John Spencer is recognized as one of the world's leading experts on urban warfare. One of his books, "
Understanding Urban Warfare," is considered a leading source on the topic. He is the chair of
Urban Warfare Studies with the Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy. He served twenty-five years in the U.S. Army as an infantry soldier and is a highly decorated combat veteran. Spencer is the host of the
Urban Warfare Project podcast, in which he interviews fellow industry experts.
This
thread he wrote yesterday is essential reading.
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In my opinion,
Israel has implemented more measures to prevent civilian casualties in urban warfare than any other military in the history of war. This includes many measure the U.S. has (or has not) taken in wars and battles but also
many measures no military in the world has ever taken.
Precautions during the initial air campaign to target enemy military capabilities to include using precision guided munitions and strict targeting protocols in both pre-planned and dynamic strikes against only military targets.
Use of precision guided munitions (PCMs): Despite the ignorance of reporting on ratios of PCMs to non-PCMs, Israel has used many types of PCMs to include lower collateral damage munitions/small diameter bombs and technologies and tactics that increase the accuracy of non-PCMs (dive bombing) limit civilian causalities (sat imagery, AI, cell phone presence)
The idea that a military must use more PCMs vs non-PCMs in a war is a myth. In the First Gulf War the U.S. fired 250,000 individual bombs and missiles in just 43 days. A small fraction of those
would fit the definition of PCMs.
Also myths about choice of munitions and proportionality assessment/value of target/collateral damage estimate such as saying a 500 lbs bomb would achieve the same military task of a 2,000 lb. bomb with no mention of tunnels that would require greater penetration or availability of types/quantity of munitions.
Call/Text ahead of a strike with (at times) roof-knocking (
no military has ever implemented in war). In some cases, IDF will call, text, drop small munitions on the roof of a building. While limited in the context of the strike it has been used in this war.
Provide warning and evacuate urban areas/cities before the full combined air and ground attack begins. While the tactic does alert the enemy defender and provide them the military advantage to prepare further, it is one of the best ways to prevent civilian casualties.
The U.S. did not do this in the invasion of Iraq or attack of Baghdad in 2003. Did not do this in the 2004 1st Battle of Fallujah but did do this in the Second Battle of Fallujah 6 months later because of the different context.
In the 2016-2017 Battle of Mosul, the Iraq government told the civilian to not evacuate and shelter in place during the battle for both Eastern and Western Mosul, but
later changed instructions further into the battle.
Israel provided days and then weeks of warnings and time for civilians to evacuate multiple cities in northern Gaza before starting the main air-ground attack of urban areas.
Use of air dropped flyers to give instruction on evacuations and establishing evacuation corridors (U.S. implemented in 2nd Fallujah & assisted 2016-2017 Mosul). Israel dropped over 520,000 pamphlets, broadcasted over radio and through social media messages to provide instruction for civilians to leave combat areas using corridors.
Use of real phone calls (19,734) to civilians in the combat areas, SMS texts (64,399) and pre-recorded calls (almost 6 million) to civilians to provide instructions on evacuations.
No military has never done this in urban warfare history.
(full article online)
Blogging about Israel and the Arab world since, oh, forever.
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