Bad analogy. Do you understand why? Here's the opening paragraph, which combined with the Drucker quote that precedes it, is all anyone deeply familiar with management and accounting theory and econ needs to read in order to know what Steve was going to say.
“Imagine an NFL coach,” writes Roger Martin, Dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, in his important new book,
Fixing the Game, “holding a press conference on Wednesday to announce that he predicts a win by 9 points on Sunday, and that bettors should recognize that the current spread of 6 points is too low. Or picture the team’s quarterback standing up in the postgame press conference and apologizing for having only won by 3 points when the final betting spread was 9 points in his team’s favor. While it’s laughable to imagine coaches or quarterbacks doing so, CEOs are expected to do both of these things.
I glanced over the next few paragraphs to see if the writer would start discussing exactly what I thought he would based on the inferences one might reasonably make from the paragraph above. And don't you know, that's exactly what the author did.
Now, I want you to put your hand under your jaw so you catch it when it drops, because it's about to. I knew what Steve was going to say; moreover, I agree with him. Indeed, everyone who's fortunes don't depend on stock price agrees with him. His core message is one I've been communicating successfully to my clients for decades, literally. Look back at the flow I showed you. It reflects exactly the same principle Steve puts forth in his editorial.
Surely now you are thinking, "Well then WTH? What's bad about the analogy?" The answer has a few dimensions:
- You've applied a public company concern to small, privately held companies.that have no need to be concerned with meeting The Street's expectation. Owners and investors in such companies reap returns based on "real market," to use Steve's term, returns, not on "expectations market returns.
- Because #1 is the case, small company CEOs/Managers/Owners manage to maximize profitability, not market cap/stock price. Their capitalization derives from (1) owner direct investment, (2) undistributed earnings, and (3) contribution interests (loans or other cash/asset contributions from parties who receive interest for the use of their contribution that does not entitle them to an ownership stake).
- Yes, public companies can take a beating for not hitting or besting expectations; however, if their underlying operations are sound and profitable, the company can endure. Sales of issued stock at however low a price on an exchange isn't going to alter that.
What the depressed stock price will do is make it difficult to raise new capital via issues (sales) of new stock, but the stock that's trading hands in the marketplace doesn't bring fresh infusions of cash into the company. Now if the company wants to raise money or purchase another company, stock that carries a low per share price or that is volatile is stock that's hard to use for those purposes. Indeed, lenders often enough stipulate as a condition of the loan that the company maintain a given share price/market cap and failure to meet them can automatically trigger a loan default, which then requires renegotiating the loan, which the company may or may not be able to do, etc., etc. So that's where the "hell" comes from re: declining stock prices. Obviously, companies that have borrowed heavily and have such covenants have to at least fulfill the terms of their loans.
The stock market is, after all, little but gambling. The better the odds of one not losing money -- and those odds are given by a stock's historic performance -- for a lot of investors, the easier it is to buy. Of course, there are "sophisticated" investors who thrive on volatile stocks and day trading and the like, and that's great, but it's not what most investors are doing, and certainly not most large institutional investors.
- A large portion of the problem Steve describes accrues from CEO's receiving often receiving the lion's share of their compensation via stock and stock options. To a public company, stock is, for all intents and purposes, just a piece of paper, so in the trade-off between paying a CEO (and other employees) tens to hundreds of millions in cash compensation, any company would sooner pay in stock/options. The employees take their compensation from the market, not from the company. With "C" Level folks, over time they can end up being majority or controlling shareholders, at which point, when they manage the stock price, what they are doing is managing their compensation. There again, however, this isn't a concern if a company's stock isn't traded.
- Steve refers to FAS 142. Let's get one thing that is factually inaccurate, though not material to the discussion -- his or this one -- out of the way: the impairment of intangible assets, namely goodwill, does not result in a writedown of real assets. The impairment writedown is against the one intangible asset called goodwill.
Now that writedown reduces net income, thus EPS, but it has no EBITDA impact. (Let me know if the implications of that aren't apparent to you. I can easily enough post some links.)
Let's go back to the writedown of goodwill. First one must understand what accounting goodwill is. Goodwill the sum paid in excess of underlying net asset value to purchase a company (or share of it). If you've ever found yourself in a "bidding war" for a new house and paid more than the market price, you sort of have some sense of goodwill. (The over-list sum you paid is not actually goodwill, but for now, and for simplicity, you can think of it that way.)
Now let's say instead that you (the CEO of a public company) purchase a company and pay more for it than the net asset value, you'll have purchased goodwill right along with everything else. If the company you buy does well, all is well. If it starts losing its appeal to customers, however, you made a poor decision in buying it. Your poor decision will result in your having to book an impairment to the goodwill you booked when you bought the company. Current and potential investors will see that writedown and they'll know you decision making is awry in some way. That doesn't bode well for the company as long as you're running it, unless there's a offsetting and legit reason why people should think otherwise.
- As Steve rightly notes, public companies do manage to Street/lender expectations, but they also manage to real market earnings. The circumstance of managing a public company isn't binary in that they can only manage to one or the other objective. Yes, public CEOs and CFOs do the expectations thing, which is quite literally gaming the market and the company; it's pure gambling and gamesmanship. COO's manage real expectations and do everything they can to profit maximize, and the more effective they are, the more leeway the provide for the CFO and CEO.
- Public CEOs and CFOs drive the expectations the Street/lenders have for stock price. They know that stock price predictability and performance is what allows them to earn tons and maintain the company's access to borrowed cash.
Now here's why yours is a bad analogy. All the stuff I mentioned about managing to expectations, and that Steve mentioned applies to public not private companies. So what's bad about the analogy is that you used Steve's in relation to a discussion that focuses on companies that aren't public. Sure, the overall thread does not make a distinction between public and private companies. The line of discussion into which you inserted yourself -- and it's okay that you did, that's not a problem -- is about small companies and the impact of the minimum wage increase on them.
I bring up public companies because the majority of minimum wage workers work for large companies with more than one hundred employees.
(See the last paragraph just above)
Most small business pay better than minimum wage, which is perhaps why, as I pointed out, the majority of them support increasing the minimum wage. It would help them on the demand side more than any increase would hurt them on the supply side.
You should probably explain what you think you mean more clearly. From where I'm sitting, I know that direct materials and direct labor are the two primary inputs to COGs/COGS, and both are variable costs. As such an increase in one, while holding the other constant, will have the same impact as will increasing the other and holding the former constant, provided the increase is the same.
- DM: 10 --> 15
DL: 5 --> 5
20 -->20
Do the same thing but hold DM constant and increase DL by 5 and COGs is still $20. There's no demand side difference. $20 is $20 to the customer.