is that Mr. Bush is really following in Reagan's footsteps.
Admittedly, this thought is not original: Der Spiegel beat us to it. Still, it says something that the leftish German newsweekly, which two years ago devoted an entire cover story to advancing the "Blood for Oil" thesis about U.S. ambitions in the Middle East, has gingerly raised the question, "Could Bush Be Right?"

"The Germany Reagan was traveling in, much like today's Germany, was very skeptical of the American president and his foreign policy," Der Spiegel writes. "When Reagan stood before the Brandenburg Gate--and the Berlin Wall--and demanded that Gorbachev 'tear down this Wall,' he was lampooned the next day on the editorial pages. He is a dreamer, wrote commentators. . . . But history has shown that it wasn't Reagan who was the dreamer as he voiced his demand. Rather, it was German politicans who were lacking in imagination--a group who in 1987 couldn't imagine that there might be an alternative to a divided Germany."

It is doubtful that Der Spiegel would have made these observations had Mr. Bush's visit taken place just before Iraq's election rather than just after. And we suspect most of the magazine's editors would dearly have preferred to see a President Kerry.

But events have a way of imposing both discipline and clarity. For much of Europe, the idea that President Bush is the real and legitimate face of America came a few years late. But it has come, as has the realization that a hopeful era is dawning in the Middle East thanks to U.S. "unilateralism" and force of arms. In this sense, the purpose of Mr. Bush's trip isn't to present himself anew to Europe. It is to allow European leaders--France's Jacques Chirac, Germany's Gerhard Schroeder and Russia's Vladimir Putin--to present themselves anew to Mr. Bush.

Partly this reflects political facts: Contrary to expectation a year ago (and with the qualified exception of Spain), the leaders who supported the war in Iraq have all been returned to office, while Messrs. Chirac, Putin and Schroeder languish in polls.

Partly, too, it reflects the realities of power. Europe, collectively and in its several parts, requires a functioning relationship with the U.S. to secure its vital interests. The same cannot be said of America's requirements of Europe. President Bush was gracious when he acknowledged the willingness of Germany and France to contribute to the training of Iraqi policemen. But the one (yes, one) French officer now detailed to the task will probably not turn the tide of war.

Probably the most important component is that President Bush's vision of spreading democracy--of getting to the "tipping point" where tyrannies start to crumble--seems not only to be working but also winning some unexpected converts. Just ask the Lebanese who are suddenly restive under Syrian occupation. As a result, European politicians are in a poorer position to lecture this President about the true ways of the world.





This isn't to say that Mr. Bush can or should be indifferent to the attitudes of his European counterparts. They have agreed to put differences about Iraq behind them, which is good. The U.S., France and Germany also seem to be reasonably united in their concern about Russia's imperial pretensions and attenuated civil liberties. But potentially larger differences loom before them, above all over the nuclearization of Iran and the lifting of the post-Tiananmen arms embargo to China.
In each case, fundamental U.S. strategic interests--the security of Taiwan and Israel; the sovereignty of Iraq; naval supremacy in the Persian Gulf--stand at odds either with European commercial interests or ideological hobbyhorses (the French infatuation with "multipolarity"). If smoother diplomacy, both public and private, can avert another Iraq-style eruption without compromising U.S. interests, so much the better.

Then again, if Europe continues to demand a high price for its political favors, the Bush Administration would do well to shop for partners and ad hoc coalitions elsewhere. America's cultural links to Europe may be precious, but there is no law of nature or history that requires both sides of the Atlantic to act in concert. To the extent that Europeans continue to value the relationship, it is up to them to demonstrate it, chiefly by not acting as freelancers or spoilers in areas of vital U.S. concern.

Still, there are reasons to be sanguine about the future of trans-Atlantic relations. We are in no doubt that most European hearts thrilled to the sight of Iraqi voters going to the polls last month, suggesting that, whatever Europe and America's political or ideological differences, we remain alike in our innermost values and aspirations. Nor do we believe our world views are so divided that persuasion and compromise are impossible. Pundits may differ as to whether Mr. Bush and his European counterparts planted the seeds for a better relationship. What's sure is that they were planting on fertile soil.

 

[Adam's Apple]

Great articles on the topic of "Was Bush Right?" or "Was Bush Wrong?" Seems more and more that he was right, and that the war in Iraq has lit a match under the other countries in the Middle East wanting to be free of their dictatorial forms of government.

I thought it ironic that the Spiegel Online writer stated: "Europeans today -- just like the Europeans of 1987 -- cannot imagine that the world might change. Maybe we don't want the world to change, because change can, of course, be dangerous." The greatet change that the European continent has ever known--the establishment of the European Union--is currently taking place right now. Are the people in Europe ready for such a drastic change on their own continent? The establishment of the European Union is definitely going to turn the Europeans' world upside down. They will be forced to let go of their individual cultures and become one unified country. It remains to be seen how this change will affect them and the entire world in the years ahead.