Follow up: What do you think of Stephanie and CrusaderFrank?
Two morons desperate for attention, IMO.
As for B-37 I agree with Lakhota, she had an agenda going in, and that agenda had nothing to do with trying to determine the truth.
In this case, as with so many, the truth cannot be known – as its sole proprietor is the defendant.
Consequently justice is the only appropriate outcome of such a trial, and the verdict of not guilty indeed served justice, as we wisely place the greatest burden upon the state when oneÂ’s liberty or life are in jeopardy.
True and well 'said'; however (you knew that was coming, huh?) IMO GZ is not innocent. He is not a victim. When one chooses to carry deadly weapon they have already decided to be judge, jury and executioner. In law they may be exonerated; morally they remain culpable unless their actions meet the standard outlined for a just war.
First, war must occur for a good and just purpose rather than for self-gain (for example, "in the nation's interest" is not just) or as an exercise of power. (Proper Authority is first: represents the common good: which is peace for the sake of man's true end—God.)
Second, just war must be waged by a properly instituted authority such as the state. (Just Cause: for the sake of restoring some good that has been denied. i.e., lost territory, lost goods, punishment for an evil perpetrated by a government, army, or even citizen population.)
Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence.[13] (Right Intention: an authority must fight for the just reasons it has expressly claimed for declaring war in the first place. Soldiers must also fight for this intention.)
Wry, I give you credit for one thing here; although you could have done it more clearly, you've pointed out the main difficulty everyone has had with this case. There is not a single issue here,; there are two; they are separate and distinct, and must be adjudged by two very different standards.
The first is criminal culpability. That one is a matter of law, and insofar as the facts can be known, the jury got that one right. According to the laws of the state of FL, Zimmerman acted lawfully, (or at any rate there is insufficient probative evidence to show that he did not), and by law, he had to be acquitted of the charges brought. The way that statute is written (and it is different from the common law self-defense provisions that apply in many other jurisdictions), it does not matter, that Zimmerman's judgement could have been better; nor whether what he did was morally justified on any level. The only question is, were his actions, as far as they can be known, lawful? They were, and one does not have to agree with them, to understand that.
The second, and perhaps more pertinent question is moral culpability. That is entirely different; very different standards apply, and I am less sympathetic with Zimmerman on that question. When one chooses to carry a (legally defined) deadly weapon, or is simply possessed by training and/or physical ability with the means to react with deadly force, there is an extra moral responsibility to exercise restraint in acting in any way which might initiate an unnecessary confrontation. (Again, by law in some jurisdictions, that responsibility may extend into the legal realm, but under the relevant FL statute, it does not). Zimmerman's actions do NOT meet THAT standard. He reasonably could, without endangering himself or anyone else, have broken off any pursuit of Martin when he lost sight of him, if indeed, he had elected to pursue him at all. He failed to do so, and is morally (though NOT legally) culpable to some extent, for that failure. However, Martin was not entirely without fault in his own actions. He could have, had he kept going in the direction he was headed, have reached the safety of the apartment where he was staying well before Zimmerman could have caught up to him. For whatever reason, he chose not to do that, and he too, has some share of moral responsibility for what ensued. (It is worth noting, parenthetically, that in many jurisdictions, Martin could not have legally claimed self-defense either; he would have had a "duty to flee or retreat", if he could reasonably have done so, and all we know, suggests that he could have). Now, it may not feel fair, to many, that a an older man was absolved of legal consequence for his moral failing, while a seventeen-year-old paid for his with his life. It's hard to accept, from an emotional standpoint, and so it's easy to fault the legal system, or blame racism, or do anything, but accept that life is not always fair, and justice and morality are not always the same. (We often confuse them, because of our desire for a fair society, and our sympathy for underdogs, but they remain fundamentally different)
All that said, what I've said from the beginning of this still stands. We cannot ask the judicial process to mete out punishments for what we believe are MORAL (but not legal) offenses; that process necessarily has a narrower purview. Nor can we mete out any such punishment ourselves, individually or collectively; to form a lynch mob, or contribute to one, is if anything, a greater moral failing than the one we seek to sanction. As a society, we've agreed not to do that, even when we want to. That's some progress, and I hope we maintain it.
And so, we cannot punish George Zimmerman; he is, like it or not, beyond our legitimate reach. To some, he's a victim, or a hero; to others, he's a villain. Perhaps he's none of those, just someone who did not live up to a big responsibility, and now has to live with the memory of what he did. Whether that's enough, I'll personally leave for a Higher (and Far Wiser) Court to decide.
