CHAPTER 5
A Strategic Framework for Korea
“Either [North Korea] is going to …invade the South…or it will collapse internally, or implode because of the incredible economic problems the country faces; or third, it will over time lead to some peaceful resolution with the South.”John Deutch
Former Director of Central Intelligence
1996
It is no wonder that there is no comprehensive strategy for dealing with North Korea with three such diverse scenarios put forth by the Intelligence Community. While on the one hand this statement can certainly be looked at as one covering all the bases, it is really illustrative of the complexities that policy makers and strategists have faced when thinking about the “Korea Question.” On the one hand the military of both the ROK and the US are obligated to plan for the worst case scenario and for the past 51 years this has been the main effort in planning. However, for the ROK Government, particularly with the rise of the liberal, center-left leaders in South Korea, such as Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, the focus has been on peaceful resolution and even co-existence. Finally the collapse and implosion/explosion scenarios have been deemed as too complex for most planners.
This paper has examined the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula, the nature of the Kim Family Regime and the state of the ROK-US alliance and the policy differences that exist. The remainder of this paper will chart out a strategy of “Comprehensive Engagement with Strength: Partner and Prosper” that should be considered for adoption as a combined strategy by the ROK and US.
Why a Combined Strategy
The Korean Peninsula has a unique 5000 year history but for the past 150 years it has been intertwined with the US and for the past 51 years the ROK and US have been inextricably linked. Despite the rising tide of anti-Americanism in South Korea and feelings of ambivalence if not resentment toward the ROK by a growing number of Americans due to that anti-American sentiment, the US cannot extricate itself from the ROK for two main reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, the US has a responsibility to help solve the “Korea Question” because, like it or not, it has had a hand in causing the division of the Peninsula.
The second reason is that it is a vital interest of the United States to be fully engaged in Northeast Asia and to ensure security and economic prosperity for the region and for the US. The status quo offers a measure of stability, but the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely. While crises have occurred in the past 51 years, not even the nuclear crisis will compare to the twin potential disasters of collapse or war and the potential for the devastation of the Peninsula, the huge toll in human suffering, and the damage to the regional, US, and world economies. There is no doubt that war must be as a minimum forestalled and at best deterred but when Kim Jong Il is faced with imminent collapse his only option to guarantee his survival may be to execute his military campaign to reunify the Peninsula. There may be nothing that can deter Kim when he is faced with such an untenable situation as imminent regime collapse and loss of control of the regime and the nation. Therefore, as it has for 51 years the alliance must continue to prepare to defeat an attack from the North. Conversely, if there is regime collapse and the internal situation turns chaotic and violent with attendant humanitarian disaster, the alliance must also be prepared with a military response as well. Deterrence and defense and military preparedness have to be the foundation of any strategy.
This foundation must be made unshakable and that must be done through a strong alliance in which each partner maximizes its strengths to minimize the weaknesses. Once the foundation is firm then the framework of the strategy for solving the “Korea Question” can be erected. This framework must be large and have much room to maneuver. The internal workings of the framework must be flexible enough to deal with multiple crises and forestall and deter war but also to identify opportunities from crises that can be exploited in ways that will contribute to reaching the ultimate end state. Key to making this strategy work is going to be intensive management, coordination and collaboration. The situation on the Peninsula will not remain static therefore the strategy cannot be static.
Strategy Development to Repair the Alliance
The alliance is in a state of disrepair so the first step must be to repair it. While no easy feat to do so, the tensions and distrust that have arisen as well as the policy differences between the two allies since the end of the Cold War must be overcome. It will require intervention and direction at the highest levels to rebuild the ties that have become weak.
There are three basic requirements to repair the alliance. First is that both administrations must believe it is their best interests to do so and will make the commitment to repair it. The second step is to establish a long term vision acceptable to both countries that focuses on achieving an end state that solves the “Korea Question.” Finally, both nations must commit to establishing a structure that is committed to not only developing the combined strategy but also to managing that strategy until the end state is achieved.
Assuming both nations desire to re-commit to and strengthen the alliance the following is the proposed end state introduced in Chapter 1 that seeks to resolves the “Korea Question.”
A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.
Reunification is the only acceptable long term outcome that can ensure stability on the Peninsula. The goal is noble and right but the path to get there is literally and figuratively a minefield and it will take a concerted and coordinated effort by the alliance to get there. Therefore a structure is required for the development and management of the strategy for navigating the minefields. Both nations at the National Security Council level should establish a Korea Strategy Division (KSD) to develop, refine and adjust their countryÂ’s strategies as well as manage their respective nationsÂ’ actions within the strategic framework.
Together these Divisions will form the Korea Strategy Group (KSG). This will have permanently assigned members from each KSD co-chaired by each nationÂ’s senior member and will meet on a quarterly basis rotating between both capitals. Most important is that the members will have direct communications capability to maintain close coordination in all areas.
The KSG will be chartered to manage and ensure synchronization of all elements of national power in the pursuit of the established end state. Together they will manage strategic level Peninsula crises and seek opportunities for implementing elements of the strategy. Each KSD will serve as the focal point for their respective nation in which to ensure synchronization of all actions by its elements of national power. One of the subtle purposes of the KSG is to bring together ROK and US national security professionals in a disciplined process that will allow transparency and prevent misunderstanding between the allies. The process of developing and managing the strategy will cause issues to be thoroughly staffed and coordinated and the increased contact will create an environment more conducive to cooperation and understanding.
ROK and US individual policies are not intended to be identical. In fact, it is probably better that they are different as the differences may be able to be exploited to create opportunities with the North. At times the combination of hard line and engagement (“good cop, bad cop”) may be the right way to create opportunities.” The most important thing is for the actions to be synchronized.
