The Reckoning
Israel must grapple first with its enemies, and then with the failures of its own government.
By Yossi Klein Halevi
Israel faces two very different reckonings. The first is with our enemies.
Until now, Netanyahu and his right-wing allies viewed Hamas as a kind of strategic asset: So long as it was in power in Gaza, a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was impossible. For that reason, in addition to effectively bribing Hamas to refrain from attacking Israel, Netanyahu allowed massive infusions of cash from Qatar to prop up the Hamas government.
Besides Netanyahu’s delusion that Hamas could be politically useful, successive Israeli governments had other reasons to stop short of removing Hamas. The price of such a military conflict, in the loss of both Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians, would be horrific. And now all-out war with Hamas would mean an almost certain death sentence for the 150 Israeli hostages it has seized in its attacks.
Israel is hardly blameless. Understandably but disastrously, many Israelis have conflated security fears, which justify a military presence in the West Bank, with historical and religious longings for the biblical land we call Judea and Samaria. Those longings are the basis for the settlement enterprise, whose political goal is to preclude any solution to the Palestinian tragedy. And in recent months we have seen an outrageous rise in settler violence against innocent Palestinians. Even as we protect ourselves from Hamas, we need to oppose those among us who would emulate Hamas.
Israel’s second reckoning, which must await the end of the war, will be with Benjamin Netanyahu. Following the Yom Kippur War, a lone reservist named Motti Ashkenazi began a hunger strike outside the office of Prime Minister Golda Meir, demanding that she take responsibility for the joint Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack and resign. The Agranat Commission, a government-appointed inquiry headed by Israeli Supreme Court Chief Justice Shimon Agranat, focused on the failures of the military leadership and avoided blaming the politicians. But an enraged public rallied around Ashkenazi and, six months after the war, the prime minister resigned.
If anything, the rage many Israelis feel today toward Netanyahu is far greater. By tearing apart the country in his attempt to weaken the courts, he knowingly undermined Israeli deterrence. He was repeatedly warned by the IDF of the likely consequences of his judicial revolution, in terms of both the IDF’s readiness for war and the willingness of Israel’s enemies to test its weakness. Netanyahu ignored the warnings, even refusing at one point to meet with the IDF chief, Herzi Halevi.
Israel must grapple first with its enemies, and then with the failures of its own government.
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