FINDING #1: In the months before the attacks on September 11,2012, the IC provided ample strategic warning that the security situatiol) in ea$t~tll LibY3was deteri()rating and that tJ~S. facilities and personnel were at risk,:in ~Q~ngJJazi~ _ _ _ __ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ ~ The IC produced hundreds of analytic reports in the months preceding the September 11-12, 2012, attacks, providing strategic warning that militias and terrorist and affiliated groups had the capability and intent to strike U.S. and Western facilities and personnel in Libya. For example: • On June 12, 2012, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced a report entitled, "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests." The report noted recent attacks against the U.S. Mission compound in Benghazi,
the growing ties between al-Qa'ida (AQ) regional nodes and Libya-based expect more anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in eastern due to the terrorists' greater presence terrorists conducting more ambush and lED attacks as well as more threats against ,4) • On June 18, 2012, the Pentagon's Joint Staff produced a slide in its daily intelligence report entitled, "(U) Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya." In the slide, the Joint Staff assessed: support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment. Attacks will also increase in nt~mber and lethality as terrorists connect with AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern will • become a safe haven by the end of • On July 6, 2012, CIA produced a report entitled, "Libya: Al-Qa'ida Establishing Sanctuary." In the report, CIA stated: "AI-Qa'ida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach. This year, Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and ai-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have conducted training, built communication networks, and
facilitated extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of eastern Libya."45 • On August 19, 2012, the Pentagon's Joint Staff produced a slide in its daily intelligence report entitled, "(U) Libya: Terrorists to Increase Strength During Next Six Months." In the slide, the Joint Staff stated: "There are no near-term prospects for a reversal in the trend towards a terrorist safe haven in Libya, and areas of eastern Libya will likely become a broader safe haven by the end of 2012. The conditions in Libya will allow terrorists to increase attacks against Western and Libyan interests in the country, as well as attempt attacks in the region and possibly Europe in the next six moilths."46 • On September 5, 2012, AFRICOM produced a Theater Analysis Report entitled, "(U) Libya: Extremism in Li and Future." The report contained a map showing how are actively exploiting the open operating environment in Libya." (The map is located in Appendix IV of this report). The report also noted: "Disarray in Libya's security services, and a likely focus by authorities on pursuit of Qadhafi loyalists is likely allowing jihadists in Libya freedom to recruit, train, and facilitate the movement of fighters and weapons. The threat to Western and U.S. interests and individuals remains high, particularly in northeastLibya."47 2012, DIA produced ~ .-o"r"" ' that stated:
State Department officials, including Ambassador Stevens, were aware of, and had regular access to, threat reporting on Libya. According to DCM Greg Hicks, he and Ambassador Stevens read the · the ClA and communicated with the other intelligence officials on a daily basts. · of and As part of this regular interaction, the Ambassador was provided with an intelligence "read book," which would include information on the security situation and terrorism issues. The read book was also supplied to the Embassy's RS0.50 As the Accountability Review Board found, there were at least 20 security incidents involving the Temporary Mission Facility, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and third-country nationals and diplomats in the Benghazi area in the months leading up to the September 11, 20 12, attacks. 51 The
Intelligence Community reported on several ofthese incidents in finished intelligence products prior to the September 11, 2012, attacks, including:52•53•54•55 e April 6, 2012-A small lED was thrown over the wall of the Temporary Mission Facility. • April 10, 20 12-An explosive device was thrown at a convoy in Benghazi carrying the head of the UN mission to Libya. • May 22, 2012-The ICRC building in Benghazi was attacked with RPGs. The Omar Abdul Rahman Brigade56 claimed responsibility for the attack, according to press, social media, and other intelligence. • June 6, 2012-An lED exploded near the main gate of the Mission facility in Benghazi, creating a 9x1Z foot hole in the exterior wall. The Omar Abdul Rahman Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack, according to press reporting and a web forum. • June 8, 2012-Two hand grenades were placed under two parked UK diplomatic vehicles in Sabha (800 km south of Benghazi). • June 11, 20 12-Unknown assailants using two RPGs and small-arms attacked a three-vehicle convoy in Benghazi carrying the British Ambassador.
June 12, 2012-The ICRC building in Misratah57 was attacked by either an RPG or bomb. • July 17, 2012-Unknown assailants attacked with small arms a threevehicle, armored UN convoy as it left Damah (250 km east of Benghazi). e July 29, 2012-A number ofiEDs are found and defused at the Tibesti Hotel in Benghazi. The Tibesti Hotel is frequented by foreign diplomats and businessmen and was previously used by Ambassador Stevens as a base of operations. • August 1, 20 12-The former regime military intelligence building in Benghazi was bombed. • August 5, 2012-Unknown assailants attacked the ICRC building in Misratah. ICRC facilities in Misratah and Benghazi were attacked fout times between May and August, usually with RPGs.58 • August 6, 2012-Two U.S. military personnel in diplomatic vehicles were forced off the road and attacked near Tripoli. In the months prior to the attack, Ambassador Stevens and other State Department officials in Libya outlined concerns via cables to State Department headquarters about the security of the Mission compound in Benghazi and made several requests for additional security resources. For example: • On June6, 2012, Stevens recommended the creation of ~teams, made up of locally hired personnel, in Benghazi and Tripoli. The State Department attempted to create a team in Tripoli, but was unable to · difficult to find and clear appropriate team was never created in Benghazi, ua•,.,a•uv• s recommendation.
On July 9, 2012, Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters requesting a minimum of 13 "Temporary Duty" (TDY) U.S. security personnel for Libya, which he said could be made up of DS agents, DoD Site Security Team (SST) personnel, or_some combination ofthe two.61 These TDY security personnel were needed to meet the requested security posture in Tripoli and Benghazi. The State Department never fulfilled this request and, according to Eric Nordstrom, State Department headquarters never responded to the request with a cable.62 e In an August 16, 2012, cable to State headquarters, Stevens raised additional concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi following an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting held on August 15, 2012, in Benghazi. The EAC is an interagency group convened periodically in U.S. embassies and other facilities in response to emergencies or security matters. ~n this case, the head State Department officer in Benghazi, ca11ed the Principal Officer, convened the meeting "to evaluate Post's tripwires in light of the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi." 63 The cable summarizing this EAC included the following points: ( 1) The Principal Officer "remarked that the security situation in Benghazi was 'trending negatively"' and "that this daily pattern of violence would be the 'new normal' for the foreseeable future, particularly given the minimal capabilities of organizations such as the Supreme Security Council and local police." (2) A CIA officer "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi." (3) The Principal Officer and a CIA officer "expressed concerns with the lack of host nation security to support the U.S. Mission [facility]."
FINDING #2: The State Departmegt should have increased its security . posture more significantly in Benghazi based on the deteriorating security sltu~tion on the ground and IC threat re~orting on the ·P-rior attack$ against
If you care to read the rest, and the jumbled part, read the bi partisan senate report. Here is the link to the pdf
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf
Lemme check. Nope, Benghazi was still not caused by a video.
Actually, the video was a factor. This has been shown many times.
And you said no other embassies were dealing with protests when in fact the embassy in Egypt was stormed.
You lied, and now you are trying to divert from the fact I just proved you lied.
Lemme check. Nope, Benghazi was still not caused by a video.
Actually, the video was a factor. This has been shown many times.
And you said no other embassies were dealing with protests when in fact the embassy in Egypt was stormed.
You lied, and now you are trying to divert from the fact I just proved you lied.
