In Slavery, Abortion, and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning Justin Buckley Dyer explores the analogy of abortion and slavery from historical, politica
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In Slavery, Abortion, and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning Justin Buckley Dyer explores the analogy of abortion and slavery from historical, political, and philosophical perspectives. In the 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandforddecision the Supreme Court elevated the property interests of slave owners above all other rights, including the human rights of slaves. In Roe v. Wade (1973), Dyer argues, the Court similarly elevated a woman's right to choose an abortion above all other rights, including the rights of the fetus. Scott v. Sandford has long been invoked by prolife activists as a call to arms against abortion rights. Dyer agrees that it is appropriate for prolife activists to claim the legacy of the antislavery movement in their battle against legalized abortion.
The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Scott v. Sandford and established rights for the newly freed slaves that were enforceable against the states. That amendment's broad language has proven to be a vehicle for identifying other fundamental rights, including abortion rights. Dyer effectively describes the history and constitutional politics of the Supreme Court's substantive due process rulings, and the historical parallels between the antislavery and prolife movements.
In the Roe v. Wade decision Justice Harry Blackmun claimed that there is no consensus on when life begins, and he maintained that there was no widespread condemnation of abortion in this country until the late nineteenth century. Dyer examines the legal strategy of the case's attorneys and accuses them of engaging in “law office history.” He argues that nineteenth-century antiabortion laws were aimed at protecting the life of the fetus and not at restricting women's rights. However, Dyer fails to acknowledge the significance of the many restrictions on women's rights that did exist in the nineteenth century, including the lack of reproductive rights for the slaves who were to benefit from the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dyer also explores the history of abortion politics in the twentieth century. Legal historians such as Reva Siegel have written extensively about the role of the women's movement and its claims of liberty and equality in convincing the Court to find for a fundamental right to choose contraception and abortion. However, Dyer does not engage that history in his discussion of abortion politics.
In the last two chapters, Dyer turns to the underlying philosophical debate about abortion, exploring the analogy of slavery and abortion. He argues that there is no principled reason for treating a fetus as a nonperson, lacking the protection of law. In the slavery-abortion analogy, pregnant women are to the aborted fetus as slaveholders are to slaves. Nonetheless, Dyer fails to address the arguments of those who have stressed women's interests of equality and liberty in his otherwise detailed analysis of the numerous scholars and ethicists on both sides of the abortion debate.
Fundamentally, Dyer argues, the question is “who counts as a member of our political and moral community” (p. 157). His book may leave readers wondering about the extent to which women count as part of the slavery analogy in prolife politics.
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Race related chattel slaves were never existed ibsude a white make slave holder’s body.
Dyer argues, the Court similarly elevated a woman's right to choose an abortion above all other rights, including the rights of the fetus.
Analogy? WTF kind of reasoning is this?