So your doing your happy dance well hold as it has to be interpreted. Obvious your opinion favors Trump.
You know it still does not matter. Trump changes his residency in mid 2019 and the hush money was paid in 2016. Continuously does not make a difference. They have time to still prosecute him. They are in the Grand Jury phase now,
if the time had ran out they would not be doing this. His lawyer would ask for a dismissal. The extended time just adds to the amount of time that it has to be prosecuted.
So if the year was 2025 then trump would be doing his happy dance.
The appeals court has render a verdict that even if it is not continuous, the days that he was out of the state can be added up. This case had the defendant had move to another state but did comeback to NY on occasions
People v. Knobel, 94 N.Y.2d 226 | Casetext Search + Citator
NY appeals court has ruled on how it should be interpreted.
The People urge that the indictment was proper because the Statute of Limitations was tolled during all periods defendant was "continuously outside" the State. For an absence from the State to be "continuous" within the meaning of
CPL 30.10(4)(a)(i), the People argue, it need not be a single uninterrupted period of time. We agree. The focus of the tolling provision of
CPL 30.10 is "the difficulty of apprehending a defendant who is outside the State" (
People v. Seda,
93 N.Y.2d 307, 312). Thus, all periods of a day or more that a nonresident defendant is out-of-State should be totaled and toll the Statute of Limitations.
Applied here, defendant's own calculations demonstrate limited periods of presence in the State, totaling 114 days (or 219 days), during the six and a half year period at issue. This establishes that between December 19, 1991 and February 24, 1998, defendant was continuously outside the State within the meaning of
CPL 30.10(4)(a)(i) during sufficient periods of time for us to conclude, as a matter of law, that the instant prosecution was timely commenced.
In so holding, we reject defendant's contention that the civil tolling provision
(CPLR 207), which requires that a continuous absence from the State be no less than four months in duration, applies analogously to the proper interpretation of
CPL 30.10(4)(a)(i). Unlike
CPLR 207, which mentions a minimum four month period of continuous absence from the State,
CPL 30.10 (4)(a)(i) contains no minimum durational requirement. We refuse to read such a substantive element into this CPL provision.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Order affirmed. Opinion by Judge Smith. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur.
Your arguments defy logic. The defense will bring it up but the appeals court has already said that it does not have to be continuous and that only the amount of days out of the state should equal the amount of the total time limitations.