31. The aforementioned facts relative to communication
procedural peculiarities unique to ships of LIBERTY's
mission resulted in the ship transmitting under the
scheduling control of the research department. This practice
permitted optimum performance by the research department,
scheduling outgoing transmissions during lull periods of
research activities; furthermore, when available research
lull periods were short, the practice had grown up, quite
naturally, to combine into single transmission packages all
of the outgoing traffic which had accumulated. Such
procedures necessitated transmission of each ships
communication package under a classification applicable to
the highest classification of any single element within the
package itself. Such transmission packages would frequently
contain research material, ship position reports, and,
periodically, requests for messages missed on the regular
ship broadcast schedule. A built-in delay factor exists in
this procedure however, inasmuch as not all shore-based
terminals are equipped to accommodate research material. In
the case of LIBERTY during the time period under
consideration, the closest available eligible terminal for
LIBERTY research material was NAVSECGRUDET Morocco, rather
than NAVCOMMSTA Asmara, which happened to be serving LIBERTY
as a subscriber at the time of the attack. The above
conditions are detailed to point up occurrence of delays
which must be anticipated in any such system. In summary,
if LIBERTY had a normal outgoing message requesting missing
sked numbers, it would first have to wait, under normal
circumstances, for transmission during a lull period. It
would next, by virtue of leaving the ship as part of a
package containing research data, go to NAVSECGRU- DET
Morocco where the combined communication package would be
broken down in its component parts; thirdly, the element of
the package requesting retransmission of missed fleet
broadcast numbers would then have to be sent from NAVCOMMSTA
Morocco back to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara for action, Asmara being
the transmitting station serving LIBERTY at the time.
[168]
32. Detailed questioning of available surviving
communication witnesses disclosed that LIBERTY had never
before found missing messages, subsequently requested and
received, to have been critical to ship's operational
commitments.
This fact was explained by ship's personnel as being due to
the very few messages ever missed. This condition was
attributed to superior equipment in the ship coupled with
the fact that the ship operated independently as a regular
practice and had not found herself wanting at any time
previous.
33. It is important to be aware at this point that there
are no logs and or records available in LIBERTY. There are
no communication officers left alive with first hand
knowledge of the missed message backlog on 8 June. It could
only be determined from testimony that the ship had been
copying transmissions from NAVCOMSTA Asmara with no apparent
difficulty from 70000lZ and the time of the attack. One
witness who was on watch on the Asmara broadcast between the
hours of 0645 and 1615 on 7 June stated that he had logged
no missed message numbers during the period of his watch and
that the reception of the JRAIT broadcast was excellent.
34. LIBERTY's technical mission was one that made it
necessary, in exercising the aforementioned close
cooperation, to use minimum electronic transmissions and
radiations on certain frequencies - radio transmissions
particularly. LIBERTY was continually subjected to and used
to the prejudicial effects such transmissions would on the
degree of efficiency of her primary functions. In summary
on this point, ships of LIBERTY's configuration, like
submarines, are members a "silent service" all their own.
35. It is found that it has been, and continues standard
practice, in ships of this type to cultivate great patience
with regards to desires to get electrical traffic off the
ship because of the prejudicial effect on the ship's
mission.
36. It is evident that communications procedures for ships
of this type would be improved were they to be considered in
a communication category analogous to submarines.
[169]
37. On the matter of operational control of LIBERTY vis a
vis the precise directives to the ship governing the
application of her embarked capabilities, it is important to
understand LIBERTY's situation as a mobile platform, under
naval command, transporting capabilities belonging to a
service or agency other than the Navy. This condition and
situation, while not unique to naval platforms, requires a
complete awareness and understanding of the very close
coordination and cooperation between those responsible for
operation of and positioning of the platform itself in
relation to those responsible for the embarked capabilities.
Detailed testimony discloses that LIBERTY found absolutely
no difficulties accommodating to this conditions, unique
within the navy to ships off this particular type.
38. The on-line crypto capability has engendered a
dangerous willingness to send more classified traffic than
in days of manual decoding without required proportionate
increase in experienced supervisory personnel to ride herd
on traffic quantum increases. Conversely, we find often
very inexperienced personnel being the first to give
attention to misrouted messages such as those in question.
39. Key messages critical to international relations were
not in this case, paralleled on other circuits.
40. High precedence of operational messages is too often
not enough to overcome circuit choking resulting from large
volume of such as FBIS of the same precedence competing for
inexperienced operator attention at the same time.
41. LIBERTY's embarked "warning" capabilities apparently
gave no indication of impending danger during the period
prior to the attack.
42. LIBERTY had experienced periodic reconnaissance on this
and other operating stations which tended to create a
feeling of "acceptance without undue concern" conditions as
they were on 8 June 1967.
Reconnaissance experiences known to LIBERTY and other ships
of LIBERTY's class in other parts of the world minimized
concern by LIBERTY personnel
[170]
over recon efforts on 8 June.
43. Commanding Officer LIBERTY appropriately reported
recon early on A.M. of 8 June through her "locating two".
This report was transmitted promptly by ship despite
temporary interruption of her mission, at the direction of
the Commanding Officer.
44. Up to the time of the attack, testimony disclosed no
reasons to abort LIBERTY's mission in accordance with
paragraph 1A of Appendix B to SM 676-66 of 19 August 1966.
45. The degrees of coordination and accuracy of the air and
surface attacks combined first to wipe out defense and
shipboard control capabilities, followed by the crippling
blow of a torpedo.
46. The Israeli aircraft rockets penetrated topside steel
easily, leaving roughly five inch holes, with innumerable
shrapnel pock marks on the inside of spaces penetrated.
47. The heroism displayed by the Commanding Officer,
officers and men of the LIBERTY was exceptional. The
Commanding Officer is being recommended for the
Congressional Medal, and the ship for an appropriate unit
citation. These planned actions are fully supported by
testimony to the Court.
48. LIBERTY apparently experienced a phenomenon identified
as electronic jamming of her voice radio just prior to and
during air attacks. This jamming was described as a steady
carrier without modulation.
49. Disparities in reported times relating to sequence of
events can well be attributed to the number of ship's clocks
on board hanging askew and often stopped from shock at
various times. It was necessary to reconstruct time
sequences, because QM notebook was incomplete from 1355 to
1446 since the QM was killed during the first attack.
50. Extent of Damage. The major material damage to LIBERTY
resulted from the torpedo explosion, as follows:
A. SHELL DAMAGE: Hole centered at FR 60 and extending 24
ft downward from just below second deck and longitudinally
from frame 53
[171]
to frame 66 (39 feet). The hole was teardrop in shape,
larger at bottom.
B. Interior structural damage: Outboard 15 feet of first
platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser
damage to second platform deck (tank top). Second deck and
frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and extending
inboard 15 feet.
C. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below
second deck frame 52 to 78, entire width of ship.
In summary of above, the two research compartments, which
extend the entire width of the ship, suffered severe
structural damage and were flooded. Installed equipment and
fittings were reduced to twisted wreckage.
Topside damage resulting from aircraft strafing and rocked
attacks and from MTB strafing (ship was hit by more than
821 shells and rockets, many of them incendiary) summarized
as follows:
Pilot house and signal bridge forward deck house, all gun
tubs, many antennas including radar antenna, numerous
bulkheads and decks holed by explosive rockets. Whale boat
destroyed in davits by incendiary rockets and many life
rafts holed or burned in their stowages. Flag bags burned
and numerous fires resulting from incendiary munitions.
The gyro compass, air conditioning plant and many minor
items of equipment, located in superstructure spaces, were
damaged or destroyed. Numerous living spaces and personnel
effects damaged by holing, shrapnel and wetting during
firefighting.
Cost estimated - Value of destroyed research equipment $6-8
million, 12 months lead time. Structural repairs to ship
and ship's equipment $2-4 million, 3-4 months.
51. The Israeli government set forth 7 points of rationale
to explain their position relative to the attack on LIBERTY
in USDAO Tel Aviv message DTG 091520Z. Legal opinion and
other comments on each is appended hereto (Appendix VI).
[172]
52. That any killed or wounded personnel attached to the
USS LIBERTY during the attack are eligible for the Purple
Heart under the provisions of SECNAVINST. P1650.1C Chapter
TWO SECTION THREE ARTICLE 231 PARA 12 b. sub-paras (4) and
(5). The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY is preparing a
listing of eligible personnel to be recommended.
[173]
[signature] Isaac C. KIDD, Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President
[signature] Bernard J. LAUFF
Captain, U.S. Navy Member
[signature] Bert N. ATKINSON,
Jr. Captain, U.S. Navy Member
[signature] Isaac C. KIDD, Jr. Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President
[signature] Ward BOSTON, Jr. Captain, U.S. Navy Counsel for
the Court
USS LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY
