Still waiting for you to defend your boy, G.T. You brought him up.
From "A Refutation of Cosmic Skeptic's Sophomoric Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument"
Part I. Everything Needs a Cause?!
In order to understand the ultimate essence of Cosmic Skeptic's (O'Connor's) erroneous critique one must first understand what makes the Kalam Cosmological Argument of the Sunni tradition unique: namely, it evinces why the necessary existent must be a personal free agent. But first we need to flush O'Connor's most obnoxious straw man (beginning at 4:19 in the video) down the toilet where it belongs and spray the entire contents of a can of air freshener to eliminate the lingering stench of it.
One has to wonder whether O'Connor is even listening to himself when he observes that cosmological arguments proceed from the necessity of a noncontingent existent and then in the very next breath obtusely prattles: "But of course it takes but the logic of a five-year-old to ask, 'Okay, well, if everything needs a cause, then what caused God?' "
crickets chirping
Zoom!
Right over his head.
Apparently, O'Connor lives in a bubble and is utterly unaware of the fact that Dawkins, who infamously asks the same stupid question in
The God Delusion, has been excoriated from virtually every germane quarter of academia for his jejune philosophical babble.
No. Actually, even most five-year-olds can readily grasp the necessity of an eternally self-subsistent existent of some kind given that something does in fact exist rather than nothing. Apparently, it takes a snot-nosed teenybopper—who less than five minutes into his lecture has shown himself to be a fool on the order of Polonius—to ask what caused that which by definition is an uncaused cause to exist, call it "a fair question" and imagine that men like Al-Kindi, Al-Ghazali and Aquinas were retards.
(Earth to O'Connor: no apologist of classical theism would ever argue against the logical principles of eternalism and sufficient causality, let alone say anything as imbecilic as
everything has a cause of its existence. You are the imbecile in this instance who doesn't fly anywhere near the altitude of these men's intellects.)
But the idiocy doesn't stop there. . . . At 5:00, O'Connor opines:
A few centuries earlier in fact in Islamic theological circles people like Al-Kindi and Al-Ghazali were talking about this very thing and they effectively changed one of the premises. Instead of saying that everything has a cause, now all of a sudden it's everything that begins to exist has a cause. That's the change they made, and that's what gave us the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
That's what gave us the Kalam Cosmological Argument?!
A bit later in the video, O'Connor says: "Let it not be said that I tamper with anyone's premises".
It will be said, and it will be said by me.
A little history. . . . Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is dramatically different from that of classical theism. Given the divisibility of magnitude (or mass), Aristotle held that God's existence is axiomatic. Aristotle's primary concern was to establish an ontological justification for his cosmology and the physics thereof, wherein the Prime Unmoved Mover and the several dozen subordinate unmoved movers are discrete individual beings of an immaterial substance that affect change and the uniform circular motion of the celestial spheres in time. The celestial spheres comprise the astronomical infrastructure of the co-eternal, geocentric universe. While the unmoved movers are independent beings in terms of their essence residing in the highest heaven beyond the outermost celestial spheres of magnitude, their existence is contingently bound to the physical universe and vice versa. Though Aristotle doesn't satisfactorily account for how divisible magnitude could be temporally infinite, there is no everything has a cause of its existence in Aristotelian cosmology either, and while Aristotle played lip service to the created gods (or immortals) of the Hellenistic pantheon, there's no reason to think that he actually believed they existed.
Islamic philosophers seized on Aristotle's terminology and related it to the eternally self-subsistent and wholly transcendent Creator of all other things that exist. They developed two distinct lines of the cosmological argument: (1) the impossibility of an infinite regress of causation, albeit, in terms of contingency (the argument of a necessary existent) and (2) the impossibility of an infinite regress in time (the argument from the absurdities of an actual infinity). These are also referred to as the vertical and horizontal versions of the cosmological, respectively, and the ontological justification for both is the logical necessity of eternalism.
Ibn Sina (also known as Avicenna, 980–1037 A.D.) extrapolated the argument from contingency, which was further developed by Aquinas (1225–1274 A.D.). However, the Christian theologian and early empiricist philosopher John Philoponus of the 5th Century was actually the first to argue from the impossibility of an infinite regress in
Against Aristotle wherein he not only refuted a temporally infinite universe but the credibility of Aristotelian cosmology concerning the composition of the lower heavens and celestial spheres.
Following the arguments of Philoponus, Al-Kindi (801–873 A.D.) composed the first formal version of the horizontal cosmological: "Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning." (I don't remember when exactly, but I encountered an article written by someone who wrongfully attributes this formulation to Al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali uses it, but it didn't originate with him.)
Aristotle himself understood that an actual infinity is impossible; i.e., the physical universe couldn't be spatially infinite. Philoponus and Al-Kindi argued that precisely because the universe is divisible magnitude as Aristotle points out, nothing about the universe could be infinite. An infinite past would be an actual infinity. Absurdity! Hence, the universe necessarily began to exist in the finite past. Philoponus and Al-Kindi's primary interest was to evince why no divisible entity could possibly be the necessary existent and invited one to conclude that only an indivisible and, therefore, timelessly immaterial entity could be the necessary existent.
While Al-Ghazali (1058–1111 A.D.) wholeheartedly agreed, he was dissatisfied with the unnecessary ambiguity of the argument. Like Philoponus and Al-Kindi before him, he argued that the universe is composed of temporal phenomena preceded by other temporally-ordered phenomena, and given that an actual infinite is impossible, such a series of temporal phenomena cannot continue to infinity. Then Al-Ghazali brilliantly observed that not only must the universe have a timeless cause of its existence, but this timeless cause must be a personal free agent; for if the cause of the universe's existence were impersonal, it would be operationally mechanical. This would mean that the cause could never exist sans its effect, as from eternity the sufficient causal conditions for the effect to occur are given.
As explained by Craig:
The only way for the cause to be timeless but for its effect to begin in time is for the cause to be a personal agent who freely chooses to bring about an effect without any antecedent determining conditions. Philosophers call this type of causation 'agent causation,' and because the agent is free, he can initiate new effects by freely bringing about conditions which were not previously present. . . . Similarly, a finite time ago a Creator endowed with free will could have freely brought the world into being at that moment. In this way, the Creator could exist changelessly and eternally but choose to create the world in time. So the cause is eternal, but the effect is not. Thus, we are brought, not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe, but to a Personal Creator.
Hence, Al-Ghazali appends the syllogism per his ontological analysis of the properties of the cause. Known today as the Kalam, it's this version of the argument that came to the medieval Christian tradition through Bonaventure (1221–74 A.D.), and it's this version that's championed by Craig et al. today with the very same philosophical supports for the second (or pivotal) premise, albeit, as decisively supplemented by Al-Ghazali's personal-impersonal distinction. Craig et al. have since mathematically and analogously elaborated on the philosophical supports and formulated a syllogistic expression of Al-Ghazali's ontological analysis.
Note that neither of the main premises were ever changed. Of course, they were never changed! O'Connor's notion is conceptually absurd, and his chronology regarding the historical development of the Kalam is nonsensical. Only the philosophical support for the second premise, deduced from the first principles of metaphysics, was revised, and the first premise is a metaphysical axiom! Axioms don't require additional proof. They are proofs (or logical necessities) in and of themselves.