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Natural Rights and the Social Contract
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antagon
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only troubling to the extent that these concerns have already been dispatched above and as yet without rebuttal:
on natural rights as a social derivative and on their differences from ability itself...
on natural rights being independent from government and the role of government to restrict rather than avail rights...
That's what we're doing. Nothing posts. Simply saying "wrong" isn't good enough.
The concerns HAVE NOT been dispatched. That's what the discussion is all about. You're saying rights have an existence outside governmenrt, but I don't see a single example where you've shown that to be true. Platitudes about state-of-nature and free-will notwithstanding, I see nothing concrete at all.
antagon
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dispatched as yet without rebuttal. i've put forward concrete application of natural rights, and you have put forward what i have shown to be merely responses to the application. what you have reduced to a platitude has not been challenged by a reasoned argument. could you present one, or are ad lapidems all that dissenters could muster?
Dante
I have always been here
existence without being conceived = beliefs, not facts.
you're getting close. not there yet, but close.
---
you cannot hide natural rights behind science.
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natural rights are something which cannot be taken away, precisely because they are ideas. anything real, physical, tangible, can be taken away -- including life.
Dante
I have always been here
Dante
I have always been here
antagon
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existence without being conceived = beliefs, not facts.
you're getting close. not there yet, but close.
---
you cannot hide natural rights behind science.
---
natural rights are something which cannot be taken away, precisely because they are ideas. anything real, physical, tangible, can be taken away -- including life.
not belief... "this does not preclude their existence without being conceived, however." as in, this does not mean that they don't exist without being conceived by man.
i don't aim to 'hide' my theory behind any science, but instead to draw a parallel. intangible forces such as gravity and electromagnetic force have been studied for their properties and their effects on actors subject to them. in the same way the earth and an apple availed newton to a concept active in our universe, an individual possessing free will and a social paradigm avails a study of natural rights.
because we determine our actions, we possess a fundamental right. we cant turn that right to determine our actions over to someone else for them to act for us. someone can't take that fact from us by force. that is the fact of the matter about natural rights. exploring that with a human as a subject affords you many tangibles. for me it is obvious as hell, but perhaps in your insistence that this fact does not exist, you might be able to propose a scenario which can intercept our right to choose what we will and wont do. what will allow someone the power to control our actions themselves?
with the further subject of a social contract, natural rights afford us insight to the sources of civil unrest. the extent that measures are taken to isolate citizens from their freedom to exercise natural rights which they hold dear, is commensurate with a response of volatility. conversely, there is a response of stability which comes from social contracts which tailor protections to the desires of their constituents and have constructed a mechanism (like democracy) which can keep these aligned.
but don't sprint ahead in the lesson, come to grips with the basic precept and we could move from there.
Dante
I have always been here
I fully understand what you are saying -- your premise. But it is flawed.
gravity and an electromagnetic force may be invisible, but they can be manufactured and shut off. they are observable phenomena. they are physical forces subject to the physical world.
rights are ideas.
Dante
I have always been here
arguments and opinions. ideas.
I can even agree with your arguments without negating mine own. you cannot do the same. why?
why?
because your arguments deal with the philosophical, the intangible: ideas.
--
I will argue ideas with you, but only when you agree they are ideas and not facts.
antagon
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these arguments, opinions and ideas are on an element of nature. i specifically referred to the tangibility of their application, but you've presented an ad lapidem argument that no such tangibility exists.
ignoring argumentation is not a form of argumentation itself.
as to fact, i remind that a theory like the one which i have presented is an offer of fact with the condition that it could be disproved. the reason theories in science, to include this on social science, don't term their thesis as fact is because all science welcomes argumentation and supported opinion in dissent. i further remind that theories like relativity and concepts like gravity and electromagnetic force are ideas, too, and that the mere fact that they are ideas does not preclude their application in real life. for this reason, i propose that your observation that this is opinion, philosophy, an idea, or a theory is moot as it has no impact on how natural rights impact individuals or social contracts any more than pointing out the same about newton's gravitation might impact whether or not that force is real.
your challenge in dissent is to present some evidence that such a natural right to determine actions of free will is not exclusively possessed by the actor, perhaps by showing how one can readily and naturally circumvent or seize this right and take control of other people directly.
the potential that someone can do that seems like sci-fi to me, but it is your contention to this point, that it is an idea conceived by humanity which keeps that in place. can you show this science fiction of yours to be a credible theory?
ignoring argumentation is not a form of argumentation itself.
as to fact, i remind that a theory like the one which i have presented is an offer of fact with the condition that it could be disproved. the reason theories in science, to include this on social science, don't term their thesis as fact is because all science welcomes argumentation and supported opinion in dissent. i further remind that theories like relativity and concepts like gravity and electromagnetic force are ideas, too, and that the mere fact that they are ideas does not preclude their application in real life. for this reason, i propose that your observation that this is opinion, philosophy, an idea, or a theory is moot as it has no impact on how natural rights impact individuals or social contracts any more than pointing out the same about newton's gravitation might impact whether or not that force is real.
your challenge in dissent is to present some evidence that such a natural right to determine actions of free will is not exclusively possessed by the actor, perhaps by showing how one can readily and naturally circumvent or seize this right and take control of other people directly.
the potential that someone can do that seems like sci-fi to me, but it is your contention to this point, that it is an idea conceived by humanity which keeps that in place. can you show this science fiction of yours to be a credible theory?
antagon
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the fundamental flaw is in your understanding of gravitation and of electromagnetic force.
far from merely being invisible, these forces are just circumstantial to our universe. we understand them from their effect on subjects -- matter. without a particle, there is no way of accounting for either one. it isn't until an electron and a conductor combine to present an application for electromagnetic force that we have electricity. by studying electricity, magnetism and the molecular structure of certain materials, we have shaped an idea of the constant electromagnetic force which our universe is subject to.
these forces are constant, they cant be manufactured manipulated or turned off. this is the parallel which i am drawing to natural rights. while natural rights is not a physics principle, its application in social scientific and anthropological contexts is similarly observable. we understand it from its effects on subjects.
Greenbeard
Gold Member
antagon, I'm not sure I follow what you're saying here. The analogy with physical law is good: the equations of gravitation and electromagnetism govern interactions, which is exactly what natural rights are conceived to do in the social sphere. But you keep referring to the concept of free will to support the point that natural rights (as some manifestation of an underlying natural law) exist and I don't see how that can be the case.
The reason the interactions of gravitation and E&M are said to obey laws (which you could formulate as some inalienable set of "rights" each particle subject to those forces enjoys in interactions) is simple: they have absolutely no agency to disobey the set rules of the interaction. Outcomes are set by the rules of the interaction and as such are completely predictable.
The same isn't true of social (as opposed to physical) interactions. That's not to say social interaction isn't generally subject to certain rules, of etiquette, of law, of custom, etc (when I lived in a very dense urban neighborhood I became interested in symbolic interactionism because it's interesting to consider the why and the how of human interaction in those kinds of settings). But those rules or laws of interactions aren't laws like Brannigan's law (or Maxwell's equations)--hard-and-fast--precisely because we either have free will or we have the appearance of having free will.
So when some political theorist declares that we have a "natural right" to life, that's a bit like the electron's natural right not to be touched by another electron. Both are statements of outcome that describe something that can't happen in an interaction. But the electron's natural right is enforced by a repulsive force experienced by would-be transgressors that rapidly escalates toward infinite magnitude as other electrons attempt to violate its right. A human being's right to life, however, has no such protections. We can and do kill each other. Similarly, we can and do violate property rights.
Governments and social structures are emergent features of human interaction that we've developed to help generate mutually desirable outcomes. As such, they're analogs of the mediators of physical interactions (Uncle Sam's a boson!). But they'll never be completely analogous because the interaction of electrons is not governed by rules instituted because a majority of electrons who decided they wanted particular outcomes in interactions, nor can the rules governing electromagnetic interactions be ignored at will by an anti-social electron.
Imagining social interaction between individuals in a world with no governments is like imagining electromagnetic interactions between charged particles in a world with no electromagnetic force--it doesn't really make sense because the notion of "charge" has electromagnetism built into it just as the notion of "social interaction" has the concept of some governing social customs built into it. But the entire idea of "natural rights" is based on the idea that even if the governing structures that enforce and define them somehow went away, they would still exist and thus are super-legitimate. The implication being that no governing regime can ever legitimately change certain rules of social interaction, like sanctioning a cavalier attitude toward property rights. But, to go back to the physical analogy, that's like arguing that since electrons have a "natural right" to not be touched by other electrons--i.e. they should repel each other--if we could somehow alter the laws of physics ("put in a new governing regime") so that particles of like charge no longer repel, that would be illegitimate because it would violate a "natural right" that every electron possesses. But of course that's silly, because the "rights" are a function of the rules governing the interactions and if the rules somehow change, so do the rights. They aren't (theoretically) constant in this example, but constancy (inalienability) is supposed to be the defining feature of "natural rights."
This is where the physical and social examples part ways. As far as we know, we can't change the laws of physics (and, in fact, the example with charges I was playing with there is somewhat nonsensical since the definition of charge itself is simply a description of outcomes so it doesn't quite make sense to talk about holding charges constant and altering outcomes but you get the idea). We can, however, change the laws governing social interactions and in fact, as Carlin astutely points out, they already differ across regions with different governing regimes.
In reality, no one has rights outside of the dominant governing regime. That statement by itself is a complete repudiation of the concept of natural rights, which would argue exactly the opposite. But it's true. The notion of "natural rights" attempts to create a universal principle where none exists. In fact, if you put stock in some of the more speculative ideas in physics (e.g. bubble universes in inflationary cosmology), even the universe doesn't obey those sorts of universal principles and in fact does have different rules ("particle rights") in different regions ("nations"?). So perhaps the analogy is better than I'm giving it credit for...
The reason the interactions of gravitation and E&M are said to obey laws (which you could formulate as some inalienable set of "rights" each particle subject to those forces enjoys in interactions) is simple: they have absolutely no agency to disobey the set rules of the interaction. Outcomes are set by the rules of the interaction and as such are completely predictable.
The same isn't true of social (as opposed to physical) interactions. That's not to say social interaction isn't generally subject to certain rules, of etiquette, of law, of custom, etc (when I lived in a very dense urban neighborhood I became interested in symbolic interactionism because it's interesting to consider the why and the how of human interaction in those kinds of settings). But those rules or laws of interactions aren't laws like Brannigan's law (or Maxwell's equations)--hard-and-fast--precisely because we either have free will or we have the appearance of having free will.
So when some political theorist declares that we have a "natural right" to life, that's a bit like the electron's natural right not to be touched by another electron. Both are statements of outcome that describe something that can't happen in an interaction. But the electron's natural right is enforced by a repulsive force experienced by would-be transgressors that rapidly escalates toward infinite magnitude as other electrons attempt to violate its right. A human being's right to life, however, has no such protections. We can and do kill each other. Similarly, we can and do violate property rights.
Governments and social structures are emergent features of human interaction that we've developed to help generate mutually desirable outcomes. As such, they're analogs of the mediators of physical interactions (Uncle Sam's a boson!). But they'll never be completely analogous because the interaction of electrons is not governed by rules instituted because a majority of electrons who decided they wanted particular outcomes in interactions, nor can the rules governing electromagnetic interactions be ignored at will by an anti-social electron.
Imagining social interaction between individuals in a world with no governments is like imagining electromagnetic interactions between charged particles in a world with no electromagnetic force--it doesn't really make sense because the notion of "charge" has electromagnetism built into it just as the notion of "social interaction" has the concept of some governing social customs built into it. But the entire idea of "natural rights" is based on the idea that even if the governing structures that enforce and define them somehow went away, they would still exist and thus are super-legitimate. The implication being that no governing regime can ever legitimately change certain rules of social interaction, like sanctioning a cavalier attitude toward property rights. But, to go back to the physical analogy, that's like arguing that since electrons have a "natural right" to not be touched by other electrons--i.e. they should repel each other--if we could somehow alter the laws of physics ("put in a new governing regime") so that particles of like charge no longer repel, that would be illegitimate because it would violate a "natural right" that every electron possesses. But of course that's silly, because the "rights" are a function of the rules governing the interactions and if the rules somehow change, so do the rights. They aren't (theoretically) constant in this example, but constancy (inalienability) is supposed to be the defining feature of "natural rights."
This is where the physical and social examples part ways. As far as we know, we can't change the laws of physics (and, in fact, the example with charges I was playing with there is somewhat nonsensical since the definition of charge itself is simply a description of outcomes so it doesn't quite make sense to talk about holding charges constant and altering outcomes but you get the idea). We can, however, change the laws governing social interactions and in fact, as Carlin astutely points out, they already differ across regions with different governing regimes.
In reality, no one has rights outside of the dominant governing regime. That statement by itself is a complete repudiation of the concept of natural rights, which would argue exactly the opposite. But it's true. The notion of "natural rights" attempts to create a universal principle where none exists. In fact, if you put stock in some of the more speculative ideas in physics (e.g. bubble universes in inflationary cosmology), even the universe doesn't obey those sorts of universal principles and in fact does have different rules ("particle rights") in different regions ("nations"?). So perhaps the analogy is better than I'm giving it credit for...
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american chaos
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Excuse me--can you give us an example of a natural rights
Please list this right! A wordy or disparaging response is not good enough for us!
american chaos
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Let me help you out--
A man has the right to die.
That is an inalienable rights, is it not?
Metternich
Federalist Farmer
I think, oddly enough, the best way to start this is to reject--out of hand--the idea that 'natural rights' cannot possibly be static constructs. Why? For the simple reason that we cannot violate fundamentals about the human mind. Namely, that certain concepts (if not, necessarily, natural rights) are developed a priori and perfectly.
[As an aside, it's ironic to note how we have both developed; to the point where empiricism is used as an attempt to disprove Natural Rights; while rationalism is used to support them. Funny, no?]
To use examples from the world's reigning philosophical influence, Kant, the mind is not the blank paper or empty cupboard of the empiricists, waiting to be filled in by experience. The mind comes furnished with a set of pure a priori concepts, Categories, which organize incoming sensory information. The mind actively interprets the incoming information and imposes meaning on the material of experience. This of course, has been acknowledged as having a physiological basis. Noam Chomsky's Language Acquisition Device (LAD) or the work done by the popular author Steven Pinker both prove that the human mind is innately blessed with some sort of intuition (not to mention, unknown influences that society has no control). It follows that if humans can infer the meaning derived from words that they should never have known, then experience does not determine the structure of the mind. This allows for universality. Propositions become necessary and valid because of the way the mind functions.
If that one point is acknowledged, the whole argument presented in this thread against Natural Rights ceases to be internally consistent. If universality exists, and if innateness 'exists,' there is obviously the third tenant: reasonable explanation (that, I believe, we all have at least glanced over) for why Natural Rights can be described as part of this innateness and universality if those two adjectives really do exist. At which point, the whole argument that Natural Rights have physiological and philosophical basis that can't be contradicted by political entities is close too settled. If Natural Rights are thought to be a universal aspect inherent to human beings, it really doesn't matter what a government does. If, for instance, a government declared that no one will speak any bit of coherent language for their entire lives; no one would say that the PAD was eliminated from the human psyche. Similarly, Natural Rights exist no matter what variances occur.
Admittedly, there is no such thing as a completely 'self-regarding.' Yet, there is a difference--one you either ignore or don't realize--between individuals voluntarily accepting the role of society and them being dependent on society for their natural rights.
John Mill said:
Of course, the argument against having Natural Rights mean nothing unless within the greater context of society is, quite simply, society is stupid. People are stupid. When the public opinion and individual rights entangle, it is almost wholly the public which interferes wrongly; at the misappropriate place, time and belief. I need not to go into examples now, we all know too many, but one that springs to mind is the recent Proposition 8 battle, the Mosque near the former location of the WTC, and Muslim architecture in Switzerland.
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antagon
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thanks for this well considered response. 
within it some references are made to elements of hobbes' and locke's concepts of natural rights to which mine abides, but without any of the several qualifications each and many subsequent theorists have adorned them with. i explained a bit of this in the OP, and may further explain below, but what is left once these qualifications are stripped is quite simple: the right to determine any and all actions of free (self-determined, non-reflexive, non-autonomous) will.
is this to say that the illusory violation of rights isn't equivalent to the illusory defiance of gravity entailed in flight? i argue that efforts can be made to overcome forces in nature. we could insulate conductors to limit the impact of particles acting out EM. gravity isn't a very strong force at all. we could merely hop in order to create the illusion of directly defying gravitation itself, howsoever briefly. similarly, imprisonment can function to insulate individuals from the potential to act out their natural rights. threat of force could be applied such that an individual is inclined to align their actions with the aggressor's will.
what we know in the end is that none of the core natural forces were remotely disturbed. they remained constant. in the case of natural rights, imprisonment didn't change the fact that the actor possessed the exclusive right to determine his own actions, he was merely insulated from doing so outside of specified confines. i argue that our societies are such conduits of natural rights for their constituents. in the case of slavery, where a master seems to get individuals to act to his pleasure, i argue that he uses coercion and threat of force to persuade them to do as he wills, but that the slaves make the decision in the end. the greater the extent which a social interaction contradicts the natural rights valued by the parties to the interaction, the more volatility there will be within the interaction. hence, a slave master has to watch his back for the wraith of his slaves.
there are a number of claims to natural rights which dont conform to my definition. initself our lives are sustained autonomously. i would contend that a social right to life is extended by many societies, but that life does not arise from our free will and is not self-determined, precluding it from conforming with my definition. add property rights, habeus corpus and any essential entitlement to this non-natural right characterization.
within it some references are made to elements of hobbes' and locke's concepts of natural rights to which mine abides, but without any of the several qualifications each and many subsequent theorists have adorned them with. i explained a bit of this in the OP, and may further explain below, but what is left once these qualifications are stripped is quite simple: the right to determine any and all actions of free (self-determined, non-reflexive, non-autonomous) will.
is this to say that the illusory violation of rights isn't equivalent to the illusory defiance of gravity entailed in flight? i argue that efforts can be made to overcome forces in nature. we could insulate conductors to limit the impact of particles acting out EM. gravity isn't a very strong force at all. we could merely hop in order to create the illusion of directly defying gravitation itself, howsoever briefly. similarly, imprisonment can function to insulate individuals from the potential to act out their natural rights. threat of force could be applied such that an individual is inclined to align their actions with the aggressor's will.
what we know in the end is that none of the core natural forces were remotely disturbed. they remained constant. in the case of natural rights, imprisonment didn't change the fact that the actor possessed the exclusive right to determine his own actions, he was merely insulated from doing so outside of specified confines. i argue that our societies are such conduits of natural rights for their constituents. in the case of slavery, where a master seems to get individuals to act to his pleasure, i argue that he uses coercion and threat of force to persuade them to do as he wills, but that the slaves make the decision in the end. the greater the extent which a social interaction contradicts the natural rights valued by the parties to the interaction, the more volatility there will be within the interaction. hence, a slave master has to watch his back for the wraith of his slaves.
there are a number of claims to natural rights which dont conform to my definition. initself our lives are sustained autonomously. i would contend that a social right to life is extended by many societies, but that life does not arise from our free will and is not self-determined, precluding it from conforming with my definition. add property rights, habeus corpus and any essential entitlement to this non-natural right characterization.
certainly not a complete analogy, but deep notwithstanding. can you appreciate that entitlements requested of government are superficial to natural rights as defined? can you see how an anti-social individual exhibits the role of natural rights -- that the rights possessed exclusively of individuals to act at their determination create liabilities in social paradigms?
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