CHINA: Desperation, Despair and Nuclear Threats
July 19, 2005: Chinese officials have admitted that they want to obtain foreign military technology, rather than trying to develop the latest stuff in China. This is a very practical approach to closing the gap between what China has (a lot of stuff based on tech that is several decades out of date), and what it needs to compete with potential foes like America, Japan, Taiwan, India or Russia.
July 17 2005: The main opposition party in Taiwan, the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), has elected a new leader that is even more enthusiastic about developing closer relations with China. The KMT was the loser in a long civil war with the communists, and fled mainland China for Taiwan in 1947. Recently, the KMT lost control of Taiwan, to a party backed by the majority of Taiwanese (who are native to Taiwan, not descended from the refugees the KMT brought to Taiwan in the late 1940s.) China hopes to negotiate a union deal with the KMT, although most Taiwanese are more interested in independence.
July 14, 2005: For the second time, since 1999, that a Chinese general has said, openly, that China would use nuclear weapons against the United States if China found itself fighting American forces in some future war. The most likely source of conflict would be American intervention during a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan. The major general who made the comment was an instructor at China's senior defense institution (National Defence University). This is the kind of place where China's brightest military minds develop strategies for future wars. The decision to use nukes is an admission that China believes its conventional forces would not be able to deal with intervention by American air force and navy units. The only catch with this threat is that, at the moment, China doesn't really have any reliable way to deliver a nuclear weapon to the United States. So the threat bespeaks desperation as much as an admission of military inferiority. As happened in 1999, the government later downplayed, but did not deny, the nuclear weapons comment.
http://www.strategypage.com//fyeo/qndguide/default.asp?target=CHINA.HTM
July 19, 2005: Chinese officials have admitted that they want to obtain foreign military technology, rather than trying to develop the latest stuff in China. This is a very practical approach to closing the gap between what China has (a lot of stuff based on tech that is several decades out of date), and what it needs to compete with potential foes like America, Japan, Taiwan, India or Russia.
July 17 2005: The main opposition party in Taiwan, the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), has elected a new leader that is even more enthusiastic about developing closer relations with China. The KMT was the loser in a long civil war with the communists, and fled mainland China for Taiwan in 1947. Recently, the KMT lost control of Taiwan, to a party backed by the majority of Taiwanese (who are native to Taiwan, not descended from the refugees the KMT brought to Taiwan in the late 1940s.) China hopes to negotiate a union deal with the KMT, although most Taiwanese are more interested in independence.
July 14, 2005: For the second time, since 1999, that a Chinese general has said, openly, that China would use nuclear weapons against the United States if China found itself fighting American forces in some future war. The most likely source of conflict would be American intervention during a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan. The major general who made the comment was an instructor at China's senior defense institution (National Defence University). This is the kind of place where China's brightest military minds develop strategies for future wars. The decision to use nukes is an admission that China believes its conventional forces would not be able to deal with intervention by American air force and navy units. The only catch with this threat is that, at the moment, China doesn't really have any reliable way to deliver a nuclear weapon to the United States. So the threat bespeaks desperation as much as an admission of military inferiority. As happened in 1999, the government later downplayed, but did not deny, the nuclear weapons comment.
http://www.strategypage.com//fyeo/qndguide/default.asp?target=CHINA.HTM
