I emphasized the part I have a problem with. What the founders meant is not and never will be relevant. What was written is what counts. Just. read. it. not into it.
pegwinn,
I’m not sure I understand what you mean by “What the founders meant is not and never will be relevant. What was written is what counts. Just. read. it. not into it.”.
I do know the most fundamental rule of constitutional law is stated as follows:
“The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is that effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. This is the polestar in the construction of constitutions, all other principles of construction are only rules or guides to aid in the determination of the intention of the constitution’s framers.”--- numerous citations omitted, Vol.16 American Jurisprudence, 2d Constitutional law (1992 edition), pages 418-19, Par. 92. Intent of framers and adopters as controlling
This rule is also stated by Jefferson in the following words:
"On every question of construction [of the Constitution], carry ourselves back to the time when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was passed."--Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Johnson, June 12, 1823, The Complete Jefferson, p. 322.
Unfortunately, we have law students who are no longer taught the most fundamental rule of constitutional law [enforcing the documented intentions under which our Constitution was adopted]. They are taught case law, and then to apply “precedent” as set by our Supreme Court. But the fact is, our Constitution is the ultimate “precedent” and not supreme court rulings designed to circumvent the very intentions and beliefs under which our Constitution was adopted.
But getting back to the most fundamental rule of constitutional law, which is enforcing the intentions and beliefs under which our Constitution was adopted, our very own Supreme Court stated the following in Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903):
But there is another question underlying this and all other rules for the interpretation of statutes, and that is what was the intention of the legislative body? Without going back to the famous case of the drawing of blood in the streets of Bologna, the books are full of authorities to the effect that the intention of the lawmaking power will prevail even against the letter of the statute; or, as tersely expressed by Mr. Justice Swayne in 90 U.S. 380 :
"A thing may be within the letter of a statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning, though not within its letter. The intention of the lawmaker is the law."
Bottom line is, when one is curious as to what a particular part of our Constitution means, their most reliable method to satisfy the curiosity would be to research contemporary source material during which time our Constitution was being framed and ratified, e.g., the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers; Madison’s Notes on the Convention of 1787; and Elliot’s debates (State ratification debates) which are some of the primary sources from which to document the intentions and beliefs under which our Constitution was adopted!
Applying this rule to the much misrepresented meaning of the phrase “general welfare” which has been used by many to attach their own meaning to our Constitution, in Federalist No. 83, Hamilton, in crystal clear language, refers to a
“specification of particulars” which
“evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative authority“. Hamilton writes:
"...the power of Congress...shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative authority, because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as well as useless if a general authority was intended..."
And Madison, in No. 41 Federalist writes with regard to the meaning of “general welfare“:
"It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes...to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare of the United States amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor [the anti federalists] for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction...But what color can this objection have, when a specification of the object alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not ever separated by a longer pause than a semicolon?...For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power...But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning...is an absurdity."
And in the Virginia ratification Convention Madison explains the general welfare phrase as follows to gain ratification of the constitution:
"the powers of the federal government are enumerated; it can only operate in certain cases; it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction."[3 Elliots 95] [also see Nicholas, 3 Elliot 443 regarding the general welfare clause, which he pointed out
"was united, not to the general power of legislation, but to the particular power of laying and collecting taxes...."]
Similarly , George Mason, in the Virginia ratification Convention informs the convention
"The Congress should have power to provide for the general welfare of the Union, I grant. But I wish a clause in the Constitution, with respect to all powers which are not granted, that they are retained by the states. Otherwise the power of providing for the general welfare may be perverted to its destruction.".[3 Elliots 442]
For this very reason the Tenth Amendment was quickly ratified to intentionally put to rest any question whatsoever regarding the general welfare clause and thereby cut off the pretext to allow Congress or the courts to extended the federal government’s powers via the wording provide for the “general welfare“.
Bottom line is, we are not free to attach our own meaning to the phrase “general welfare” in order to advance our personal whims and fancies.
Also note that under the rules of constitutional construction
16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional law
Meaning of Language
Ordinary meaning, generally
”Words or terms used in a constitution, being dependent on ratification by the people voting upon it, must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption…”__ (my emphasis) The Court is not free to make the words or phrases in our Constitution mean whatever they so desire, but are confined to their original understanding as understood by our founding fathers. This fundamental rule was not followed in the Kelo decision in which Justice Stevens in delivering the opinion in Kelo writes:
” while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed "use by the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the public" test difficult to administer (e.g., what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?),7 but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society.8 Accordingly, when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as "public purpose.”
But the irrefutable fact is, the people did not erode the meaning of “public use” via an appropriate constitutional amendment, the only lawful way to change the meaning of words in a Constitution. Justice Stevens took it upon himself to do for the people what they did not willingly and knowingly do for themselves within the framework of our constitutional system, and, the Court brazenly appealed to the “evolving needs of society” to justify what amounted to be judicial tyranny and the Court imposing its will upon the people!
On the other hand, Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion, observes the most fundamental rule of constitutional law and carefully documents the meaning of the phrase “public use” as it was understood during the time the Constitution was adopted. He then concludes :
”The Court relies almost exclusively on this Court's prior cases to derive today's far-reaching, and dangerous, result. See ante, at 8-12. But the principles this Court should employ to dispose of this case are found in the Public Use Clause itself, not in Justice Peckham's high opinion of reclamation laws, see supra, at 11. When faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of our founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of the Constitution's original meaning. For the reasons I have given, and for the reasons given in Justice O'Connor's dissent, the conflict of principle raised by this boundless use of the eminent domain power should be resolved in petitioners' favor. I would reverse the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.”
If we are to restore the greatness of our constitutionally limited system of government and end the legislative and judicial tyranny which our folks in Washington now practice with impunity, we need to start learning the fundamental rules of constitutional law and then punish public servants who intentionally seek to subvert them.
JWK
Health care by consent of the governed (Article 5) our amendment process --- tyranny by a Supreme Court's progressive majority vote