Okay, now let's deal with your claims about Eisenhower’s statements on nuking Japan. I suspect your claims are based on Robert Maddox’s book Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism. It is ironic that Maddox thinks of himself as battling “revisionism” when in fact the majority of scholars who have published on this subject disagree with him.
Most scholars do not disagree with Mr. Maddox.
To give you some idea of how extreme he is on the issue, Maddox stridently applauds the censoring and cancellation of the modestly objective and carefully worded text of the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution in 1995, even though dozens of leading historians—including historians from Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Ohio State, Dartmouth, Georgetown, and Stanford—condemned the censoring and removal of the text.
The exhibit was filled with anti-American lies. Opposing such lies is hardly evidence of extremism.
When dealing with the fact that General Omar Bradley confirmed in his memoir that Ike voiced objection to nuking Japan to Stimson and Truman, Maddox argues that that part of Bradley’s book was fabricated by Bradley’s co-author!
And indeed it was fabricated.
The account in Bradley's book is contrary to known facts.
It is also contrary to Ike's own account of his opposition to the bombs.
Ike clearly describes that the conversation about the atomic bombs happened in a private dinner with Stimson, not in a general meeting with lots of other people including Truman himself.
Perhaps sensing that his claim that Bradley’s confirming account was fabricated might seem doubtful,
No fears on that account. The Bradley account is an obvious fabrication.
Maddox is forced to admit that one of Stimson’s aides recorded that Stimson and Eisenhower did in fact discuss the atomic bomb when the two had lunch at Ike’s HQ on July 27, even though Stimson’s diary for that day says nothing about it, which should warn us about making arguments from silence.
Forced to admit??
Maddox has no trouble admitting to facts.
This data from Stimson's aid is more confirmation that the Bradley account is a fabrication.
Maddox also noted that July 27 was after the final orders to drop the atomic bombs had already been sent out to the military and Stimson had left Potsdam to fly home.
Stimson was not in the same room with Truman again until after Hiroshima had already been bombed.
Even if Ike had been convincing, he was too late to stop the atomic bombs from being dropped.
And Ike's own account makes it pretty clear that he failed to convince Stimson of anything at all.
In reply to Maddox and other Truman defenders, Professor Gar Alperovitz has said the following:
Alperovitz is a known fraud.
(B) It is sometimes urged that there is no record of any of the military men directly advising President Truman not to use the atomic bomb--and that this must mean that they felt its use was justified at the time. However, this is speculation. The fact is there is also no record of military leaders advising President Truman to use the bomb:
We simply have little solid information one way or the other on what was said by top military leaders on the key question at the time: There are very few direct contemporaneous records on this subject. And there is certainly no formal recommendation that the atomic bomb be used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Either way, there is no record of anyone ever advising Mr. Truman against using the atomic bombs.
Here, for instance, is how General George C. Marshall put it in a discussion more than two months before Hiroshima was destroyed (McCloy memo, May 29, 1945):
... he thought these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave--telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers.... Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force. [THE DECISION, p. 53.]
That is exactly what we did do.
Hiroshima was Japan's primary military port.
Subsequent atomic bombs were aimed at enemy war industry.
Leaflets were dropped warning people to flee before we bombed.
The President's Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy--the man who presided over meetings of the Joint Chiefs--noted in his diary of June 18, 1945 (seven weeks
prior to the bombing of Hiroshima):
It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression. [THE DECISION, p. 324.]
(Leahy also stated subsequently something which should be obvious--namely that the Chief of Staff regularly made his views known to the President. His well-documented comments in a meeting with the President urging assurances for the Emperor this same day--June 18--are only one indication of this. Although we have no records of their private conversations, we know that the two men met to discuss matters of state every morning at 9:45 a.m. [THE DECISION, pp. 324-6.])
He was right. We got Japan to surrender on satisfactory terms.
There is also substantial, but less direct evidence (including some which seems to have come from President Truman himself) that General Arnold argued explicitly that the atomic bomb was not needed [THE DECISION, pp. 322-4; 335-7]--and as noted above, that Arnold instructed his deputy Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker that although he did not wish to press the point, he did not believe the bomb was needed. As also noted above, in his memoirs Arnold stated that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." [THE DECISION, p. 334.] (In this connection, as we shall discuss in Part III, it is commonly forgotten that by the time Hiroshima was bombed orders had already been given to alter targeting priorities so as to down-play city bombing. Although there were some difficulties in the field, the new priorities were on the verge of being moved into implementation as the war ended. [THE DECISION, p. 342-3.]) (
Decision: Part I)[/INDENT]
Did I mention that Alperovitz is a known fraud?
Alperovitz is maliciously misrepresenting what General Arnold said.