rancidmilko,
et al,
Yes, this is a very common argument. It is all about the concept of negative development of the countries that might acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It presupposes that a anti-American, but rational country, will negatively develop into a further anti-American posture AND becomes irrational - to the point of suicidal action.
Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are well aware that a Nuclear Attack would result in their obliteration by the US; it would be suicide for their government, country and culture.
Iran wants to be the Lord Protector of the Gulf States, and the major voice for the greater Middle East Region and its policies. It wants to be a force that moves out/ejects the non-Islamic Military Hegemony that the US represents. But there is no reason to believe that with, or without, a Nuclear Military Capability, Iran would unleash such a weapon; even on Israel.
What it does want is parity with Israel; to achieve a balance of power. And this is a critical point of disagreement.
The problem is that there are even worse extremists among them
If Iran government fell, what would happen to the nukes?
Think of Pakistan. The US treats Pakistan differently because of the nukes.
Nobody hates the US more than NK. But they haven't used nukes.
But they get away with printing hundreds of millions of fake dollars every year.
(COMMENT)
There are several different sets of arguments against a Iran being allowed to attain a Nuclear Weapons potential. The most often cited are portions or variants of the
CGL Argument, named after andexplained by ROBERT P. CASEY, LINDSEY GRAHAM AND JOE LIEBERMAN.
In the thumbnail view, the CGL Argument emphasizes a couple of major points of concern.
- The containment of a Nuclear Armed Iran, as was accomplished with the Cold War Soviet Union, is not possible.
- A nuclear armed Iran is a global threat with the primary crosshairs on the US and Israel.
The first premise gives way to the idea that a nuclear armed Iran will:
- Hold the global economy - relative to energy, hostage, threatening the oil supply.
- Significantly change the military profile in the Persian Gulf through its missile strike capability.
In the second case, the CGL Argument suggests that allowing Iran to become a nuclear weapons state will cause:
- The greater GCC and Middle Eastern states to go nuclear. There will be no chance for the region to become and remain nuclear weapons free.
- And the resulting proliferation of the nuclear technology will eventually result in one or more of the radial terrorist elements, that are prevalent in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, to acquire a nuclear weapon.
- The argument also suggests that state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, will arm its proxy terrorist action arms, such as Hezbollah or Iraqi Shi'ite Militias, with its weaponry to carry-out to terrorist actions under the protection of Iran's nuclear umbrella.
"Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." - Albert Einstein
The CGL Argument implies that the strategy of containment cannot be applied to Iran because it would require the US to compromise its absolute position that Iran can never be allowed to attain Nuclear Weapons; as it is an unacceptable risk.
It also suggests that such economic pressure must be brought on Iran to the level that it would threaten the existence of the Regime.
First, it is imperative that the U.S. and its partners accelerate and expand economic pressure on Tehran. The only thing Iran's leaders value more than their nuclear ambitions is the survival of their regime. Consequently, sanctions must threaten the very existence of that regime in order to have a chance of stopping its illicit nuclear activities.
SOURCE: Iran Can't be Allowed a Nuclear Capacity
This is a paradox... The CGL Argument implies that the Iranian Regime is both rational and
(more importantly) non-suicidal. That is to say that: To Iran survival is more important than nuclear aggression or proliferation. But if the economic pressure is so great that the survival of the regime is threatened, than the only recourse in the future is to develop a countermeasure; the nuclear armament option.
Institute for International Economics said:
Of 115 cases of economic sanctions between World War I and 1990, we judged 34 percent to be at least partially successful. These cases include instances of multilateral sanctions and they include sanctioners other than the United States. The objective is to provide as comprehensive an analysis of sanctions as possible. Comparing the economic and political circumstances across these episodes, we found that sanctions tend to be most effective when:
- The goal is relatively modest (thus lessening the importance of multilateral cooperation, which often is difficult to obtain, and reducing the chances a rival power will bother to step in with offsetting assistance).
- The target is much smaller than the country imposing sanctions (the average sender's economy was 187 times larger than that of the average target), economically weak and politically unstable.
- The sender and target are friendly toward one another and conduct substantial trade (the sender accounted for 28 percent of the average target's trade in success cases but only 19 percent in failures).
- The sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively to maximize impact (the average cost to the target as a percentage of GNP in success cases was 2.4 percent and 1 percent in failures, while successes averaged 2.9 years in duration and failures 8 years).
- The sender avoids high costs to itself.
SOURCE: Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism
- Sanctions “succeed” in about one-third of the cases overall, but the success rate depends importantly on the type of objectives sought
Again, we cannot approach these types of sanctions in the same way as we have in the past without running the risk of military action being required. So we have to ask ourselves, which has been more successful in the past: Sanctions or Containment?
Most Respectfully,
R
you are one ignorant bigot
