What the decision REALLY means is that carefully crafted laws need to be written about what's permissible at a funeral to balance privacy and free speech rights. I heard that a big part of the decision involved the fact that there was no such law that the WBC had broken. Apparently, a law could be crafted that would pass Constitutional muster, like a buffer zone, for example. It's not like anyone's preventing the WBC from speaking, only where and when. It happens all the time and is permitted by the 1st Amendment in the "right of the people peaceably to assemble" clause, which has been interpreted to mean NOT that people may assemble wherever and whenever they please, but that the government has a vested interest in the logistics in the name of "peaceful assembly". IMO, a good case can be made for the WBC's "disturbing the peace", but first the law must be written.
Yup.
Directly from the Court's opinion:
That said, “[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.” Id., at 479 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc. , 473 U. S. 788, 799 (1985) ).
Westboro’s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government’s regulatory reach—it is “subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions” that are consistent with the standards announced in this Court’s precedents. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence , 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984) .
Maryland now has a law imposing restrictions on funeral picketing, Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §10–205 (Lexis Supp. 2010), as do 43 other States and the Federal Government. See Brief for American Legion as Amicus Curiae 18–19, n. 2 (listing statutes). To the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case. Maryland’s law, however, was not in effect at the time of the events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it might apply to facts such as those before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional. 5
We have identified a few limited situations where the location of targeted picketing can be regulated under provisions that the Court has determined to be content neutral. In Frisby , for example, we upheld a ban on such picketing “before or about” a particular residence, 487 U. S., at 477. In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. , we approved an injunction requiring a buffer zone between protesters and an abortion clinic entrance. 512 U. S. 753, 768 (1994) . The facts here are obviously quite different, both with respect to the activity being regulated and the means of restricting those activities.
SNYDER v. PHELPS
About two-thirds the way down.