I guess that where we differ. They didn't strike down the mandate section, they said the fines were unconstitutional through commerce but would be constitutional as a tax penalty. The mandate clause was upheld.
Are you saying that Judge Roberts came up with the tax idea himself? Also, what was the original plan on how the mandate was supposed to be handled that was originally presented to him?
It was supposed to be a tax penalty and actually the mandate was stricken, they used the theory that if a tax was levied, then having coverage was technically optional, you could not have it and just pay the tax. They didn't consider that a penalty, even though it operates as a penalty because the liability didn't preexist.
The problem there is there was no such tax in the law and I argue it is an unconstitutional direct tax, it violates the prohibition on direct taxes, see article 1, section 9, clause 4. It isn't an income tax, as allowed by the 16th Amendment, because it's not triggered by income and is added in addition to your normal income tax liability. It would have been permissible if they had allowed an income tax deduction for having insurance, that would be a reduction of an existing tax liability. But congress would have included that, the court had no right to just make it up.
Also I say Roberts because he wrote the opinion, no one knows who actually came up with the scheme.
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Thats pretty crazy... I'd love to know the inside scoop of how all that played out. It sounds like it was a request by the government during court proceedings.
Check out Pages 2, 3 and 4 of the decision. I've highlighted key pieces:
2. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concluded in Part III-A that the individual mandate is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Pp. 16-30. (a) The Constitution grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce." Art. I, ?8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated. This Court's precedent reflects this understanding: As expansive as this Court's cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they uniformly describe the power as reaching "activity." E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 560. The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Congress already possesses expansive power to regulate what people do. Upholding the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause would give Congress the same license to regulate what people do not do. The Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing. They gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction would undermine the principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited and enumerated powers. The individual mandate thus cannot be sustained under Congress's power to "regulate Commerce." Pp. 16-27. (b) Nor can the individual mandate be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an integral part of the Affordable Care Act's other reforms. Each of this Court's prior cases upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U. S. ___. The individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power and draw within its regulatory scope those who would otherwise be outside of it. Even if the individual mandate is "necessary" to the Affordable Care Act's other reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a "proper" means for making those reforms effective. Pp. 27-30. 3. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concluded in Part III-B that the individual mandate must be construed as imposing a tax on those who do not have health insurance, if such a construction is reasonable. The most straightforward reading of the individual mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance. But, for the reasons explained, the Commerce Clause does not give Congress that power.
It is therefore necessary to turn to the Government's alternative argument: that the mandate may be upheld as within Congress's power to "lay and collect Taxes." Art. I, ?8, cl. 1. In pressing its taxing power argument, the Government asks the Court to view the mandate as imposing a tax on those who do not buy that product. Because "every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality," Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657, the question is whether it is "fairly possible" to interpret the mandate as imposing such a tax, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62. Pp. 31-32. 4. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III-C, concluding that
the individual mandate may be upheld as within Congress's power under the Taxing Clause. Pp. 33- 44. (a) The Affordable Care Act describes the "hared responsibility payment" as a "penalty," not a "tax." That label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act. It does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Congress's power to tax. In answering that constitutional question, this Court follows a functional approach, "[d]isregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance and application." United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 294. Pp. 33-35. (b) Such an analysis suggests that the shared responsibility payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax.
Full text of the Supreme Court health-care decision - The Washington Post