On the contrary- the Court VERY specifically says otherwise:
United States v. Wong Kim Ark | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
It necessarily follows that persons born in China, subjects of the Emperor of China but domiciled in the United States, having been adjudged, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins to be within the jurisdiction of the State within the meaning of the concluding sentence, must be held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the meaning of the first sentence of this section of the Constitution, and their children "born in the United States" cannot be less "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."
More lies, as Section 96 plainly states that to qualify for birthright citizenship the parents must have legal domicile and have permission of the USA.
Lol, it must suck to be as stupid as you are.
The Court explained that anyone present in the country, other than those immune from the laws because of their status as diplomats for representatives of a foreign sovereign, are subject to the jurisdiction of that nation:
"The reasons for not allowing to other aliens exemption "from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found" were stated as follows:
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were [p686] not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign counties are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter can never be construed to grant such exemption."
Accordingly, anyone here other than those expressly not subject to our jurisdiction are subject to our jurisdiction.
The Court further explained:
"In short, the judgment in the case of
The Exchange declared, as incontrovertible principles,
that the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, and is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself; that all exceptions to its full and absolute territorial jurisdiction must be traced up to its own consent, express or implied; that,
upon its consent to cede, or to waive the exercise of, a part of its territorial jurisdiction rest the exemptions from that jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns or their armies entering its territory with its permission, and of their foreign ministers and public ships of war, and that the implied license under which private individuals of another nation enter the territory and mingle indiscriminately with its inhabitants for purposes of business or pleasure can never be construed to grant to them an exemption from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found.
See also Carlisle v. United States (1872), 16 Wall. 147, 155;
Radich v. Hutchins (1877),
95 U.S. 210;
Wildenhus' Case (1887),
120 U.S. 1;
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889),
130 U.S. 581, 603, 604.
Foreign sovereigns, their armies or navies and their foreign ministers are the only ones "not subject to the jurisdiction. This is what the Court explained in those parts of the decision you wish to ignore.
"The words "in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution must be presumed to have been understood and intended by the Congress which proposed the Amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice Marshall in the well known case of
The Exchange and as the equivalent of the words "within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States," and the converse of the words "out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States" as habitually used in the naturalization acts. This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word "jurisdiction" in the last clause of the same section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is impossible to construe the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the opening sentence, as less comprehensive than the words "within its jurisdiction" in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons "within the jurisdiction" of one of the States of the Union are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
How can this be any plainer to you? The words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" means that anyone within the United States is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Here is the penultimate holding in Wong Kim Ark:
"The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to
these conclusions: the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes."
The courts conclusions are (1) that the 14th amendment affirms the longstanding common law principle of "citizenship by birth within the territory"; and (2) subject only to the exceptions of "children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers"; those "born on foreign public ships" or born to "enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory"; and "members of Indian tribes.." That is the court's holding. Your attempt to somehow turn "domicile", which simply means where you live, into a legal term of art somehow denoting that you are "legally" allowed in the country is ridiculous.
You again ignore language in the opinion that directly contradicts you:
"It can hardly be denied that an alien is completely subject to the political jurisdiction of the country in which he resides -- seeing that, as said by Mr. Webster, when Secretary of State, in his Report to the President on
Thrasher's Case in 1851, and since repeated by this court,
independently of a residence with intention to continue such residence; independently of any domiciliation; independently of the taking of any oath of allegiance or of renouncing any former allegiance, it is well known that, by the public law, an alien, or a stranger [p694] born, for so long a time as he continues within the dominions of a foreign government, owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for treason, or other crimes, as a native-born subject might be, unless his case is varied by some treaty stipulations.
Ex.Doc. H.R. No. 10, 1st sess. 32d Congress, p. 4; 6 Webster's Works, 56;
United States v. Carlisle, 16 Wall. 147, 155;
Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 6
a; Ellesmere on Postnati 63; 1 Hale P.C. 62; 4 Bl.Com. 92."
So, independent of any "domiciliation", a person in a nation is subject to its jurisdiction. There goes your silly reliance on the fact that the parents were "domiciled" (i.e. lived) in the US. The Court specifically rejected that precise argument.
Finally, the argument you have parroted here are the same arguments set forth in the dissenting opinion. Guess why it was a dissenting opinion?
