No, his argument is that they didn't plan for this eventuality, and that it was a very possible (if not probable) eventuality.
No, he argued that the military should plan (and equip) for ANY eventuality and EVERY possibility. He refuses to see the impossibility of this.
But, as far as what YOU said:
That's why I asked:
How probable was the eventuality we have, and was that eventuality probable enough to warrant the extra cost?
There doesn't need to be a showing that everyone was clamoring for this before the invasion.
No, but it would go a long way to dispel the 'Monday morning quarterback' characterization. Anyone can criticize anything after the fact.
The President has at his disposal the greatest collection of military advisors and intelligence on the planet. They are expected to foresee things that we cannot. They are expected to be prepared for things that we cannot foresee. That is part of the reason why we keep such a large defense budget.
Yes.
And THEY concluded that it was not necessary/cost effective to equip the troops as Matt suggests, because the probability of neededing to to do was low enough. Before the war, who disagreed, and on what grounds?
Maybe you are right that had they planned for this and the eventuality had not arisen, the administration would have been accused of waste.
There's no maybe here -- and, guaranteed, sometime after we pull out, that very criticism will be made regarding all that equipment gathering dust.
However, that doesn't change the fact that they didn't appear to have accounted for this possibility adequately.
Of coure not -- because they assessed the possibility of the particular situation as low enough to not warrant the preparations noted here. Given the low probability, there was no reason to armor every vehicle and soldier as you would if they were expected to see frontline combat.
Nobody said being the President was easy. Especially in wartime, you are expected to make the right call, and I think it is fair game to criticize the leader when he does not.
And this is only the case if you can present an argument as to why the military planners, before the war, should have placed a higher probability the scenario that actually played out. Else, its just arguing from hindsight.
** All of this is neglecting the fact that within the intelligence community, people were warning that this could be a long drawn out affair of civil conflict
Which was one of just many such 'warnings' provided to the military - not the least of which was that our invasion would result in the gassing of our troops, of the Sauds, of Israel...
The question is: Why, without the benefit if hindsight, should the planners have heeded this warning and not the ones that were actually planned for?