The Nuking of Nagasaki: Even More Immoral and Unnecessary than Hiroshima

[RetiredGySgt]

That is untrue.
The only reservation from total unconditional surrender the Japanese wanted, was some sort of protection for the Emperor.
That was because the role of Emperor was more than political, but also religious.

Of course we know exactly what the Japanese offered to the Soviets, but it was absolute.
They were willing to give up everything but the Emperor.

Be VERY SPECIFIC and link to the intercept that said that because the only intercepts I saw said wat I said and then another saying don't offer anything.

 

[Rigby5]

Be VERY SPECIFIC and link to the intercept that said that because the only intercepts I saw said wat I said and then another saying don't offer anything.

There were no intercepts involved.
The Soviets were our allies and wanted us to have all the latest communications from the Japanese.
Like I said, read the "Postdam Diaries".
Truman is clear that Stalin told him the Japanese were willing to give unconditional surrender, but were hoping to negotiate some protection of the Emperor.

{...

8/10/45 Diary Entry:

"Ate lunch at my desk and discussed the Jap offer to surrender which came in a couple of hours earlier. They wanted to make a condition precedent to the surrender. Our terms are 'unconditional'. They wanted to keep the Emperor. We told 'em we'd tell 'em how to keep him, but we'd make the terms."
...}

Hiroshima: The Harry Truman Diary and Papers

Harry Truman's Diary and the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima.

www.doug-long.com

 

[RetiredGySgt]

There were no intercepts involved.
The Soviets were our allies and wanted us to have all the latest communications from the Japanese.
Like I said, read the "Postdam Diaries".
Truman is clear that Stalin told him the Japanese were willing to give unconditional surrender, but were hoping to negotiate some protection of the Emperor.

{...

8/10/45 Diary Entry:

"Ate lunch at my desk and discussed the Jap offer to surrender which came in a couple of hours earlier. They wanted to make a condition precedent to the surrender. Our terms are 'unconditional'. They wanted to keep the Emperor. We told 'em we'd tell 'em how to keep him, but we'd make the terms."
...}

Hiroshima: The Harry Truman Diary and Papers

Harry Truman's Diary and the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima.

www.doug-long.com

Sorry but we do have the intercepts.

 

[Turtlesoup]

How many military personnel were killed in the bombings vs how many civilians?

Like it matters--------We were at war with the very EVIL japanese then and they needed to be bombed to stop them from killing others including their own. It had to be done, and our military did it.

 

[Unkotare]

Truman created the chairman position in 1949

You had better hurry and tell the Admiral.

Like it matters--------....

What do you think the topic of this thread is, stupid?

 

[Mac-7]

You had better hurry and tell the Admiral.

Why?

you are the one trying to rewrite history

 

[Unkotare]

Why?

you are the one trying to rewrite history

Because YOU are denying the Admiral's own words? You are suffering from a serious reverse-cognition problem.

 

[Mac-7]

Because YOU are denying the Admiral's own words?

Did the admiral promise that japan would not be a divided half communist country after the war?

and its just speculation that no invasion was necessary to begin with

 

[gipper]

Like it matters--------We were at war with the very EVIL japanese then and they needed to be bombed to stop them from killing others including their own. It had to be done, and our military did it.

Yet you don’t think Truman’s mass murdering defenseless women and children was NOT evil. Crazy!!!


The only obstacle to ending the war months earlier had been the Allied Powers insistence on unconditional surrender (which meant that the emperor could be removed from his figurehead position in Japan and perhaps even brought before a war crimes tribunal). That demand was intolerable for Japan’s military leaders, who regarded the emperor as a deity.


The USSR had declared war against Japan two days after Hiroshima was bombed on August 6. The USSR was hoping to regain some of the territories that had been lost to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War 40 years earlier. Stalin’s army had already begun advancing across Manchuria. Russia’s entry into the war had been encouraged by President Truman before he knew of the success of the atom bomb test in New Mexico on July 16.

But now, knowing how powerful the “Gimmick bomb” was, Truman and his strategists knew that they could force Japan’s surrender without Stalin’s help. So, not wanting to divide any of the spoils of war with the USSR, and because the US wanted to send an early cold war message to the USSR (that the US was the new planetary superpower because it was the only nation that had such powerful weapons), Truman ordered bomber command to deploy the two atomic bombs “as soon as they became available”.

The list of protected cities included Niigata, Kokura, Kyoto, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The intent was to preserve them as potential large population targets for the new weapon that had been developed in labs and manufacturing plants all across America under the auspices of the Manhattan Project.

Prior to August 6 and 9, the residents of those five cities had considered themselves fortunate for not having been fire-bombed as had the other large cities. Little did the residents of the doomed cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki know that they were only temporarily being spared a fate far worse than simply being burned to death.
The 77th Anniversary of the Bombing of Nagasaki - LewRockwell

 

[Markle]

But YOU do?

Certainly you do not. On an almost daily basis you seem to demand to remain ignorant about the extent to which the Emperor controlled the Japanese people.
Tens of thousands of military and civilians had already committed suicide and murdered their children rather than surrender.

 

[Unkotare]

Certainly you do not. On an almost daily basis you seem to demand to remain ignorant about the extent to which the Emperor controlled the Japanese people.
Tens of thousands of military and civilians had already committed suicide and murdered their children rather than surrender.

Read the thread before bringing up points that have already been addressed several times.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Unkotare
unkotare \ woon-ko-ta-re \ , noun;Japanese. Roughly translated as dripping poop. This word is used to describe a pornographic genre commonly known as Scat.

 

[Markle]

The anti-nuke cult can hypothize about whether the two bombs should have been dropped or not. Perhaps it gives them a false sense of superiority.

The bottom line is dropping the two bombs ENDED the war in weeks. Their battle plan did NOT.

QED

 

[Unkotare]

Admiral William Leahy, White House chief of staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war. Leahy wrote in his 1950 memoirs that "the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender."

 

[Mushroom]

Only the allies did indiscriminate bombing or deliberate firestorms to wipe out whole cities, like Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, etc.

That is only because neither the Germans, Italians, or Japanese invested much into heavy bombers. All three of those powers saw little use in such aircraft, and they are pretty much required if one is going to do massive bombing raids.

And the single Heavy Bomber that the Germans developed was essentially a flop. The He-177 was not ready for use until 1942, and it had serious issues. A weak frame, underpowered and slow, and with a low bomb load. And they were prone to mechanical failure and with catching fire that was never explained. And as with all other German Bombers, it was required to largely perform as a dive bomber. That stupid mandate prevented Germany from ever putting much into anything above small to medium bombers.

In one mission, 14 were assembled for a raid on London. One burst a tire on the runway. Eight more returned to base after taking off with either engine failure, or engines on fire. One was lost on approach to British night fighters, so only 4 of the 14 designated for the mission actually dropped bombs on target.

And the largest missions of the war for the He-177 were raids on Moscow. The largest in July 1944, where they managed to amass only 87 aircraft. But each bomber only had four 500 pound bombs, or a two 1,000 pound bomb. That makes it not even half the bomb load of a long range B-17 mission, and a quarter of the bomb load of a short range B-17 mission. And the US built over 10 times the number of B-17 bombers (12,731) than Germany did the He-177 (1,169).

Italy was even worse, with only 36 P.108 bombers built. They were constantly plagued by problems also, and by 1943 they only had 8 that were operational. At the time of the surrender, Italy had managed to return only 9 to operational condition. And all were converted to cargo aircraft because they were failures as bombers.

And for the Japanese, it was the Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bomber. Japan built 1,048 and they were very effective in carpet bombing cities in China. But it was only a medium bomber, with a payload of only 1,800 pounds. They did not have the range to attack the advancing Allied forces closing in on Japan, and by 1943 were largely relegated to long range reconnaissance. The Allies did not even get to within range of these bombers until July 1945 when they invaded Okinawa. And even then, their longest range fighter (Nakajima Ki-84 "Frank") was the only possible fighter they had to escort it.

But Germany did develop both the V-1 and V-2, and launched thousands of them. Large areas of London were leveled by them.

 

[Mushroom]

Sorry but we do have the intercepts.

Hell, we had already broken both their Naval Code, as well as their Diplomatic Code. We were reading their instructions to their Ambassador to the Soviets, and his responses back to Tokyo. And even he was telling his leadership that the attempt to arrange an armistice (not surrender, armistice) was doomed to failure because the Japanese leadership itself was unwilling to negotiate or compromise on any of their demands.

When even your own ambassador to a foreign nation is telling you that your demands were impossible, then it is obvious they never had any intention of "surrender". They still thought they were winning the war, and that nobody would ever conquer them.

I posted this before, here it is yet again.

Sato explained his duty as he saw it: “my first responsibility [is] to prevent the harboring of illusions which are at variance with reality.” The critical illusion his cables exposed is the myth that Japan’s leaders were near to ending the war by diplomacy prior to Hiroshima. Moreover, American code breaking delivered to American leaders, starting with President Harry S. Truman, Sato’s withering cross examination of Japanese diplomacy in his cables with Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo in Tokyo.

The sole Japanese diplomatic effort sanctioned by the key Japanese leadership was to secure the Soviet Union as a mediator to negotiate an end to the war. That effort ran through Sato. Decoded Japanese cables made American leaders fully aware that none of the Japanese diplomatic or military representatives in Europe who presented themselves as seeking peace on behalf of Japan carried actual sanction.

Japan’s one authorized diplomatic initiative required two things: 1) concessions that would enlist the Soviets as mediators; and 2) Japanese terms to end the war. Sato relentlessly exposed the fact that Japan never completed either of these two fundamental steps.

When Togo presented a pledge not to retain Japan’s conquests as “concessions” to secure Soviet mediation, Sato’s scathing reply was “How much effect do you expect our statements regarding the non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are about to lose will have on the Soviet authorities?” He added that mere “abstract statements” on concessions, which he slammed as “pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality,” would have no impact on “extremely realistic” Soviet authorities. And he then inserted the knife thrust: “If the Japanese empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our minds to terminate the war.” Sato thus charged that Japan’s leaders still lacked a real intent to end the war.

Togo’s reply acknowledged that Tokyo knew securing Soviet services for a proposal to send Prince Fumimaro Konoe, a former prime minister, to Moscow for talks would be difficult. Togo affirmed that Japan would not accept anything like unconditional surrender. Konoe represented the will of the emperor and he would have “positive intentions” to “negotiate details” to set up “a cooperative relationship between Japan and Russia.” Again, Togo only offered more of the “pretty little phrases” Sato had condemned.

Sato then went for the jugular. He insisted that the crucial proof that Japan seriously sought an end to the war would be a statement of Japan’s peace terms. Togo could not provide terms because even within the tiny inner circle who authorized the Soviet initiative, there was never serious discussion, much less agreement, on actual Japanese terms to end the war. This was clear both from Togo’s inability to present such terms to Sato and confirmed in post-war interviews with key officials who admitted they never agreed on concessions to obtain Soviet mediation, much less peace terms.

"Pretty Little Phrases": Japanese Diplomacy in 1945

Misguided Japanese diplomacy in 1945 helped to ensure that the war would not have a peaceful end.

www.nationalww2museum.org

 

[Mushroom]

Admiral William Leahy, White House chief of staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war. Leahy wrote in his 1950 memoirs that "the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender."

Fine, show us where the "Big Six" in any of their meetings prior to 6 August 1945 voted in any way other than 6 to 1 to continue the war forever no matter what, or where they actually arranged to offer any kind of reasonable terms to the Allies.

Anything said by anybody other than those Six individuals is absolutely meaningless.

 

[Unkotare]

 

[Unkotare]

This is clown material. We've had this same discussion at least twice, and you just keep repeating your drivel. Now, there are very good, scholarly books that provide detailed discussions on the Japanese peace feelers, the fact that most of them were supported by senior Japanese leaders, and the moderates' efforts--supported by the emperor--to bring about an early surrender. Read Gar Alperovitz's still-unrefuted book The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, or Washington State University professor Noriko Kawamura's book Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, or John Toland's book The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, or Lester Brooks' book Behind Japan's Surrender.

Let's review, yet again, the evidence regarding Japan's peace feelers:

-- In April 1945, none other than Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan’s Foreign Minister at the time, approached the Swedish minister to Japan and asked if Sweden would be willing to mediate a surrender agreement with the U.S. Now, I would say that a peace feeler done by Japan’s Foreign Minister was both official and very high level.

Shigemitsu’s effort did not succeed, but that was only because his successor, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, believed that a more powerful intermediary should be approached. Togo did not object to the approach on principle, but only to the proposed intermediary. Togo suggested that the Soviets be approached to mediate a surrender with the U.S.

-- Another peace feeler was carried out in Berne, Switzerland, by Yoshiro Fujimura, the Japanese naval attache in Berne, and had the backing of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy Minister; General Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of Operations; and Admiral Sokichi Takagi, who even offered to fly to Switzerland to open formal negotiations. On May 3, three months before Hiroshima, Dr. Heck, the German intermediary in the approach, was informed by the office of Allen Dulles that the U.S. State Department had authorized direct negotiations with the Fujimura group. Allen Dulles was the head of the OSS office in Switzerland and had numerous high connections, including in the White House.

Fujimura contacted the Navy Ministry and made them aware of his negotiations with the Dulles people. On May 23, the Navy Ministry sent Fujimura a reply, signed by the Navy Minister: the ministry advised him to be cautious but did *not* shut down the approach.

Yonai then informed Foreign Minister Togo of the negotiations, and Togo authorized Yonai to have the Fujimura group explore the Dulles proposal more thoroughly.

So the claim that the approach to Dulles was some meaningless low-level effort that had no backing in Tokyo is demonstrably incorrect. The hardliners eventually succeeded in killing the Fujimura approach to Dulles, but it was not a meaningless effort with no high-level support.

And why were the militarists able to shut down this peace feeler? And why were they able to repeatedly block the moderates' efforts to bring about a surrender? Because they were able to stress that there was no guarantee that the emperor would not be deposed in a surrender. This was militarists' trump card, and they were able to play it over and over again against the moderates, thanks to Truman's foolish, disastrous refusal to simply give a private assurance that the emperor would not be deposed if Japan surrendered.

We know that on June 4, two months before Hiroshima, Truman received a report on this peace feeler. The report stated that the Fujimura people “particularly stress” the need to maintain the emperor in any surrender in order “to avoid Communism and chaos.” The report added that Fujimura had emphasized the fact that Japan could no longer supply herself with “essential foodstuffs,” i.e., the people were beginning to starve.

On June 22, Truman received another memo on the Fujimura-Dulles peace talks. The memo advised him that “Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained.”

So Truman knew, long before Hiroshima, that the only real obstacle to a surrender was his refusal to assure the Japanese that the emperor would not be deposed if they surrendered.

-- The second peace feeler in Switzerland involved General Seigo Okamoto, the Japanese military attache in Berne, and two Japanese officials at the International Bank of Settlements in Basel. Not only was Okamoto a general and the head of the Japanese attache office in Berne, he was a close friend of General Yoshijiru Omezu, the Japanese Army Chief of Staff. This feeler also involved Per Jacobsson, a Swiss bank director. This was not Jacobsson’s first involvement with back-door peace negotiations: he had persuaded De Valera to negotiate with the British in 1935.

This approach was made to Gero Gaevernitz, Dulles’s second-in-command, and to Dulles himself. Gaevernitz was no stranger to back-door negotiations either: he had recently masterminded the surrender of all German forces in Italy.

When Jacobsson met with Dulles and Gaevernitz, he told them that the Japanese moderates were doing their best to bring about a surrender but that the Allied demand for unconditional surrender was greatly helping the hardliners. Jacobsson further told Dulles that the only real Japanese condition for surrender was that the emperor not be deposed. Following this meeting, Dulles placed a call to Potsdam.

We also know that on July 13, nearly a month before Hiroshima, Dulles sent a message about his contact with Jacobsson to Potsdam in which he advised that it had been indicated to him that “the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family.”

William Donovan, the head of the OSS, sent a follow-up message to Truman on July 16 about the Dulles-Jacobsson meeting and stated that Jacobsson advised that Japanese officials had stressed only two conditions for surrender, namely, that the emperor be retained and that there be the “possibility” of retaining the Meiji Constitution.

-- Furthermore, Emperor Hirohito himself authorized the effort to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender with the U.S., and Truman was aware of this fact from Foreign Minister Togo’s July 12 cable. Hirohito even wanted to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a special envoy to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender deal with the U.S. I’d say that a peace feeler pushed by the Foreign Minister and strongly backed by Emperor Hirohito was about as substantial, official, and high ranking as you could get.

These peace feelers, and others, are discussed in detail by John Toland in The Rising Sun, by Lester Brooks in Behind Japan’s Surrender, and by Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.

Incidentally, the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian website includes an article on the Japanese peace feelers, and it documents that American high officials were aware of these efforts:

The contents of certain of these papers [Japanese messages and memos about the peace feelers] were known to United States officials in Washington, however, as early as July 13 (see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), page 74; cf. pages 75–76) and information on Japanese peace maneuvers was received by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson at Babelsberg on July 16 (see volume II, document No. 1236, footnote 4). It has also been determined that a series of messages of Japanese origin on this subject was received by the United States Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference and that these messages were circulated at Babelsberg to some members of the President’s party. Furthermore, in a conference on January 24, 1956, between Truman and members of his staff and Department of State historians, Truman supplied the information that he was familiar with the contents of the first Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the proposal contained in document No. 582) before Stalin mentioned it to him at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 87) and that he was familiar with the contents of the second Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the approach reported in document No. 1234) before Stalin brought it to the attention of Truman and Attlee at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 28 (see volume II, page 460).​

Are you ever going to start telling the truth about this stuff?

^^^^^

 

[Mushroom]

View attachment 524823

And once again, you make no significant reply when confronted with the simple facts that Japan was not trying to surrender.

They were only willing to consider an armistice. One that even their own ambassador said was a joke nobody would listen to.

An armistice is not a surrender.