I forget... was Jim Crow repealed?
by liberals.
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I forget... was Jim Crow repealed?
Rewriting a law is not the use of logic. It is an overstep of the Courts power.
not one word was rewritten. the text of the law has NOT changed.
fail
read the decision if you can...
I forget... was Jim Crow repealed?
by liberals.
He's on my ignore list. Yeah. Republicans thwarted the Democrat South to pass it over the likes of KKK Byrd and Gore Sr.I forget... was Jim Crow repealed?
by liberals.
Panty, wrong again...
kkk started by democrats - Google Search
Rewriting a law is not the use of logic. It is an overstep of the Courts power.
not one word was rewritten. the text of the law has NOT changed.
fail
read the decision if you can...
False. Congress said "penalty."
SCOTUS (CJ Roberts) said their wrods didn't control. It was a tax. It only got sustained because ROBERTS said it was a tax. And that is also an absurd basis to sustain it.
For it is either within the enumerated powers or it isn't. And it isn't. Therefore, there is nothing on which the Congress could properly assert their taxing authority.
It is double speak gone mad in the guise of what used to be authoritative SCOTUS rulings.
I forget... was Jim Crow repealed?
by liberals.
Panty, wrong again...
kkk started by democrats - Google Search
White Southern Conservatives started the KKK. They just happen to be Democrats or Republicans depending on which side is for the negros.
"If the Affordable Care Act imposed a mandate, it was ordering people to buy insurance, and nobody likes to be told what to do by the government. But if it was a tax, then it actually gave people a choice: Pay a small tax, or buy health insurance. And if you actually read the bill, that's exactly what the law said. The mandate was directed at "taxpayer". Every taxpayer not otherwise exempted had to indicate on their tax return if they had health insurance, and if they didn't, they had to pay a small penalty."
Tax power: The little argument that could - CNN.com
and
FactCheck.org : How Much Is the Obamacare ‘Tax’?
.
White Southern Conservatives started the KKK. They just happen to be Democrats or Republicans depending on which side is for the negros.
Pante, rolmao, typical progressive liberal spin with no proof again...
i forget... Was jim crow repealed?
by liberals.
panty, wrong again...
kkk started by democrats - google search
not one word was rewritten. the text of the law has NOT changed.
fail
read the decision if you can...
False. Congress said "penalty."
SCOTUS (CJ Roberts) said their wrods didn't control. It was a tax. It only got sustained because ROBERTS said it was a tax. And that is also an absurd basis to sustain it.
For it is either within the enumerated powers or it isn't. And it isn't. Therefore, there is nothing on which the Congress could properly assert their taxing authority.
It is double speak gone mad in the guise of what used to be authoritative SCOTUS rulings.
Odd how a great legal mind like yours never links to what you are criticizing with such authority. Sounds like a lot of bullshit if you ask me.
Roberts did not just say the shared responsibility payment was a tax and not a penalty. Roberts cited precedent and more for what he did and says.
You?
Roberts' ruling does NOT give Congress authority to assert their taxing authority on anything they like. You're making shit up again. Like the Heritage Foundation does.
The Heritage Foundation's constitutional law expert, Todd Gaziano, fired back last week at people who have said the group came up with the idea of a law that requires everyone to buy health insurance also known as the individual mandate. It wasnt really our idea."
Page 6 of the Heritage Foundation
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1989/pdf/hl218.pdf
Quoting the Heritage Foundation without first checking under the beds and rugs is now like linking to FOX News for a truthful reference to what is factual (Obamacare struck down!). I may have linked to them, but not for the purposes of veracity.
and it wasn't Democrats, progressives, or liberals who started calling you people "free riders"
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act,however, are creatures of Congresss own creation. Howthey relate to each other is up to Congress, and the bestevidence of Congresss intent is the statutory text. Wehave thus applied the Anti-Injunction Act to statutorilydescribed taxes even where that label was inaccurate.See
Bailey
v.
George
, 259 U. S. 16 (1922) (Anti-Injunction Act applies to Child Labor Tax struck down as exceedingCongresss taxing power in
Drexel Furniture
).Congress can, of course, describe something as a penaltybut direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for pur-poses of the Anti-Injunction Act. For example, 26 U. S. C.§6671(a) provides that any reference in this title to taximposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to thepenalties and liabilities provided by subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code. Penalties in subchapter 68Bare thus treated as taxes under Title 26, which includesthe Anti-Injunction Act. The individual mandate, how-ever, is not in subchapter 68B of the Code. Nor does anyother provision state that references to taxes in Title 26shall also be deemed to apply to the individual mandate.
Amicus
attempts to show that Congress did render the Anti-Injunction Act applicable to the individual mandate,albeit by a more circuitous route. Section 5000A(g)(1) spec-ifies that the penalty for not complying with the man-date shall be assessed and collected in the same manneras an assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter68. Assessable penalties in subchapter 68B, in turn,shall be assessed and collected in the same manner astaxes. §6671(a). According to
amicus
, by directing thatthe penalty be assessed and collected in the same man-ner as taxes, §5000A(g)(1) made the Anti-Injunction Actapplicable to this penalty.
Opinion of R
OBERTS
,
C. J.
14 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENTBUSINESS
v.
SEBELIUS
Opinion of the Court
The Government disagrees. It argues that §5000A(g)(1)does not direct courts to apply the Anti-Injunction Act,because §5000A(g) is a directive only to the Secretary of the Treasury to use the same methodology and proce-dures to collect the penalty that he uses to collect taxes.Brief for United States 3233 (quoting
Seven-Sky
, 661F. 3d, at 11).We think the Government has the better reading. Asit observes, Assessment and Collection are chapters of the Internal Revenue Code providing the Secretary author-ity to assess and collect taxes, and generally specifyingthe means by which he shall do so. See §6201 (assess-ment authority); §6301 (collection authority). Section5000A(g)(1)s command that the penalty be assessed andcollected in the same manner as taxes is best read asreferring to those chapters and giving the Secretary thesame authority and guidance with respect to the penalty.That interpretation is consistent with the remainder of §5000A(g), which instructs the Secretary on the tools hemay use to collect the penalty. See §5000A(g)(2)(A) (bar-ring criminal prosecutions); §5000A(g)(2)(B) (prohibitingthe Secretary from using notices of lien and levies). The Anti-Injunction Act, by contrast, says nothing about theprocedures to be used in assessing and collecting taxes.
It is of course true that the Act describes the payment asa penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to theapplication of the Anti-Injunction Act,
supra
, at 1213, itdoes not determine whether the payment may be viewedas an exercise of Congresss taxing power. It is up to Con-gress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to anyparticular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Con-gresss choice of label on that question. That choice doesnot, however, control whether an exaction is within Con-gresss constitutional power to tax.Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two
Opinion of R
OBERTS
,
C. J.
34 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENTBUSINESS
v.
SEBELIUS
Opinion of the Court
challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day. Inthe first, we held that a suit to enjoin collection of the so-called tax was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
George
,259 U. S., at 20. Congress knew that suits to obstructtaxes had to await payment under the Anti-Injunction Act; Congress called the child labor tax a tax; Congresstherefore intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply. Inthe second case, however, we held that the same exaction,although labeled a tax, was not in fact authorized by Con-gresss taxing power.
Drexel Furniture
, 259 U. S., at 38.That constitutional question was not controlled by Con-gresss choice of label.We have similarly held that exactions not labeled taxesnonetheless were authorized by Congresss power to tax.In the
License Tax Cases
, for example, we held that federallicenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which thelicensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercisesof the taxing power. 5 Wall., at 471. And in
New York
v.
United States
we upheld as a tax a surcharge on out-of-state nuclear waste shipments, a portion of which waspaid to the Federal Treasury. 505 U. S., at 171. We thusask whether the shared responsibility payment fallswithin Congresss taxing power, [d]isregarding the designa-tion of the exaction, and viewing its substance and appli-cation.
United States
v.
Constantine
, 296 U. S. 287, 294(1935); cf.
Quill Corp.
v.
North Dakota
, 504 U. S. 298, 310(1992) ([M]agic words or labels should not disable anotherwise constitutional levy (internal quotation marksomitted));
Nelson
v.
Sears
,
Roebuck & Co.
, 312 U. S. 359,363 (1941) (In passing on the constitutionality of a taxlaw, we are concerned only with its practical operation,not its definition or the precise form of descriptive wordswhich may be applied to it (internal quotation marksomitted));
United States
v.
Sotelo
, 436 U. S. 268, 275(1978) (That the funds due are referred to as a penalty
Opinion of R
OBERTS
,
C. J.
35Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)Opinion of the Court
. . . does not alter their essential character as taxes.
7
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For ex-ample, in
Drexel Furniture
, we focused on three practicalcharacteristics of the so-called tax on employing childlaborers that convinced us the tax was actually a pen-alty. First, the tax imposed an exceedingly heavy bur-den10 percent of a companys net incomeon those whoemployed children, no matter how small their infraction.Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who know-ingly employed underage laborers. Such scienter require-ments are typical of punitive statutes, because Congressoften wishes to punish only those who intentionally breakthe law. Third, this tax was enforced in part by theDepartment of Labor, an agency responsible for pun-ishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue. 259U. S., at 3637; see also,
e.g., Kurth Ranch
, 511 U. S., at780782 (considering,
inter alia
, the amount of the exac-tion, and the fact that it was imposed for violation of aseparate criminal law);
Constantine
,
supra
, at 295 (same).The same analysis here suggests that the shared re-sponsibility payment may for constitutional purposes beconsidered a tax, not a penalty: * * * *
Rewriting a law is not the use of logic. It is an overstep of the Courts power.
Rewriting a law is not the use of logic. It is an overstep of the Courts power.
The law was not re-written. The mandate was de facto a tax, no matter what anyone called it.
You can call a horse a Studebaker, but it doesn't stop being a horse.
Rewriting a law is not the use of logic. It is an overstep of the Courts power.
The law was not re-written. The mandate was de facto a tax, no matter what anyone called it.
You can call a horse a Studebaker, but it doesn't stop being a horse.
But it was only a tax when the penalty had to be CALLED a tax. Congress chose its words carefully, but the majority reworded them to force fit their conclusion.
And in a fit of dishonesty, the majority THEN said that the tax WASN'T a tax for purposes of the anti-injunction Act. Their basis? Congress is presumed to choose its words carefully and for a reason.
Such blatant glaring sophistry.
No wonder you libs endorse it.
False. Congress said "penalty."
SCOTUS (CJ Roberts) said their wrods didn't control. It was a tax. It only got sustained because ROBERTS said it was a tax. And that is also an absurd basis to sustain it.
For it is either within the enumerated powers or it isn't. And it isn't. Therefore, there is nothing on which the Congress could properly assert their taxing authority.
It is double speak gone mad in the guise of what used to be authoritative SCOTUS rulings.
Odd how a great legal mind like yours never links to what you are criticizing with such authority. Sounds like a lot of bullshit if you ask me.
Roberts did not just say the shared responsibility payment was a tax and not a penalty. Roberts cited precedent and more for what he did and says.
You?
Roberts' ruling does NOT give Congress authority to assert their taxing authority on anything they like. You're making shit up again. Like the Heritage Foundation does.
The Heritage Foundation's constitutional law expert, Todd Gaziano, fired back last week at people who have said the group came up with the idea of a law that requires everyone to buy health insurance also known as the individual mandate. It wasnt really our idea."
Page 6 of the Heritage Foundation
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1989/pdf/hl218.pdf
Quoting the Heritage Foundation without first checking under the beds and rugs is now like linking to FOX News for a truthful reference to what is factual (Obamacare struck down!). I may have linked to them, but not for the purposes of veracity.
and it wasn't Democrats, progressives, or liberals who started calling you people "free riders"
1) I cited the opinion itself several times the day it came out and unlike you, not only did I read it, but I understood (correctly) what I read, Dainty, you dip shit.
Once again: CJ Roberts specifically chose to denigrate the words CHOSEN by Congress in the LAW written BY Congress. They said "penalty." He said their words were not controlling, you sub-imbecile. He said, they may have used the term "penalty," but really it's a "Tax."
But CJ Roberts argued it WAS a tax for one purpose and NOT a tax for another purpose (as I already noted and as explicitly noted by the Dissenting Justices). Pure unadulterated sophistry:
CJ Roberts would have us believe that (a) It IS NOT A TAX when being a tax would prevent the Court from ruling on it:
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act,however, are creatures of Congresss own creation. Howthey relate to each other is up to Congress, and the bestevidence of Congresss intent is the statutory text. We have thus applied the Anti-Injunction Act to statutorily described taxes even where that label was inaccurate.See
Bailey
v.
George
, 259 U. S. 16 (1922) (Anti-Injunction Act applies to Child Labor Tax struck down as exceedingCongresss taxing power in
Drexel Furniture
).Congress can, of course, describe something as a penaltybut direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for pur-poses of the Anti-Injunction Act. For example, 26 U. S. C.§6671(a) provides that any reference in this title to taximposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to thepenalties and liabilities provided by subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code. Penalties in subchapter 68Bare thus treated as taxes under Title 26, which includesthe Anti-Injunction Act. The individual mandate, how-ever, is not in subchapter 68B of the Code. Nor does anyother provision state that references to taxes in Title 26shall also be deemed to apply to the individual mandate.
Amicus
attempts to show that Congress did render the Anti-Injunction Act applicable to the individual mandate,albeit by a more circuitous route. Section 5000A(g)(1) spec-ifies that the penalty for not complying with the man-date shall be assessed and collected in the same manneras an assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter68. Assessable penalties in subchapter 68B, in turn,shall be assessed and collected in the same manner astaxes. §6671(a). According to
amicus
, by directing thatthe penalty be assessed and collected in the same man-ner as taxes, §5000A(g)(1) made the Anti-Injunction Actapplicable to this penalty.
Opinion of R
OBERTS
,
C. J.
14 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENTBUSINESS
v.
SEBELIUS
Opinion of the Court
The Government disagrees. It argues that §5000A(g)(1)does not direct courts to apply the Anti-Injunction Act,because §5000A(g) is a directive only to the Secretary of the Treasury to use the same methodology and proce-dures to collect the penalty that he uses to collect taxes.Brief for United States 3233 (quoting
Seven-Sky
, 661F. 3d, at 11).We think the Government has the better reading. Asit observes, Assessment and Collection are chapters of the Internal Revenue Code providing the Secretary author-ity to assess and collect taxes, and generally specifyingthe means by which he shall do so. See §6201 (assess-ment authority); §6301 (collection authority). Section5000A(g)(1)s command that the penalty be assessed andcollected in the same manner as taxes is best read asreferring to those chapters and giving the Secretary thesame authority and guidance with respect to the penalty.That interpretation is consistent with the remainder of §5000A(g), which instructs the Secretary on the tools hemay use to collect the penalty. See §5000A(g)(2)(A) (bar-ring criminal prosecutions); §5000A(g)(2)(B) (prohibitingthe Secretary from using notices of lien and levies). The Anti-Injunction Act, by contrast, says nothing about theprocedures to be used in assessing and collecting taxes.
YET, CJ Roberts would have us believe that (b) It IS A TAX when being a tax would make the Act "Constitutionally permissible:"
It is of course true that the Act describes the payment asa penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to theapplication of the Anti-Injunction Act,
supra
, at 1213, itdoes not determine whether the payment may be viewedas an exercise of Congresss taxing power. It is up to Con-gress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to anyparticular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Con-gresss choice of label on that question. That choice doesnot, however, control whether an exaction is within Con-gresss constitutional power to tax.Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two
Opinion of R
OBERTS
,
C. J.
34 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENTBUSINESS
v.
SEBELIUS
Opinion of the Court
challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day. Inthe first, we held that a suit to enjoin collection of the so-called tax was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
George
,259 U. S., at 20. Congress knew that suits to obstructtaxes had to await payment under the Anti-Injunction Act; Congress called the child labor tax a tax; Congresstherefore intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply. Inthe second case, however, we held that the same exaction,although labeled a tax, was not in fact authorized by Con-gresss taxing power.
Drexel Furniture
, 259 U. S., at 38.That constitutional question was not controlled by Con-gresss choice of label.We have similarly held that exactions not labeled taxesnonetheless were authorized by Congresss power to tax.In the
License Tax Cases
, for example, we held that federallicenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which thelicensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercisesof the taxing power. 5 Wall., at 471. And in
New York
v.
United States
we upheld as a tax a surcharge on out-of-state nuclear waste shipments, a portion of which waspaid to the Federal Treasury. 505 U. S., at 171. We thusask whether the shared responsibility payment fallswithin Congresss taxing power, [d]isregarding the designa-tion of the exaction, and viewing its substance and appli-cation.
United States
v.
Constantine
, 296 U. S. 287, 294(1935); cf.
Quill Corp.
v.
North Dakota
, 504 U. S. 298, 310(1992) ([M]agic words or labels should not disable anotherwise constitutional levy (internal quotation marksomitted));
Nelson
v.
Sears
,
Roebuck & Co.
, 312 U. S. 359,363 (1941) (In passing on the constitutionality of a taxlaw, we are concerned only with its practical operation,not its definition or the precise form of descriptive wordswhich may be applied to it (internal quotation marksomitted));
United States
v.
Sotelo
, 436 U. S. 268, 275(1978) (That the funds due are referred to as a penalty
Opinion of R
OBERTS
,
C. J.
35Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)Opinion of the Court
. . . does not alter their essential character as taxes.
7
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For ex-ample, in
Drexel Furniture
, we focused on three practicalcharacteristics of the so-called tax on employing childlaborers that convinced us the tax was actually a pen-alty. First, the tax imposed an exceedingly heavy bur-den10 percent of a companys net incomeon those whoemployed children, no matter how small their infraction.Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who know-ingly employed underage laborers. Such scienter require-ments are typical of punitive statutes, because Congressoften wishes to punish only those who intentionally breakthe law. Third, this tax was enforced in part by theDepartment of Labor, an agency responsible for pun-ishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue. 259U. S., at 3637; see also,
e.g., Kurth Ranch
, 511 U. S., at780782 (considering,
inter alia
, the amount of the exac-tion, and the fact that it was imposed for violation of aseparate criminal law);
Constantine
,
supra
, at 295 (same).The same analysis here suggests that the shared re-sponsibility payment may for constitutional purposes beconsidered a tax, not a penalty: * * * *
Scotus.opinion
PURE sophistry.
It is a tax when we want it to be because we can erase what Congress said about it and call it a tax even if they called it a penalty -- BUT -- we can also revere their choice of words when we need to call it something OTHER than a tax because well, because we can.
Dainty: you are DENYING what CJ Roberts himself did.
The law was not re-written. The mandate was de facto a tax, no matter what anyone called it.
You can call a horse a Studebaker, but it doesn't stop being a horse.
But it was only a tax when the penalty had to be CALLED a tax. Congress chose its words carefully, but the majority reworded them to force fit their conclusion.
And in a fit of dishonesty, the majority THEN said that the tax WASN'T a tax for purposes of the anti-injunction Act. Their basis? Congress is presumed to choose its words carefully and for a reason.
Such blatant glaring sophistry.
No wonder you libs endorse it.
That doesn't refute what I said.
No we're not. We have each other.I hope it works, 'cause if Obamacare sticks, we're fucked!
"If the Affordable Care Act imposed a mandate, it was ordering people to buy insurance, and nobody likes to be told what to do by the government. But if it was a tax, then it actually gave people a choice: Pay a small tax, or buy health insurance. And if you actually read the bill, that's exactly what the law said. The mandate was directed at "taxpayer". Every taxpayer not otherwise exempted had to indicate on their tax return if they had health insurance, and if they didn't, they had to pay a small penalty."
Tax power: The little argument that could - CNN.com
and
FactCheck.org : How Much Is the Obamacare Tax?
.
"But if it was a tax, then it actually gave people a choice: Pay a small tax, or buy health insurance."
Ya, don't foget you can VOTE THEM OUT!
And you can see why I have that liar on ignore.
White Southern Conservatives started the KKK. They just happen to be Democrats or Republicans depending on which side is for the negros.
Pante, rolmao, typical progressive liberal spin with no proof again...