And your rambling incoherent explanation somehow fails to realize that rates are high PRECISELY BECAUSE gov't (Medicaid/Medicare) reimburse at such low rates doctors must make it up on private insurance.
There isn't much evidence to indicate a significant cost shift associated with the existing public payers. In its
last report to Congress on Medicare payment policy, MedPAC pushed back against this suggestion pretty hard (all emphasis is mine):
"Why are profit margins on privately insured patients so high? Is it because hospitals under financial stress tend to have significant Medicare losses, which force them to have relatively high private-payer prices? The answer is no.
We find instead that hospitals under financial pressure tend to control their costs, which makes it more likely that they profit from Medicare patients. In fact, we find that Medicare margins are lowest in the hospitals with abundant resources (i.e., low financial pressure). Therefore, it appears that hospitals are raising prices when they have the market power to do so. As revenue rises, costs rise, and Medicare margins fall. Our key findings are:
- Costs vary widely from hospital to hospital.
- An abundance of financial resources is associated with higher costs.
- Higher costs cause losses on Medicare patients.
- As a result, hospitals with abundant financial resources tend to have Medicare losses.
- In contrast, hospitals with limited financial resources constrain their costs. Medicare payments are usually adequate to cover the costs of these financially pressured hospitals.
The Commission has argued that
high profits from non-Medicare sources permit hospitals to spend more, and nonprofit hospitals tend to do so (for-profit hospitals may retain a larger share of their revenues as profits). The causal chain is as follows: A hospital’s market power relative to insurers, payer mix, and donations determines its level of financial resources. When financial resources are abundant, nonprofit hospitals spend more, add employees, and increase their costs per unit of service. High costs by definition lead to lower Medicare margins because costs do not affect Medicare revenues (which are based on predetermined payment rates). Therefore, when costs increase, Medicare margins ((revenue – costs)/revenue) decrease.
In other words, income affects spending and costs per unit of service. Hence, if Medicare were to increase its payment rates, hospitals might spend some or all of that revenue rather than use it to lower the prices charged to private insurers. [. . .]
The data indicate that the hospitals with the largest Medicare losses tend to be in better financial shape than other hospitals. From 2002 to 2006, hospitals with low Medicare margins had median total (all payer) margins of 4.6 percent compared with 3.4 percent for hospitals with high Medicare margins. In addition, net worth for the high-cost hospitals rose by 17 percent from 2004 to 2006 compared with a 14 percent rise for low-cost hospitals. While causation may flow in both directions to a degree, the data suggest that the primary reason Medicare margins are inversely related to private-payer profits is that high non-Medicare profits are followed by high hospital costs.
It may appear odd that hospitals with high costs have high total profit margins. In a typical industry, high profits are not associated with high unit costs. The hospital industry is different, however, because of the dominance of nonprofit providers, the influence of payer mix, hospital and insurer market power, and the effect of investments and donations on hospital finances.
Increasing Medicare payments is not a long-term solution to the problem of rising private insurance premiums and rising health care costs. In the end, affordable health care will require incentives for health care providers to reduce their rates of cost growth and volume growth."
So this "solution" will actually make things worse. People on a "public option" will have fewer choices as fewer physicians accept the public option care because of low reimbursement rates.
You argue this at the same time you argue it will be an attractive option for most people in the individual market.
The existence of more ultra low reimbursement rates will cause those remaining doctors and health orgs to raise rates for everyone else to subsidize those paid out of public option.
Therein lies the feature that distinguishes the public option for Medicaid or Medicaid: it's an
option. Medicare and Medicaid are not open to you, thus their payment policies don't affect the relationship between your payer and provider. There is no credible threat that if they don't control premium increases you'll go buy insurance from Medicare because you can't do that.
That's the entire reason cost shifting can even occur, theoretically (though, as I said, there's limited evidence that it happens to any significant degree). You cost shift from A to B
because B can't join A. If B
could join A then, as you correctly point out, cost shifting would encourage him to do so.
Now imagine A is an available option (that is, an open public option, instead of the closed off Medicare). Since A reimburses at a lower rate than B, a provider would have very little incentive to take actions to shift B to A. Medicare + 5% will cover provider costs, meaning there's no necessity and nothing to be gained from attempting to drive up premiums on non-public payers. In fact, the incentive for the provider is now to reduce his own markups on medical services for private payers, allow them to control the growth in their own premiums, and reduce the disparity in premiums between public and private options.
Then private payers continue to have abundant customers and since they pay more (though, if all goes well, not too much more) than the public option, providers are better off. In other words, easing their upward pressure on private payer premiums ultimately helps providers financially because it prevents an exodus of customers from private plans to the public plan (which, again, reimburses less).
Cost shifting in such a situation makes absolutely no sense and certainly isn't financially necessary.
In the real world a private company attempting to reimburse at below market rates would go out of business since no one would accept their coverage and insureds would find better plans.
There is no "market rate" for provider reimbursements. Different payers will pay the same provider different rates for the exact same service. That is, unless you have all-payer rate setting (which, as I said earlier in this thread, I'll post a thread about in the near future).