P F Tinmore,
et al,
One can argue that there is a certain indeterminacy to the issue, or one can argue that --- one side or the other --- has more of a "right to self-determination." In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the indeterminate position is neutral position; a case of "equal rights."
"The hidden beauty of an "indeterminacy" is much like..."
The hidden beauty is that you can smokescreen the issues with verbosity.
(COMMENT)
Is it a "smokescreen?" Or is it a case in which the Arab-Palestinian claims more of a "right" of some sort than has been endowed upon them?
(As it pertains to this particular argument.)
I tried to stay away from the issue of suitability; that is, your claim that some "do not lend themselves suitable for statehood." Clearly, the suitability
(and capability) of the Arab Palestinian, both then and now, is a condition subject to an entirely different discussion.
If you rule-out the indeterminate factor intertwined in the distinction between "people" 'vs' "peoples" --- then you are left with the underlying theory behind the "right of self-determination" --- that: "the legal right of people to decide their own destiny in the international order" is somehow recognized. (
See Post #563") That would be the people of Israel
(one people) and the people of the West Bank and Gaza
(one people); or collectively, the "peoples"
(the collective).
Note: For the sake of your plural distinction:
(one people) + (one people) = (one peoples - or - the collective)
The Leaders of the early 20th Century
(trained 19th Century thinkers) did not quibble over such distinctions
(people 'vs' peoples). If they saw a universal right, then it applied to everyone equally - and was not a matter of distinguishing characteristics
(and they saw very few universal rights --- let alone the "contemporary notions of self-determination usually distinguish between “internal” and “external” self-determination, suggesting that "self-determination" exists on a spectrum"). And most certainly, as the Allied Powers were determining the establishment of a Jewish National Home
(in whatever form it would ultimately take - that being undetermined in San Remo), it was quite clear that they held the power to make the determinations and not the indigenous enemy population of lands surrendered to them at the outcome of the war
(there was no spectrum of self-determination - they made the determination). The idea of the right to self-determination was not yet a consideration. "In international law, the right of self-determination that became recognized in the post-WWII years were interpreted as the right of all colonial territories to become independent or to adopt any other status they freely chose;" had not yet been established. And the Leaders of the early 20th Century
(trained 19th Century thinkers) did not quibble about it - these were not new colonial interests, but "Mandates." And as such, "no right to secession has yet been recognized under international law;" no right to self-determination except what was granted to them by the powers-that-be.
One of the earliest proponents of a right to self-determination was U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. A month after his famous "Fourteen Points" speech to the U.S. Congress in January 1918 (in which the term "self-determination" does not appear), he proclaimed:
"Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril....
Despite Wilson's injunction, attempts to turn self-determination from a "mere phrase" into a binding norm did not occur for over 40 years, following the deaths of tens of millions in two major wars.
While the Covenant of the League of Nations did indirectly address the principle of self-determination (without using the word) in the system of mandates that it established, identification of the mandates and implementation of the system was wholly dependent on politics, not law. In most of the territorial adjustments that followed the end of World War I,
winners and losers were determined by the political calculations and perceived needs of the Great Powers rather than on the basis of which groups had the strongest claims to self-determination.
SOURCE: Legal Aspects of Self-Determination - Princeton University Encyclopedia of Self-determination
For the sake of emphasis, let me repeat something here: "In most of the territorial adjustments that followed the end of World War I, winners and losers were
determined by the political calculations and perceived needs of
the Great Powers rather than on the basis of which groups had the strongest claims to self-determination." This was the political landscape at the time the decisions were made to establish the "Jewish National Home."
Thus
(whether you like the "theory of indeterminism" or not), the Arab-Palestinian "right to self-determination" was NOT extended based on the strongest claim or any inherent right they perceived as being owed to them, but were determined on the basis of the wants and needs of the Allied Powers; that being the establishment of the Jewish National Home
(in whatever form it would ultimately take - that being undetermined in San Remo).
I know this interpretation sounds hard and harsh
(maybe even unfair), but that was the characteristics of the times.
Most Respectfully,
R