There are two parts to the Mueller Report, Part-1 is the "No Collusion" part, and Part-2 is the "No Obstruction" part.
You keep repeating that lie as if it makes it true. Billy the Bagman's deceitful summary achieved its goal, which...........
"cause(d) the Court to seriously question whether Attorney General Barr made a calculated attempt to influence public discourse about the Mueller Report in favor of President Trump despite certain findings in the redacted version of the Mueller Report to the contrary,” the judge said.
Cooperation between the Russians and Trumpers may not have reached the level of a criminal conspiracy (the criteria Mueller set), but his report is chalk full of unethical and unpatriotic if not illegal conduct. Just a sampling.........
3. The Trump Campaign chairman and deputy chairman (Paul Manafort and Rick Gates) knowingly shared internal polling data and information on
battleground states with a Russian spy; and the Campaign chairman worked with the Russian spy on a pro-Russia “peace” plan for Ukraine.
4. Trump Campaign chairman periodically shared internal polling data with the Russian spy and
with the expectation it would be shared with Putin-linked oligarch, Oleg
Deripaska.
5. Trump Campaign chairman expected Trump’s winning presidency would mean Deripaska would want to use Manafort to advance Deripaska’s interests in the United States and elsewhere.
What the Mueller Report says:
Trump Campaign chairman Paul Manafort and Rick Gates shared internal campaign polling data periodically with a Russian spy, Konstantin Kilimnik. “In accordance with Manafort’s instruction, [Gates] periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp; Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis.” “Manafort expected Kilimnik to share that information with … Deripaska,” a Russian oligarch closely aligned with Vladimir Putin. “Manafort noted that if Trump won, Deripaska would want to use Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and elsewhere.”
Supplemental information/analysis:
The Report’s wording – “whatever
interests Deripaska had” — is notable given a well-known interview by Deripaska in which he
said, “I don’t separate myself from the state. I have no other interests.”
What the Mueller Report says:
Manafort began working for Deripaska in 2005. The memo between the two men described the benefits Manafort’s work in the mid-to-late 2000s would confer on “the Putin government.” The work was “to install friendly political officials in countries” in post-Soviet republics.
Supplemental information/analysis:
The
Associated Press published a detailed investigative report based on documents the media organization obtained detailing Manafort’s arrangement with Deripaska in the mid-to-late 2000’s. The Associated Press published excerpts from the original documents that are lengthier than some of those in the Mueller Report. For example, Manafort wrote to Deripaska, “We are now of the belief that this model can greatly benefit the Putin Government if employed at the correct levels with the appropriate commitment to success.” These initiatives, Manafort also wrote, “will be offering a great service that can re-focus, both internally and externally, the policies of the Putin government.”
What the Mueller Report says:
At an Aug. 2, 2016 meeting, Manafort provided Kilimnik a briefing that included “the Campaign’s messaging and its internal polling data,” and the discussion of battleground states which Manafort identified as “Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.”
Supplemental information/analysis:
The reference to Michigan is notable. After Manafort officially left the Campaign, he remained in communication with Trump, Bannon, Kushner, and Gates (p. 141). In the final days of the campaign, Manafort offered Trump “pointers on how to handle the Clinton email news and urging him to make a play in Michigan,” according to
Politico Magazine.
What the Mueller Report says:
The Aug. 2, 2016 meeting also included the start of what would be a series of discussions between Manafort and Kilimnik about a so-called peace plan for Ukraine, which Manafort admitted to prosecutors was “a ‘backdoor’ means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.”
Supplemental information/analysis and analysis:
A senior prosecutor in the Special Counsel’s Office
told a federal judge that the Aug. 2 meeting and what happened at the meeting goes “very much to the heart of what the Special Counsel’s Office is investigating.”
Caveats:
First, although Kilimnik and Manafort shared the view that Trump’s support for the Ukraine “peace” plan would help it succeed, “[t]he investigation did not uncover evidence of Manafort’s passing along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or the Administration.” That said, the Report then notes that the Special Counsel could not gain access to all of Manafort’s electronic communications, and that Manafort lied to the Special Counsel Office about the peace plan and his meetings with Kilimnik. Also, the Report states that Kilimnik continued “efforts to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (e.g., U.S. Department of State) into the summer of 2018.”
Second, the Special Counsel’s Office “did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort’s sharing polling data and Russia’s interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the time of the August 2 meeting.”
Loose ends: The report states that the Special Counsel’s Office “could not reliably determine” Manafort’s purpose in sharing the internal polling data with Kilimnik (p. 30).
Missing intelligence analysis:
The Mueller Report apparently
omits any intelligence analysis and significant intelligence products such as signals intercepts, the kind of information that would also likely not be admissible at trial. What might those intelligence products add to the description of events? Consider this report by
CNN in 2017:
“CNN has learned that investigators became more suspicious when they turned up intercepted communications that US intelligence agencies collected among suspected Russian operatives discussing their efforts to work with Manafort, who served as campaign chairman for three months, to coordinate information that could damage Hillary Clinton’s election prospects, the US officials say. The suspected operatives relayed what they claimed were conversations with Manafort, encouraging help from the Russians.”
6. Trump Tower meeting: (1) On receiving an email offering derogatory information on Clinton coming from a Russian government official, Donald Trump Jr. “appears to have accepted that offer;” (2) members of the Campaign discussed the Trump Tower meeting beforehand; (3) Donald Trump Jr. told the Russians during the meeting that Trump could revisit the issue of the Magnitsky Act if elected.
What the Mueller Report says:
The Report notes that Rob Goldstone “passed along an offer purportedly from a Russian government official and that “Trump Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those materials.” On June 9, 2016, “senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the Russian government…. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting to Russia.” At the June 9 meeting, the Russian delegation raised the issue of overturning the Magnitsky Act, a statute that imposes financial sanctions on Russian officials. In response, Trump Jr. “suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected.” The Mueller Report notes significant discrepancies in what the Russian lawyer told Congress about the purpose of the meeting and the body of other information available to the Special Counsel’s office (p. 119;
see also fn. 676).
Caveat:
The Report provides no evidence that more significant information was exchanged during the meeting.
Supplemental information/analysis:
Removal of the Magnitsky Act has been a long-term, important goal for Putin.
The Report’s statement that senior representatives of the Trump Campaign went to the meeting “expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the Russian government” (see also p. 185) is consistent with Rep. Devine Nunes’
memo, which refers to Trump Jr., Manafort and Kushner by name (
see Finding #12). As I have previously
discussed, that finding contradicts Kushner’s written statement to Congress.
Missing intelligence analysis:
The Mueller Report does not include an analysis whether the Russian lawyer was working on behalf of Russian intelligence, or if the exchanges with the Trump Campaign before and during the Trump Tower meeting were part of a Russian intelligence operation.
One of the individuals accompanying the Russian lawyer was Rinat Akhmetshin, reportedly a former Soviet intelligence officer who “apparently has ties to Russian intelligence,” and “allegedly specializes in ‘active measures campaigns’” such as subversive political operations involving disinformation and propaganda. (
See Sen. Charles E. Grassley
letter to Sec. John Kelley, Apr. 4, 2017.) In
testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher “acknowledged that [Veselnitskaya and Akhmetshin] were probably spies,” based on his own interactions with them.
Why did the Russians not offer more at the meeting? Former
intelligence officials have assessed that the publicly reported facts (which are now included in the Mueller Report) are characteristic of Russian intelligence tradecraft, that the Russians would want to dangle the prospect of more valuable information and would observe whether the campaign reported them to federal authorities or instead welcomed the offer and wanted more. (Another former intelligence official
assessed that the meeting was a Russian intelligence operation not designed to collude, but rather designed to sow political turmoil upon its discovery.)
Finally, the Report notably references the fact that Goldstone led the effort to bring Putin to the Miss Universe contest in 2013 on Trump’s invitation (p. 111). That might suggest Goldstone has the capacity to provide these connections, which would be another reason for the Campaign to take the initial email very seriously. According to
Irakly “Ike” Kaveladze’s and
Goldstone’s Senate Judiciary testimony, the attempt to meet Putin in 2013 never happened due to a last-minute change in Putin’s schedule. Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov instead extended an offer for Trump to meet Putin at the Sochi Olympics.
Guide to the Mueller Report’s Findings on “Collusion”