U.S. weighs sending special forces to seize Iran's nuclear stockpile

[rylah]

"They don't mean it literally

when they say Death to America..."

 

[Kruska]

Counter it then.

Already did.

 

[Kruska]

"They don't mean it literally

when they say Death to America..."

Didn't you and your MAGA boys post something like "the Iranians in the USA all support the Shah boy" and are in jubilation of the Mullahs having been bombed from this earth - before that flick??

 

[rylah]

Didn't you and your MAGA boys post something like "the Iranians in the USA all support the Shah boy" and are in jubilation of the Mullahs having been bombed from this earth - before that flick??

Miss again,

Trump and many of his supporters,
including Iranian ones don't want to have
any resemblance of another imperial Shia lunatic.

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

I don’t know ANYONE who thinks it a bad idea to take matches away from children… particularly insane children.

View attachment 1237337

That looks like Jen "Circle Back" Psaki as a child!

 

[fncceo]

That looks like Jen "Circle Back" Psaki as a child!

Well I’m definitely not letting HER play with matches.

 

[Kruska]

Miss again,

Trump and many of his supporters,
including Iranian ones don't want to have
any resemblance of another imperial Shia lunatic.

You meant to say that the world can't bear two lunatic Emperors in the Middles-East and one in Mar-el-Lago.

However your US/Texas flick contradicts that Iranians in Iran would be supportive of a regime change.

 

[rylah]

"They don't mean it when they say

death to America..."

 

[IM2]

Section One: The Islamic Republic and Political Orientations​

• A significant majority of Iranians (around 70%) oppose the continuation of the Islamic Republic. The highest level of opposition (81%) occurred during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising.
• The dominant political orientation in society is “regime change as a precondition for change” (approximately 40%), followed by “structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic.” Support for regime change is more prevalent among the youth and the educated population.
• Support for “the principles of the Islamic revolution and the Supreme Leader” has decreased (from 18% in 2022 to 11% in 2024).
• Opposition to the Islamic Republic is higher among the youth, urban residents, and the highly educated.

​

Section Two: Forms of Governance​

• An overwhelming majority of Iranians (89%) support democracy.
• About half of the population (43%) is open to authoritarian rule by a strong individual leader; this view is more common among rural residents and people with lower levels of education.
• Governance based on religious law and military rule faces widespread opposition (66% and 71% respectively).

Section Three: Preferred Political Sytem and Structure​

• Only about 20% of Iranians support the continuation of the Islamic Republic; the majority want a different political system, such as a (secular) republic, a (constitutional) monarchy, or a more decentralized democracy.
• When it comes to preferred alternatives, about 26% favor a secular republic and around 21% support a monarchy. For 11%, the specific form of the alternative system is not important. About 22% report lacking sufficient information to choose an alternative system.
• Around 15% support a federal system—either as a federal republic (10%) or federal monarchy (5%). Support for a federal structure is especially high in ethnic regions such as Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, and Sistan and Baluchestan.
• Support for a republican and decentralized structure is higher among the youth and educated individuals. Support for monarchy is higher among men than women, and among those without higher education.
• Supporters of the Islamic Republic and a non-federal monarchy show a higher tendency toward preferring individual authoritarian rule. In contrast, supporters of a non-federal secular republic, a federal republic, and a federal monarchy significantly oppose the idea of authoritarian governance.

​

Analytical Report on “Iranians’ Political Preferences in 2024” – Gamaan

gamaan.org

ew events in modern Middle Eastern history have left as deep a scar as the coup of August 1953 that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. In one decisive episode, a democratically elected leader was removed in a covert Anglo-American operation, foreign powers reasserted control over Iranian oil, and the Shah’s autocracy was restored. For many Iranians, the coup became the symbol of Western betrayal, setting the stage for decades of anti-imperialism and fueling the anger that erupted in the 1979 revolution.

The coup is not only a national trauma but also a case study in the collision of empire, oil politics, and Cold War realpolitik. James Barr, in Lords of the Desert, highlights the maneuvering between Britain and America as they sought to protect their Middle Eastern stakes. Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men captures the human drama of Operation Ajax, while Ryszard Kapuściński gave it a searing literary treatment. Robert Fisk, in The Great War for Civilisation, placed it within the longer history of Western interference in the region. Scholars such as Ervand Abrahamian, Mark Gasiorowski, and Nikki Keddie have provided sober analyses of its causes and consequences.

This article examines the coup’s origins, course, and legacy — situating it in the context of Iranian nationalism, Anglo-American oil interests, Cold War strategy, and the long-term resentment it bred.

Britain and America: From Rivalry to Collaboration
Initially, Britain sought to manage the crisis alone. British leaders hoped to topple Mosaddegh and reinstall a pliant government. They planned covert operations but lacked the ability to act without U.S. support.

For Washington, the situation was complex. On one hand, the Truman administration sympathized with nationalism and sought compromise: the U.S. had long criticized colonial exploitation. On the other, officials worried that economic collapse in Iran could open the door to communism. The Tudeh Party (Iran’s communists) had a growing presence in labor unions and protests.

By 1952–53, as the Cold War intensified, the balance shifted. Winston Churchill’s government lobbied President Eisenhower to intervene. With the Korean War still fresh and Stalin’s shadow looming, the Eisenhower administration became convinced that Mosaddegh might eventually tilt toward the Soviets.

James Barr highlights how Britain, desperate to preserve its declining Middle Eastern empire, persuaded Washington by framing the crisis as part of the global contest with Moscow. In Lords of the Desert, Barr shows that British fears of losing influence meshed with American fears of communist expansion.

The CIA, under Allen Dulles, and MI6 together devised a plan: Operation Ajax. Its aim was to depose Mosaddegh and strengthen the Shah. Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, was chosen to lead the covert operation in Tehran.

Operation Ajax: The Coup of 1953
The plan involved propaganda, political manipulation, and street action. CIA and MI6 operatives funded opposition newspapers, spread disinformation, and bribed politicians, clerics, and military officers. They portrayed Mosaddegh as a communist sympathizer and a threat to Islam.

In August 1953 the Shah, under pressure, signed decrees dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. Initially, the coup faltered: Mosaddegh’s supporters resisted, and the Shah fled to Rome in panic.

But Roosevelt and his team regrouped. They mobilized paid demonstrators and allied military units. On August 19, violent clashes erupted in Tehran. Pro-coup forces, including elements of the army and street mobs, stormed Mosaddegh’s residence. After heavy fighting, Mosaddegh’s government collapsed. He was arrested, tried, and sentenced to house arrest until his death in 1967.

Zahedi assumed power, and the Shah returned triumphantly. The Anglo-American operation had succeeded.

Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men describes this as the CIA’s “first great success,” but also a Pandora’s box that would haunt U.S. policy. Kapuściński, writing with literary flair, cast the coup as a tragic betrayal of a nation’s hopes. Robert Fisk later observed that 1953 was “the original sin” of Western involvement in Iran, remembered bitterly for decades.

Aftermath: The Shah Restored
In the coup’s aftermath, the Shah consolidated power. Zahedi remained prime minister for a time, but the monarchy now dominated politics. The Majles was sidelined, opposition suppressed, and the secret police (later SAVAK) created with CIA and Mossad assistance.

Oil was reorganized under a new consortium. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company returned, but now U.S. firms shared in the spoils: five American companies, plus Shell and French interests, joined the new arrangement. Iran formally retained sovereignty, but in practice Western companies controlled production and distribution.

For the West, the coup seemed a triumph: Iran was secured as a Cold War ally, oil flowed again, and the Shah became a bulwark against Soviet influence. For Iranians, it was humiliation. The memory of foreign manipulation festered.

Legacy: Roots of Resentment​

The coup’s consequences were profound.

Domestic Authoritarianism: The Shah, restored to power, ruled with increasing autocracy for the next 25 years. His reliance on Western backing and his creation of SAVAK deepened repression.

National Humiliation: The coup became a collective memory of betrayal. When revolution erupted in 1979, chants of “Death to America” and “Death to England” drew directly on the memory of 1953.

Cold War Geopolitics: For Washington, Iran became a key ally, hosting U.S. military bases and serving as a pillar of containment. Yet the very alliance sowed the seeds of future estrangement.

Oil Nationalism: Although Mosaddegh was defeated, the principle of oil sovereignty remained powerful. Later OPEC revolts against Western oil companies drew inspiration from Iran’s example.

Enduring Distrust: The coup poisoned U.S.–Iran relations. Even today, Iranian leaders cite 1953 as proof of American duplicity. For many Iranians, the coup explains why foreign influence must be resisted at all costs.

Conclusion​

The coup of 1953 was a turning point in modern Iran. It crushed a democratic experiment, restored an autocratic Shah, and reasserted Western control over oil. For the United States and Britain, it was a Cold War victory; for Iranians, it was a national trauma. Its legacy shaped the revolutionary anger of 1979 and continues to color relations between Iran and the West.

The 1953 Coup: Oil, Mosaddegh, and the Roots of Iranian Resentment - Explaining History Podcast

In one decisive episode, a democratically elected leader was removed in a covert Anglo-American operation, foreign powers reasserted control over Iranian oil, and the Shah’s autocracy was restored.

explaininghistory.org

It's time we stopped reciting HALF-STORY, and learned HISTORY.