Can Democracy Be Forced?

[newsports]

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/07/international/middleeast/07PREX.html

Can Democracy Be Forced?

Many have argued since the lead up into war with Iraq, that the objective for the US in that war torn region of the world has very little to do with freeing the people of those tyrannical regimes for peace sake, but in an effort to further champion the Democratic cause.

In a search of the American Heritage dictionary is says that Democracy is "1. Government by the people, exercised either directly or through elected representatives." Which would lead one to understand that in order to achive a Democratic governance you "the people" must first achive a Democratic governace.

Democracy seems to be a state that must be gained "by the people". To be given Democracy is in essence mearly exchanging one ruler for another. In Iraq we do see the budding of a democratic movement but as many have feared the outcome of that movement may not be in the best interest of the Western world.

The idea that the American government can create, force, or promote a truely democratic nation within Iraq is pure non-sense. A oil rich majority Shiite nation Iraq, living side by side with another oil rich shiite nation Iran, is clearly a recipe for disaster to the western world. The US through its actions before during and since the end of major combat in Iraq attest to the fact that a Shiite dominated Iraq will not be allowed to develop.

Yet isnt that what democracy is? Allowing the people, in this case a muslim people to make their own choices, to find their own destiny without a over seer over seeing?

It seems that had communism won out during the cold war Russia would be slowly converting the worlds democracies into communist regimes, "Castro would have been in Central Park watching the execution trials of democratic leaders" (Chris Matthews Hardball). But since Democracy won the US and its allies are force feeding the ideals of Democracy down the throats of the collective world.

The problem with this is that Democracy cannot be forced, and if it is it is not a democracy. Chalabi one of the 25 Iraqi governing council members clearly was chosen to represent the American interest in his reign as the new Iraqi leader. But the people of Iraq did not accept Chalabi once the US brought him in. That is an example of pure Democracy. "New York Times Blue Print For A Mess"(http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/magazine/02IRAQ.html)

Now the Bush administration is attempting to use the entire hand picked council of former Iraqi exiles as a puppet government ( see Hamid Karizai). They will succeed in creating a new Iraq but without free and open elections from top to bottom they will not have created a democracy but another form of dictatorship.


"If the people are sufficiently intimidated ,if the popular organizations are sufficiently destroyed, if the people have it beaten into their heads that either they accept the rule of those with the guns or else they live and die in unrelieved misery, then your elections will all come out the way you want." -Noam Chomsky 'Secrets, lies and democracy'


Can Democracy be forced?

 

[spillmind]

i still argue that if there were at true 'democratically' elected leader, he would be assasinated.

 

[NightTrain]

I've said it a hundred times, it's been done before by the USA & Allies.

Germany, Japan & Italy.

i still argue that if there were at true 'democratically' elected leader, he would be assasinated.

Why? What basis do you have for believing this? Surely you aren't insinuating that the Arabs are intellectually incapable of enjoying a democracy...? Or that they can't observe the rule of law?

 

[newsports]

I dont know for sure but I beleive his argument is that any elected official chosen free of and not later subject to soft money, kick backs , favors of special interest groups , corporate, government, or organizational interest, would not be in the pockets of the controllers thus making him or her a free thinker a independent voice among the borg. A futile effort indeed.

"Any form of concentrated power doesn't want to be subjected to popular democratic control or, for that matter, to market discipline. Thats why powerful sectors, including coporate wealth are naturally opposed to functioning democracy...."

-Noam Chomsky "Secrets, Lies, and Democracy"

 

[dijetlo]

>>Germany, Japan & Italy.<<
We had the advantage of the "Red Menace" to push those people towards us. The choice wasn't US or Self-Rule. It was US or the USSR. (On the bright side, I think they chose wisely.)

 

[NightTrain]

I'll agree that the Soviets were indeed a major factor in the German picture - the vast majority of Germans knew the Soviets were bad news & tried to surrender to the Americans & Brits for fear of retribution by the Russians.

I'll have to research this, but I don't believe that Italy was influenced at all by the Soviets, that front was wrapped up long before the Soviets were even remotely close.

Japan certainly had nothing to fear from them. While Russia did declare war on Japan, it was symbolic & was done roughly around the time that they were nuked into submission.

 

[dijetlo]

>>Japan certainly had nothing to fear from them.<<
Russia and Japan are still wrangling over ownership of islands in the sea of Japan. You might also consider in '45 that the USSR block included China. After the atrocities committed by Japan on the chinese during WWII, inclusion in the Soviet block would have meant ansering for those acts.

>> I don't believe that Italy was influenced at all by the Soviets, that front was wrapped up long before the Soviets were even remotely close. <<
Italy in 43
"Italy has laid down her arms. The immediate and unconditional surrender was announced today by General Eisenhower." (September 8, 1943)
On September 3, 1943, the Allies began their invasion of mainland Italy, and the Italian government of Marshal Pietro Badoglio secretly agreed to surrender to the Allies. Italy's government had recently deposed Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini and had no desire to continue a war that the Axis would apparently lose. In order to delay the regrouping of German forces in Italy, public announcement of the capitulation was not made until September 8. By the time Italy completed its volte-face and declared war against Germany on October 13, the Germans had seized control of Rome and most of central and northern Italy.<<
At the end of the war, the Italians were allies, we didn't occupy them though we did pressure them for de-fascification of their government. I

 

[Bry]

Actually, the record shows that the Japanese tried to surrender to Russia. We nixed that idea by dropping a couple of nukes.

 

[dijetlo]

Wow, I never read about that, you got a link? I ran a quick search and came up with a US intelligence report from 1945 that suggests the Japanese were trying to diplomaticaly keep the russians out of the war as well as reports of Japanese military surrenders to russian officers in areas like China and North Korea but the russians did not enter the war against Japan until 2 days after the first atomic bomb was dropped

 

[Bry]

This is what the Encyclopedia Britannica (1959 edition) has to say: "After the fall of Okinawa [on June 21, 1945], [Japanese Prime Minister] Suzuki's main objective was to get Japan out of the war on the best possible terms, though that could not be announced to the general public... Unofficial peace feelers were transmitted through Switzerland and Sweden... Later the Japanese made a formal request to Russia to aid in bringing hostilities to an end."

The Britannica then completes its coverage by saying that Russia rebuffed the Japanese overtures because it didn't want the war to end before it was scheduled to invade the northern areas occupied by Japan. What the Britannica fails to mention is that these Japanese overtures were known to Washington because the dispatches between Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo and Japanese Ambassador Sato in Moscow were intercepted by the United States.

The entire affair is documented in the Hoover Library volume Japan's Decision to Surrender, by Robert J.C. Butlow (Stanford University, 1954). Butlow quotes the dispatch that was received and decoded in Washington on July 13, 1945:"Togo to Sato...Convey His Majesty's strong desire to secure a termination of the war...Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace." These requests continued through July.

Butlow documents that Washington knew the one "condition" insisted upon by the Japanese government was the continuation of the emperor on his throne and the symbolic recognition this implied of the Japanese home islands as a political entity. As it turned out this was exactly the "condition" that was granted when the peace was finally signed after the A-bombings August 6 and 9.

If the U.S. government knew as early as July 13 that the leading circles in Japan were seeking peace on those terms, why didn't it pursue this possibility for peace instead of ignoring it and proceeding with the A-bombings? There is simply no satisfactory answer to this question from the point of view of the military demands of ending the war - even on U.S. imperialist terms - and saving soldiers' lives.

I don't like the source much, it is well referenced. I guess you'll have to try to find the Butlow book. Here's the link:
http://www.themilitant.com/1995/5929/5929_20.html

 

[Bry]

Here's another link that mentions the content of the same telegram from Tokyo to the Moscow embassy, without noting a source of specifics.

http://www.peacewire.org/photoexhibits/Hiroshima/articles/cleanse1.html

 

[Bry]

Here, this one is good. i kept looking because I didn't like the first two sources.

http://www.historians.org/archive/hiroshima/190645.html

(Secret Diary)

JAPANESE PEACE FEELER

13 July 1945

The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today through intercepted messages from Togo, Foreign Minister, to Sato, Jap Ambassador in Moscow, instructing the latter to see Molotov if possible before his departure for the Big Three meeting and if not then immediately afterward to lay before him the Emperor's strong desire to secure a termination of the war. This he said arose not only out of the Emperor's interest in the welfare of his own subjects but out of his interest toward mankind in general. He was anxious he said to see cessation of bloodshed on both sides. Togo said to convey to the Russians the fact that they wanted to remain at peace with Russia, that the Japanese did not desire permanent annexation of any of the territories they had conquered in Manchuria. Togo said further that the unconditional surrender terms of the Allies was about the only thing in the way of termination of the war and he said that if this were insisted upon of course the Japanese would have to continue to fight.

Sato's response to the above messages was to protest that the proposals were quite unrealistic; looked at objectively it was clear that there was no chance now of dividing Russia from the other Allies, that the Agreement on Poland, on Chapultepec, and the Conference at San Francisco showed that England, Russia and the United States were determined to act in concert. Togo's response was that regardless of Sato's views, he still desired him to carry out his instructions.


JAPANESE PEACE FEELER

15 July 1945

Messages today on Japanese-Russian conversations. Togo, Foreign Minister, insisted that Sato present to Molotov the request of the Emperor himself Sato's replies insistently pointed out the lack of reality in Togo's apparent belief that there is a chance of persuading Russia to take independent action on the Eastern war. He stated very bluntly and without any coating how fantastic is the hope that Russia would be impressed by Japanese willingness to give up territory which she had already lost. He kept repeating that the Russians were completely realistic themselves and would be impressed by no gestures of this character. He said the only hope for Molotov's receiving a special envoy to Russia was if he presented the suggestion on the basis that the envoy would have a message to present from the Emperor of a totally different character than what had been contemplated in the Japanese similar proposal of a year ago to send a special envoy. He finally in his latest message said that he had made such representations to Molotov without further checking with his home office because of the imminent departure of Molotov and Stalin for Berlin. He had to do this through Lusofsky, Molotov's deputy, who apparently was quite non-committal in his response. Throughout Sato's message ran a note of cold and realistic evaluation of Japan's position; and he said that the situation was rapidly passing beyond the point of Japan's and Russia's cooperating in the security of Asia but rather whether there would be any Manchukuo or even Japan itself left as entities. The gist of his final messages was that it was clear that Japan was thoroughly and completely defeated and that the only course open was quick and definite action recognizing such fact. One gathered from the context that what he meant was that any hope of reliance on Russia was completely without substantial foundation; that Russia could not afford any appearance of desertion of her Anglo-American Allies, and, second, that it was clear from Soong's current conversations with Molotov that Japan was practically facing the stark reality of being without a friend in the world.

It is significant that these conversations began before there could have been much effect from the thousand-plane raids of the Third Fleet and several days before the Naval bombardment of Kamaishi.


JAPANESE PEACE FEELER

24 July 1945

Ten days ago Sato, who was Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, began sending messages to Tokyo in response to direction from the Japanese Foreign Office to explore the possibilities of using the Russians as intermediaries for peace. Sato's response was in effect that such an attempt would be quite naive, that Russia was in a position vis-a'-vis England and the United States where she could not afford anything even to imply a separation of viewpoint or objective. To go, the Japanese Foreign Minister, kept returning to the point and insisting that Sato tell Molotov of the Japanese desire to send Prince Konoye as a special envoy. Sato asked to see Molotov but was put off with Lusofsky, who was non-committal. He finally did see Molotov who was equally non-committal and said that all Russia could do would be to listen to any message which Japan wished to send.

Finally, on the first of July, Sato sent a long message outlining what he conceived to be Japan's position, which was in brief that she was now entirely alone and friendless and could look for succor from no one, that she was being exposed to continuous attack which might result in her practical extinction as a nation. He strongly advised accepting any terms, including unconditional surrender, on the basis that this was the only way of preserving the entity of the Emperor and the State itself.

He finally concluded by implying that he realized what he was saying might not be welcomed by the Government at home but that his conscience still forced him to send the message. The response to his message was that the Cabinet in council had weighed all the considerations which he had raised and that their final judgment and decision was that the war must be fought with all the vigor and bitterness of which the nation was capable so long as the only alternative was _ the unconditional surrender.


SURRENDER

26 July 1945

In the past days Sato in Moscow has been sending in the strongest language to the Foreign Office at Tokyo his urgent advice for Japan to surrender unconditionally. Each time the Foreign Minister, Togo, responds by saying that they want Sato to arrange for the Russians to receive Prince Konoye as a special representative of the Emperor to Moscow. Sato's persistent reply to these messages was that this is a futile hope, that there is no possibility of splitting the concert of action now existing between Great Britain, the United States and Russia. He constantly uses the most deferential language, such as "I stand in respectful awe of his Imperial Highness, but"-we must face the hard fact that Japan is thoroughly beaten and that unless we act in consonance with that fact the state may disappear as a political entity in the modern world.



Diary of James V. Forestal, Secretary of the Navy. Source: Forrestal Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

 

[dijetlo]

I wasn't aware of any of that, thanks Bry. I'll stand by my original statement which was that the USA was Japans choice over the USSR, though their use of the Russians as a diplomatic channel tends to discount this somewhat (but why let an inconvenient fact spoil a perfectly good argument, right?)

 

[Bry]

jejeje. okay, but what the information makes clear is that Japan specifically tried to negotiate a separate peace with the Russians because the "unconditional surrender" demanded by the Americans would have left Hirohito at risk of war trials (which were already starting in Nuremburg). But don't let that stop you.

 

[dijetlo]

I never addressed your core argument (necessity of Hiroshima in ending the war with Japan, I was grinding my own axe. Sorry, I forgot about yours.)
What did we gain, since the terms of the Japanese surrender didn’t improve with the weapons use?
Instant fear from the USSR jumps to mind. We were involved in the beginnings of the cold war at that time, Berlin was blockaded, the communists in China were running the last warlords onto Taiwan, the Zionists were attacking the British in Palestine later forcing the creation of the state of Israel, and the French were attempting to regain control of the colonies (having just suffered imperious interruptus at the hands of the Germans). It was a damn handy to have the worlds only nuke (for three years).
Now does that offset the suffering we inflicted and the karma we must carry as the only nation in the history of the world to have used fission to inflict mass civilian casualties (arguably the single greatest act of terrorism in the history of the earth)? I’ve got to admit I’m ambivalent. I can’t see the future that didn’t involve use of the weapon, but it appears to be littered with pitfalls we avoided since it was not necessary for us to demonstrate our military capability or to actively oppose the soviet military every time it took a provocative posture.

 

[rtm]

It wouldn't matter anyway, if they did elect one of their own people democratically, the United States would just go and assassinate him. It's happened before in Central and South America, and they'd do it just so insure their little middle east democracy

 

[AtlantaWalter]

Sure it can!! Like the way we forced it on post-war Germany, in total violation of the Atlantic Charter. Just tell the poor country you are trying to help "we want you to be just like us except there will be no freedom of speech and you have to have the type of government we tell you to have"!!!!

 

[jimnyc]

Welcome to the board, Walter.

 

[Bry]

Sorry, dijet. I think I've lost you. There's not a single historian that's seen the information available that thinks the A-bomb was necessary, or even that it might have appeared necessary to the administration. And if an Abomb isn't NECESSARY in capital letters, then its damn sure to be the worst single criminal terrorist act in history. x2.

 

[dijetlo]

>>Sorry, dijet. I think I've lost you. <<
I was trying to justify the use of the A-bomb, though even with hindsight it is difficult to make a case that the advantages of using the bomb was greater than the onus we have to bear for being the only country to have ever used a nuke.
>> its damn sure to be the worst single criminal terrorist act in history. x2.<<
In WWII we routinely bombed civilian targets in an effort to influence public sentiment in the target countries (so did our adversarys) which is another way to say we used terrorism to defeat the axis. The firebombing of Dresden killed a quarter of a million Germans, more died than in the Hiroshima bomb.