Challenger, et al,
There really isn't a universally adopted set of ethics or values for military personnel. Oh, there will be some similarities, but not the exact same concepts. In a 2007 submission to Parameters (US Army War College Quarterly Senior Professional Journal) Professor Paul Robinson, Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, noted that:
• The United States Army lists its “Army Values” as:
Loyalty
Duty
Respect
Selfless Service
Honor
Integrity
Personal Courage
• By contrast, the “Core Values” of the British Army are:
Selfless Commitment
Courage
Discipline
Integrity
Loyalty
Respect for Others
• While those of the Canadian Forces are:
Duty
Loyalty
Integrity
Courage
Again, they are similar, by with striking differences.
In Israel, you have 18-year-old kids, just coming out of high-school, suddenly having to become men and women overnight. Many are put into positions of power and authority almost immediately, not to mention life-and-death situations. I had a 19-year-old cousin who was killed in a military exercise by "friendly fire". It was a big blow to my family. Another 18-year-old cousin (at the time) drove his tank accidentally into an Arab house. So 18 and 19-year-old kids are in authority over people who are all ages. It's just not a good situation to be in.
The same applies to every army on the planet. The average age of infantry recruits in the British army was 22.1 in 2012, which has risen since 2000 when it was 18.36 years of age, field officers who lead them are on average 23 years old. The age of soldiers is by and large irrelevant, it's the training they receive beforehand that makes the difference between professionals and thugs in uniform.
(COMMENT)
It is interesting to note that Professor Asa Kasher, Tel Aviv University and at Shalem College, Israel, who authored the Code of Ethics adopted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), made the argument that in the last several decades, the Western Patterned Armed Forces use the necessity for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations as the justification for conflict entry. Indeed, most of the Rules pertaining to Armed Conflict are in the category of Customary and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These two main factors, Professor Kasher argues, demonstrates the need to expands military training beyond mere military ethics; but to embrace both military and law enforcement ethics which are noticeably different from the ethics applied in 20th Century Warfare.
By coincidence, LTC Ralph Peters, US Army DCSINT, also made a submission to Parameters (1994)(
The New Warrior Class), about a decade earlier, noting the difference between "soldiers" and "warriors:" Warriors are “erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect them, and do not obey orders they do not like.
This is important because of the emphasis the Army placed on the "warrior;" and the impact it has on the rest of the nation. And in this regard, I would like to bring to your attention of the problem, which was emerging in the 1990's --- but is prevalent today:
EXCEPRT
• IC21 THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY - STAFF STUDY PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
FIRST:
A growing concern about the concept of "sensor-to-shooter" was also expressed. Although some types of information need to be sent directly to a weapons system, inundating and overwhelming the "warrior" is a decided possibility. Some saw the eventual solution to this data overload problem in enhancing the capabilities and responsibilities of the JICs and JACs for data/analysis fusion. Others were still concerned that the prospect of
turning the "warrior" into an analyst, and, thus, reducing his operational effectiveness, were real and not necessarily good.
SECOND:
From implementation of Nunn-Lugar programs to promote Russian defense conversion to the deployment of troops into Bosnia to implement the Dayton Agreement, the DoD is the active arm of policy development and implementation. In part, this is due to changes in the stability of many regions and relationships that tend to involve armed entities and are a byproduct of a less polarized but more unstable world. For this reason, it is easy to see why much of the emphasis within the IC on SMO and "support to the warfighter" currently carries the day in terms of resource priority and focus. However, although DoD may be the active arm of many of the Nation's policy initiatives today, most if not all of these initiatives began with some level of diplomatic effort, calling into question whether "support to the diplomat" might be a more critical pursuit.
FINALLY:
"Support to the warfighter" is the area of main interest for DoD and the IC at present, and tends to be used interchangeably or as synonymous with SMO. The use of the term "support to the warfighter" is extremely problematic. It is misused to self-justify programs and budgets, and misunderstood, or defined so broadly as to encompass everything that the military does. It is also self-limiting, in that it promotes the immediate needs of a soldier, sailor, airman, marine or weapons system, making intelligence only a reactive function rather than a predictive one -- at a time when predictive analysis is becoming increasingly significant for the military commander as well as the policy maker. Moreover, the term suggests that the primary focus of intelligence should be on the actual need to use force (i.e., "fight a war"), when we continue to believe that successful foreign and national security policy is designed to preclude such an event if at all possible. This is not to say that the IC and the military should not prepare for military conflict. But this cannot be the sole focus, to the detriment of diplomacy, deterrence and force preponderance -- all of which also require IC support.
Today, nearly all the westernized Armed Forces have made the turn from "warrior" to the "warfighter"
(Professionals Soldier). But in doing so, they have become overwhelmed with the Customary IHL and the Priority Targeting as an effective combat operator.
One of the striking difference between the IDF and the Arab Palestinians is that it does not have the ability to recognize its history or its own character for what it is.
Most Respectfully,
R
