In May 2017, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel and newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron met for the first time,
many hoped for a renewal of vows. Crowds of pro-European well-wishers urged them on. Macron, the fresh-faced reformer, seemed to have a Midas-like political touch. And Merkel was at the height of her power on the international stage, having been deemed the new āleader of the free world,ā supplanting the ā
very stable geniusā in the White House, Donald Trump.
Quoting the German author Hermann Hesse, Merkel
observed that, āThere is magic in every beginning,ā but added a caveat: āThe magic lasts only when there are results.ā Eighteen months later, the magic most certainly has not lasted. Merkel has now
handed over the leadership of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and will not seek another term as chancellor. And Macron, far from walking on water, has been trying not to drown in a sea of yellow-vested protesters.
As both leadersā political stars have waned, so, too, have the prospects for a renewed Franco-German relationship. Just when Macron was placing his hopes in Merkelās power to lead at the European level, her grip on domestic power was slipping. After the German federal election in September 2017, Merkel struggled for six months to form a government. She did not want to form a minority government, and the remaining opposition parties didnāt particularly want to govern with her.
But the real damage to Merkelās power came from within. Leading politicians in the CDUās Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), have attacked Merkelās decision to welcome Syrian refugees in 2015, and even cozied up to some of her sworn enemies, not least Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor OrbĆ”n, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, and Matteo Salvini, the Italian deputy prime minister and interior minister. These populists and their CSU sympathizers have used immigration as a wedge issue to attack Merkel.
Macron, meanwhile, has sought to make French renewal synonymous with European renewal. Since coming to power, he has pursued a new grand bargain with Germany. In exchange for France finally getting a grip on its finances and reforming its public sector and labor market, Germany would back Macronās proposals to deepen EU and eurozone integration, including a joint eurozone budget, an EU finance ministry, and more unified foreign and defense policies.
Though Merkel recently
agreed to a joint budget in principle, many in France now suspect that Macron has been duped. Early in his presidency, he introduced a series of unpopular measures, slashing the wealth tax and cutting social benefits. More recently, he rolled out a fuel-tax increase to keep this yearās deficit below 3% of GDP, in the process unleashing the sea of yellow vests now laying siege to his administration.
In response, Germany has offered Macron essentially nothing. It has dragged its feet on completing a banking union and introducing eurozone investment bonds, and has paid only lip service to the idea of a joint budget. Even on defense policy, which could serve as a stand-in for meaningful economic reforms, Germany has put up resistance, watering down EU proposals for an āavant-gardeā grouping and
balking at Macronās proposed European Intervention Initiative (EI2).