Attack on the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi
Various critical statements about the response to the September 2012 terrorist attacks on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya, were false.
op-ed piece (“White House Watched Benghazi Attacked And Didn’t Respond”), the opening paragraph of which is quoted in the example block above.
However, that description is a rather distorted version of what the news sources it references (CBS News and ABC News) actually reported. A CBS News story from that same day (“U.S. military poised for rescue in Benghazi”)
statedthe following:
Meanwhile, CBS News correspondent Margaret Brennan reports that the FBI and State Department have reviewed video from security cameras that captured the attack on the consulate.
The audio feed of the attack was being monitored in real time in Washington by diplomatic security official Charlene Lamb. CBS News has learned that video of the assault was recovered 20 days later from the more than 10 security cameras at the compound.
The government security camera footage of the attack was in the possession of local Libyans until the week of Oct. 1. The video will be among the evidence that the State Department’s review board will analyze to determine who carried out the assault.
According to that report, it was not the case that President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary of Defense Panetta, and a national security team were “watching real-time video of developments from a drone circling over the site”; rather, a
single diplomatic security officialwas listening to an
audio feed of events in Benghazi. Security cameras in the U.S. consulate compound did record video of the events as they unfolded, and a U.S. surveillance drone camera did capture the last hour of the attack, but neither of those sources was watched real-time by officials in Washington, as the consulate video recordings were not recovered until weeks after the attack:
Video footage from the United States consulate in Benghazi, Libya, taken the night of the Sept. 11 anniversary attacks, shows an organized group of armed men attacking the compound, according to two U.S. intelligence officials who have seen the footage and are involved in the ongoing investigation. The footage, which was recovered from the site [during the first week of October] by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, offers some of the most tangible evidence yet that a military-style assault took place, according to these officials.
The Obama administration has been studying the videos, taken from closed-circuit cameras throughout the Benghazi consulate’s four-building compound, for clues about who was responsible for the attack and how it played out. The two officials [said] that analysts are hoping to decipher the faces of the attackers and match them up with known jihadists.
In addition to the footage from the consulate cameras, the U.S. government is also poring over video taken from an overhead U.S. surveillance drone that arrived for the final hour of the night battle at the consulate compound and nearby annex.
On 26 October 2012, Fox News reported “urgent requests for military back-up” from those on the ground during the attacks on the U.S. mission in Benghazi were turned down by the CIA:
Fox News has learned from sources who were on the ground in Benghazi that an urgent request from the CIA annex for military back-up during the attack on the U.S. consulate and subsequent attack several hours later on the annex itself was denied by the CIA chain of command — who also told the CIA operators twice to “stand down” rather than help the ambassador’s team when shots were heard at approximately 9:40 p.m. in Benghazi on Sept. 11.
Former Navy SEAL Tyrone Woods was part of a small team who was at the CIA annex about a mile from the U.S. consulate where Ambassador Chris Stevens and his team came under attack. When he and others heard the shots fired, they informed their higher-ups at the annex to tell them what they were hearing and requested permission to go to the consulate and help out. They were told to “stand down,” according to sources familiar with the exchange. Soon after, they were again told to “stand down.”
However, administration officials denied that any requests for military assistance by those at the U.S. mission in Benghazi were rejected:
The White House [has] flatly denied that President Barack Obama withheld requests for help from the besieged American compound in Benghazi, Libya, as it came under on attack by suspected terrorists on September 11th.
“Neither the president nor anyone in the White House denied any requests for assistance in Benghazi,” National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor [said].
And the CIA has denied that anyone in its chain of command rejected requests for help from the besieged Americans.
Fox News Channel reported that American officials in the compound repeatedly asked for military help during the assault but were rebuffed by CIA higher-ups. At a press briefing one day earlier, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, asked why there had not been a quicker, more forceful response to the assault, complained of “Monday-morning quarterbacking.” Panetta said he and top military commanders had judged it too dangerous to send troops to the eastern Libyan city without a clearer picture of events on the ground.
On 1 November 2012, U.S. intelligence officials released an account stating the CIA had in fact rushed security operatives to the U.S. mission compound in Benghazi within half an hour of the start of the attack:
The CIA rushed security operatives to an American diplomatic compound in Libya within 25 minutes after it had come under attack and played a more central role in the effort to fend off a night-long siege than has been publicly acknowledged, U.S. intelligence officials said.
The agency mobilized the evacuation effort, took control of an unarmed U.S. military drone to map possible escape routes, dispatched an emergency security team from Tripoli, the capital, and chartered aircraft that ultimately carried surviving U.S. personnel to safety on Sept. 12, U.S. officials said.
U.S. intelligence officials insisted that CIA operatives in Benghazi and Tripoli made decisions rapidly throughout the assault with no interference from Washington, even while acknowledging that CIA security forces were badly outmatched and largely unable to mobilize Libyan security teams until it was too late.
Among the new disclosures is that the CIA station chief in Tripoli sent an emergency security force, with about a half-dozen agency operatives as well as two U.S. military personnel, to Benghazi aboard a hastily chartered aircraft while the attack was underway.
The CIA team attempted to organize an effort to make its way to a hospital where U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens had been taken and was thought to be still alive. But the team was held up by Libyan officials at the airport and scrapped the plan to reach Stevens after learning that the security situation at the hospital was uncertain.
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s 15 January 2014
review of the attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi viewed video footage documenting the dispatch of a security team to the Mission compound within 20-25 minutes of the first report of the attack, and they found that no “stand down” orders were issued to the security team at the Annex:
After the Diplomatic Security (DS) agent in the Tactical Operations Center at the Temporary Mission Facility alerted the Annex security team that TMF was under attack at 9:40, the Chief of Base called the [redacted] “who advised that he would immediately deploy a force to provide assistance,” according to a September 19,2012, cable.
Two armored vehicles were prepared so the security team could respond from the Annex. Approximately 20-25 minutes after the first call came into the Annex that the Temporary Mission Facility (TMF) was under attack, a security team left the Annex for the Mission compound. In footage taken from the Annex’s security cameras, the security team can be observed departing the CIA Annex at 10:03 p.m. Benghazi time.
The team drove to the Mission facility and made their way onto the Mission compound in the face of enemy fire, arriving in the vicinity of the compound at approximately 10:10 p.m. Benghazi time. The Committee explored claims that there was a “stand down” order given to the security team at the Annex. Although some members of the security team expressed frustration that they were unable to respond more quickly to the Mission compound, 12 the Committee found no evidence of intentional delay or obstruction by the Chief of Base or any other party.
General Carter Ham headed the U.S. Africa Command during the attacks on the U.S. mission in Benghazi. A late October 2012 rumor claimed General Ham declined an order to “stand down” and attempted to provide military assistance during the attacks, only to be relieved of his command “within a minute” of doing so, and Rear Admiral Charles M. Gaouette was likewise relieved of his command for ordering his forces to support those ordered into action by General Ham. That rumor was fueled by an 18 October2012
announcement that President Obama had selected a nominee to replace General Ham (who subsequently retired from the U.S. Army in April 2013) as commander of the U.S. Africa Command:
President Barack Obama will nominate Army Gen. David Rodriguez to succeed Gen. Carter Ham as commander of U.S. Africa Command and Marine Lt. Gen. JohnPaxton to succeed Gen. Joseph Dunford as assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced.
In announcing Ham’s successor, Panetta also praised the work Ham has done with Africa Command.
“Gen. Ham has really brought AFRICOM into a very pivotal role in that challenging region,” Panetta said. “I and the nation are deeply grateful for his outstanding service.”
However, Secretary of Defense Panetta stated during an October 2012 press briefing that General Ham was one of the military commanders who had judged it too dangerous to send troops to Benghazi without a clearer picture of events on the ground:
The “basic principle is that you don’t deploy forces into harm’s way without knowing what’s going on; without having some real-time information about what’s taking place,” [Panetta] said during a joint question-and-answer session with Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff General Martin Dempsey.
“As a result of not having that kind of information, the commander who was on the ground in that area, General Ham, General Dempsey and I felt very strongly that we could not put forces at risk in that situation,” Panetta said.
On 29 October 2012, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also asserted that this rumor was false:
The speculation that General Carter Ham is departing Africa Command (AFRICOM) due to events in Benghazi, Libya, on 11 September 2012 is absolutely false. General Ham’s departure is part of routine succession planning that has been on going since July. He continues to serve in AFRICOM with my complete confidence.
General Ham himself
testified before the House Committee on Armed Services in June 2013 that the decision not to deploy close air support during the attack was made by him based on his assessment of the situation at the time, not because he was ordered to “stand down”:
I will admit to giving a lot of thought about close air support. And in the lead up to September 11th, in the discussions about what forces should we have available, it was my determination, obviously with advice from others, but the responsibility was mine as the commander, was that close air support was not the appropriate tool in this situation.
And as I look back on the events of that night and say … and think in my own mind would air have made a difference? And in my military judgment, I believe the answer is no. It was a very uncertain situation in an environment which we know we had an unknown surface-to-air threat with the proliferation particularly of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, many of which remain unaccounted for. But mostly it was a lack of understanding of the environment, and hence the need for the Predator to try to gain an understanding of what was going on.
Knowing the intelligence that I had at the time, not obviously what I have now, but the intelligence I had at the time caused me to conclude in my military judgment that attack aircraft would not be the appropriate response tool. And so I did not direct a heightened alert. That is obviously fair for criticism, and knowing what we know now maybe that was — maybe I would make a different decision. But close air support I think, I still even knowing what I know now, think that was not the right tool to effect change in this situation.
General Ham also addressed this rumor directly during his testimony:
The head of U.S. Africa Command, Gen. Carter Ham, debunked a widespread rumor that he was removed from overseeing the military operation because he wanted to do more militarily that night than he was allowed to by his superiors or the White House.
Immediately following the Benghazi attack, the Internet became rife with speculation that Ham had been pushed out for wanting to do more militarily to help those Americans who were stranded after the attack. Shortly afterward, Ham announced his retirement, further fueling speculation that he was pushed out. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon put the question to Ham.
MCKEON: “This might be a good time to ask … I heard that you had made the statement that you were prepared to go to their aid and somebody told you no and you said you were going anyway. Is that all some supposition that comes from some reporter?”
HAM: “Yes, sir. No one ever told me no.”
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Just to start with.
