Navy leadership is a bunch of traitors

[kwc57]

They want 315 ships. That's it? That would make us weak! After all, in 1864 the navy had 700 ships in its fleet!! The navy today wants to be less than half as strong as it was in 1864! What a bunch of traitors they are. We need Mitt Romney as President, so he can build 1000 ships!

Why do you and Obama resort to snark instead of addressing the claim that we have fewer ships than the navy says we need?

Does anyone on the left have anything but snark in the face of serious questions?

They are just following their leader.

 

[Mr. Shaman]

We will be totally energy independent during Romney's first term.

I doubt that in reality. We will most definitely be piping in oil from Canada tho....helping obtain a much more secure energy source.

Yeah....for China.

You actually believe WE'LL be using that oil??!!!!

 

[Mr. Shaman]

Building ships creats jobs. donut?

Yeah....that's what's in Romney's plans....

October 25, 2012

McMitt's Navy​

"The airwaves of three key battleground states — Florida, Virginia, and New Hampshire — were hit this morning with advertisements from the Romney campaign about the size of the American navy. “Our navy is smaller now than any time since 1917,” Romney warns in the radio spots. A narrator adds, “As commander in chief, Mitt Romney… will invest in our military.”

Expanding the Navy has become a theme of the campaign; during Monday’s debate Romney used the same line, and Obama responded with a now-famous zinger about “horses and bayonets.” But new information discovered by Wired casts a new light on Romney’s push to beef up ship building: One of his top military advisers is in the ship building business.

John Lehman was Secretary of the Navy under Ronald Reagan, but is now an investment banker with stakes in several ship building companies.

Lehman is one of Romney’s “special advisers” on his Foreign Policy and National Security Advisory Team, and his particular emphasis as an adviser is on the Defense work group. Lehman has spoken publicly on Romney’s behalf about the expansion of the Navy, pushing the Romney campaign’s line that the Navy needs to produce 15 new ships a year, to the tune of tens of billions of dollars."

Yeah.....Mitt's all-about national-$ecurity!!

 

[Wehrwolfen]

Without a powerful Navy America loses. Oh yes, we have how many carrier groups? In Main article: Carrier strike group


[snip]
"In modern United States Navy carrier air operations, Carrier strike group (CSG) has replaced the traditional term of carrier battle group (CVBG or CARBATGRU). The Navy maintains 11 carrier strike groups, 10 of which are based in the United States and one that is forward deployed in Japan. CSG or CVBG normally consist of 1 Aircraft Carrier, 2 Guided Missile Cruisers, 2 Anti Aircraft Warships, and 1-2 Anti Submarine Destroyers or Frigates.[2] The large number of CSGs used by the United States reflects, in part, a division of roles and missions allotted during the Cold War, in which the United States assumed primary responsibility for blue water operations and for safeguarding supply lines between the United States and Europe, while the NATO allies assumed responsibility for brown and green water operations."

Then again, there is a need for supplying these ships and our troops overseas. Does everyone believe that the airforce alone transports troops? WRONG. We need transport ships, and all sorts of ships to supply those men fighting on foreign shores. So although Oblamer claims we don't need bayonets and horses anymore, I'd claim he doesn't know crap from Shinola about the needs of our combined armed forces. Without a strong Navy we cannot bring the fight to our enemies, nor can we protect ourselves adequately.

 

[Wehrwolfen]

We've been discussing the cuts to the U.S. Navy, however the draconian cuts to all our armed forces will totally weaken America's capability to protect itself.

Source: US Defense Cuts and Spending | 2012 Defense Budget Proposal
[snip]
The large reduction in the OCO account raises two questions about the Administration’s defense policy. First, is the Administration acting responsibly in drawing down forces in Iraq or is it drawing down the forces to achieve its budget goals? The evidence suggests that the Administration has subordinated military goals in Iraq to budget goals. Second, is the Administration shifting some costs of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to the core defense budget accounts? In other words, is the Administration asking the core defense budget to absorb some costs for contingency operations that properly belong in the OCO account? This appears to be the case, particularly in “resetting” the forces used in Iraq. If so, the cost shifting would more than offset the modest nominal increase in the core defense budget and would harm the military’s ability to prepare for future conflicts.

The core defense budget includes the accounts that fund the basic building blocks of the military: military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research and development (R&D). These accounts are intended to sustain the U.S. defense posture over the longer term. However, the Administration’s core defense budget of $586 billion for FY 2012 inadequately funds these key accounts. Given that Secretary Gates has announced that portion of the overall core defense budget under his purview (the vast majority of the core budget)[7] will not grow through FY 2016, each of the core defense program building blocks will be weakened.

Weakness #1: The defense budget will lead to dangerously low personnel levels.

The Obama Administration has been clear about certain aspects of this weakness. Secretary Gates has announced plans to reduce Army personnel levels by 27,000 positions and the Marine Corps by 15,000 to 20,000 positions beginning in FY 2015.[8] These are roughly a 5 percent reduction for Army and up to a 10 percent reduction for the Marine Corps from FY 2012 requested manpower levels. Secretary Gates’s announcement omitted additional manpower reductions, particularly in the Air Force and the Navy. While the services have considerable room to improve management of military personnel, the more likely outcome is that a smaller military will lead to a weaker military.

A military that is significantly smaller than today’s military will have difficulty responding to the future operational demands that will likely be placed on it. The military’s high operational tempo in recent years has created significant problems by requiring military personnel to deploy repeatedly for long periods. The Army has been working toward increasing the time at home to two years for every year deployed, as opposed to recent rotations of just one year at home for each year deployed. Reducing manpower levels will make the rotation goal difficult to achieve if unforeseen circumstances, such as Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf, lead to the resumption of high operational tempos.

Weakness #2: The defense budget will lead to a smaller force structure.

The military fights as units, not as individuals. These units include Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, Army brigade combat teams, and Navy carrier task forces. While the man power reductions clearly imply a smaller and less capable military, these units of force structure require more than just personnel. They require operating funds, weapons, equipment, and new technologies.

The Administration’s inadequate core defense budgets through FY 2016 will almost certainly lead to a force structure that is at least 10 percent smaller. The proposed manpower reductions in the Army and Marine Corps already point in this direction. This would return Marine Corps force structure to a level slightly higher than during the “peace dividend” years of the 1990s.

If internal savings to the core defense budget are not achieved and reinvested into defense, the force structure could be reduced by up to 15 percent. This would mean 65 active-duty Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) (down from 72 now), 18 Air Force tactical air wings (down from 20), 254 Navy ships (down from 282), and 186,300 active-duty Marines (down from 202,100). This force structure could handle just one medium contingency operation and an array of smaller peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions.

A significantly smaller force structure will lead to vulnerabilities in responding to significant challenges in multiple regions of the world. For example, if the U.S. needed to commit major forces to respond to a North Korean threat in East Asia, it would find it very difficult to continue operations in Afghanistan and maintain sufficient response forces in the greater Middle East region.

Weakness #3: The proposed defense budget would shortchange modernization, in part by reducing procurement funding in the OCO budget.

The Obama Administration’s budget request for the core defense program in FY 2012 would fund today’s military at the expense of tomorrow’s military. Specifically, the core defense budget for FY 2012 would dedicate 62.8 percent to the military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts, an increase over the already unbalanced 61.7 percent in the FY 2011 request. Consequently, the procurement and R&D accounts would decline from 34.4 percent of the core defense budget in FY 2011 to 34.0 percent in FY 2012. This problem in the core defense program will likely be exacerbated by the 50 percent reduction in procurement funds in the OCO budget between the FY 2011 and FY 2012 budget requests.

Shortchanging modernization is already forcing the Administration to back away from several important programs. For example, the Marine Corps variant of the F-35 fighter has been put on “probation,” raising the question of how the Marine Corps will obtain a next-generation air superiority capability. Further, the Administration is curtailing future U.S. participation in the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a joint air and missile defense program with Germany and Italy. This decision complicates the command and control needed to protect U.S. and allied forces against air and short-range missile threats during expeditionary operations and undermines the policy of expanding allied participation and cooperation in missile defense.

Weakness #4: Inadequate funding for research and development.

The Obama Administration has requested just $75.3 billion for defense R&D in the core FY 2012 defense budget, down from $80.9 billion for FY 2011. Thus, the Administration is proposing to cut R&D by 6 percent in nominal dollars and 8 percent in real dollars. This will further shrink the pool of technologies that the military can use in the future.

For example, future reductions in R&D funding raise the question of how the U.S. will modernize platforms and delivery vehicles in its strategic nuclear force. During the Senate debate over the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the Obama Administration specifically committed to pursue this much-needed modernization. A significant cut in R&D funding over the next five years would make it extremely difficult for the Administration to fulfill its commitment to the Senate.

The R&D account was too large relative to the procurement account until the past two years due to severe procurement cuts. This created a circumstance in which the procurement account was too small to efficiently absorb the technologies that the R&D account was making available. The proper solution to this problem would be to increase the size of the procurement account, but the Administration has chosen instead to reduce the R&D account. The requested procurement budget for FY 2012 is a fraction of a percent increase in nominal dollars over the requested level for FY 2011, but it is a reduction in inflation-adjusted dollars.

Even this likely understates the problem of failing to restore procurement funding to appropriate levels because the FY 2011 and FY 2012 budget requests would effectively halve the procurement account in the OCO budget. This draconian cut makes it highly likely that the procurement account in the core defense budget would be asked to pay for procurement that should be in the OCO budget, such as resetting units with weapons and equipment that were worn out or broken during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Weakness #5: An insufficient commitment to modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and missile defense.

The overall U.S. deterrence posture needs to shift from a posture based on threats to retaliate against strategic attacks to a “protect and defend strategy” more suitable to the threat environment of the post–Cold War world.[9] Accordingly, the U.S. needs to modernize its deterrence forces so that they can hold at risk potential enemies’ means of strategic attack against the U.S. and its allies, regardless of where those means of attack are located. Further, this force must consist of a balance of offensive and defensive weapons, including ballistic missile defenses.

During Senate consideration of New START, President Obama specifically committed to increase funding for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, particularly $7.6 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in the Department of Energy. The NNSA request for weapons activities in FY 2012 is in keeping with the Obama Administration’s commitments in December 2010, but still fails to address four important problems:
■The $7.6 billion may not be adequate. President Obama committed to increase funding under pressure from Senator Jon Kyl (R–AZ) during the New START debate. In the Senate, Senator Kyl has been the most attentive to the overall health of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex for well over a decade. Senator Kyl’s vote against ratification of New START demonstrates that he is still not confident about the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.
■It is inadequate for the President to submit the budget request for nuclear modernization and then walk away from the legislative process. Whether the agreement reached during the New START debate will survive even the next few months is doubtful. For example, some Members of the House of Representative do not view these NNSA accounts as part of the broader national security budget because they are under the jurisdiction of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies.
■The Obama Administration continues to obstruct genuine nuclear modernization by declaring that the effort may not produce new nuclear weapons designs that can perform new missions to meet new threats or that may require explosive nuclear tests.
■The Administration’s proposed nuclear modernization budget will almost certainly prove inadequate to making the U.S. nuclear arsenal consistent with the broader protect and defend deterrence posture.[10]

The core defense budget request includes $10.7 billion for missile defense programs in the Missile Defense Agency and the services. This compares to a $9.9 billion request for FY 2011.[11] While this request increases the missile defense budget, it will not redress the damage caused by budget reductions and programmatic decisions by the Obama Administration and Congress during FY 2010. For example, The Heritage Foundation recommended that the missile defense program receive $1.3 billion more than what the Obama Administration requested for FY 2011.[12] While Congress has not yet set the defense budget for FY 2011, it is unlikely that the missile defense program will receive anywhere near what Heritage recommended. Thus, the missile defense program is still being held back by the Obama Administration’s budget request.

The Growing Commitment Gap

The Obama Administration is bluffing when it asserts that a U.S. military capacity that is sharply curtailed by budget reductions can adequately meet the nation’s security commitments to itself and its allies around the world. Bluffing is a dangerous approach to national security.

To keep the federal government’s commitment to defend the American people against strategic attack, the U.S. needs a strategic posture that consists of a thoroughly modernized mix of offensive and defensive capabilities as well as nuclear and conventional strategic weapons to hold at risk potential enemies’ means of strategic attack. These strategic forces also serve the purpose of allowing the U.S. to operate freely in space and cyberspace and on the high seas. The Administration’s strategic policies and inadequate budget request for strategic forces exhibit a preference for threatening to retaliate for such attacks over directly deterring strategic attacks by defending against them. This “minimal deterrence posture” is less expensive than a protect-and-defend posture, but wholly inadequate to meeting U.S. security needs in a proliferating world.[13]

The U.S. needs general purpose forces primarily to protect U.S. interests and meet security commitments to friends and allies in three key regions: East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. However, the Administration’s longer-term core defense budget would force reductions of at least 10 percent below the level necessary to protect its interests and meet its regional security commitments. Effectively, the Administration is using the defense budget to change U.S. foreign policy by forcing the U.S. to abandon one of these regions. From outward appearances, the Obama Administration may be preparing to abandon Europe.