How About An Alliance With Russia?

[sealybobo]

An alliance with the dark side? No thanks. Let's get the Republicans out of control and go back to a liberal democracy

"Dark side?" How about explaining the inspiration for that label.

For one anti environment. Two, corrupt collision with evil Russia. You think Russia's elections aren't rigged? So are ours. Corporate voting machines?

 

[JoeB131]

They also served our interests as an indispensably effective ally without which we would not have defeated Hitler. The The Russians didn't take anything from us in post-War Europe -- they earned what they got. Ultimately they lost most of it because they couldn't financially sustain it.

I think the people who lived for decades under Soviet occupation wouldn't be as blase as you are about it...

"A few angry jihadists . . ." today. Why are you so comfortably confident about tomorrow? Don't you think these Muslims have any long-range plans for tomorrow?

In case you haven't noticed, a virtual army of military-age Muslim men are streaming into Europe, and now Canada, and probably across our vulnerable Southern and Northern borders. This is a passive invasion. Right now they are not armed -- but how long do you suppose they will remain that way? One armed, angry and motivated terrorist among us is worth a hundred ordinary soldiers attempting invasion from outside.

Not really. again, there's nothing a terrorist can do to bring down the government or change our society. We can only do that shit to ourselves. Now while I am sure you are pissing yourself at the thought of the scary Muslim under your bed, 50 years ago, somoene like you was pissing himself at the thought of the Communist under his bed and 100 years ago, someone was pissing himself at the thought of the Catholic under his bed.

 

[usmbguest5318]

Thank you for the reading list.

You're welcome.

 

[The Sage of Main Street]

I am neither well read nor well educated on the topic of international politics, mainly because one simply cannot believe anything any politician says and only a little of what the mainstream media has to say. But I would be interested in reading the opinions of others on the topic of a close alliance with Russia.

I harbor no personal antipathy for Russia or the Russian people and I quite frankly could never understand why we seem to be at odds with them for so long. What did the Russians ever do to us? I've found there is a lot to admire about the Russian people. They are passionately artistic, especially in the fields of music and dance. They are physically strong and healthy and their history shows them to have survived generations of tragic hardship. So it seems to me that American culture could benefit from absorbing that of the Russian culture.

We are presently witnessing the literal rape of European culture by the passive invasion of extraordinarily aggressive Islamic migrants who represent themselves as asylum-seekers but who have imposed themselves on Europe in an offensively militant manner. Surprisingly the Europeans seem to be passively tolerating the barbaric behavior of these bottom-feeders -- who undoubtedly will be "migrating" from Europe to these United States when their number rises sufficiently. And the longer we wait to take decisive deterrent action the more difficult it will be.

Based on what I've been reading and seeing on tv news it seems that Russia is beginning to be similarly affected by the expansion of migrating Islamic "refugees," which consists mainly of military-age males unaccompanied by and unburdened with wives and children. It is increasingly clear that we have this rather menacing circumstance in common with Russia, so what is the reason for the current re-emergence of Cold-War era hostility toward that nation, its people and its leader? It seem unquestionably obvious that the opposite situation would be to our mutual advantage.

Again, I am interested in knowing how others feel about this situation.

Pick up a cold war history book..
Putin is a threat to democracy world wide. No alliance.

Want a Squeaky-Voiced, Pencil-Necked, Hollow-Chested Bear

He's a threat to girlymanhood. That's what really motivates the Russophobe wimps.

 

[The Sage of Main Street]

The Cold War was real and based on soviet actions and intentions.

The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone.

Putin is NOT a threat to anyone not on his borders.

There is not reason to NOT have good relations with Russia, even an alliance.

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

 

[Aries]

The Cold War was real and based on soviet actions and intentions.

The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone.

Putin is NOT a threat to anyone not on his borders.

There is not reason to NOT have good relations with Russia, even an alliance.

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

 

[The Sage of Main Street]

The Cold War was real and based on soviet actions and intentions.

The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone.

Putin is NOT a threat to anyone not on his borders.

There is not reason to NOT have good relations with Russia, even an alliance.

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Of course you don't the GOP never cares when they aren't personally affected. But it is an international crime, putin is a war criminal, murder, dictator. If you like him so much- move to moscow because his puppet will be out of the white house soon.

The threat of the Soviet Union rolling over Western Europe was a threat to the global balance of power that required US action to prevent.


The Crimea is not that important.


It is not our problem and not our fight. It is literally on the other side of the world.


We are not the World's Policeman.

Okay, so we'll just have a free for all and let putin take whatever he wants. That has never led to world wars or anything.

Busybodies Bring Us Body Bags

What has he taken that belongs to us?

 

[usmbguest5318]

I believe it would be productive for you to respond to TooMuchTime's very substantive commentary in Message #47

Oh, my. You are, intentionally or not, asking me to make exactly the kind of post that, while I don't mind making it, most members here absolutely detest. Thus, I don't know how productive it'll be to comply, but you've asked, so I'll share the framework of understanding from whence my stance on the matter issues, and then I'll identify what my stance is. I'm doing the former because:

• I'm not an international relations or diplomacy expert; thus the background information and experiences upon which I can draw to develop a stance are limited. I know enough to listen critically to discussions among IR experts, make intelligent inferences and ask thoughtful clarifying questions. But that's as far as my knowledge goes. (I also know where to look for high quality information if I need it. I shared that as part of the earlier reading list.) Thus, I am reticent to have too strong a POV, much less share it. I don't much like to discuss publicly things on which I'm at best a novice.
• You've asserted you're no pro on IR either, so I can't reasonably discuss the topic and assume you are familiar with the theoretical framework that drives how I've arrived at my position. If we are to discuss this any further, we have to at least fully understand one another's conceptual framework as goes IR, and then consider them in terms of U.S.-Russian relations and actors.

My Foundational Framework
Having only at your behest read post #47, and from it I noticed an amalgamation of theories international relations (IR) theories: Constructivism and the competing theories to which it is a response, (Neo)realism and (Neo)libralism [1]. (Some folks call the latter two "neo" and others don't. The distinction between what's "neo" and what's not is likely not relevant here, but for the sake of completeness I at least make not that there are very detailed-level distinctions one can make.)

As goes applying those theories to "solutioning" current IR (as opposed to using them to explain the past) discord, while each of them gives some credence to vicissitudes of human nature, each of them strikes me as being useful in various aspects of IR, but none of them offers an IR analogue of natural science's "holy grail," the unified theory of everything.

​

• Realism is good for explaining what is, but not so good at explaining the outcomes of or facilitating change. Realist theory of IR rests on the assumption that states in an anarchic international system [1] act out of rational self-interest to compete for power and security. Realism is able to explain that the bipolar world of the Cold War existed because of a struggle for power between the Soviet Union and the United States that was due to the lack of an international government to regulate power.
  
  Realists claim that their theory is conducive to forecasting state actions because those states carefully calculate moves based on self-interest, and those calculations can be predicted. State calculations cannot be foreseen, however, when they are based on anything other than realist assumptions. These assumptions hold that the international system is anarchic and states seek to “maximize their relative power positions over” each other. [3] Thus, the world must necessarily and always exist in a state of constant security conflict. Given this, in a Realist world, states’ calculations are always motivated by security and power. Realist theory is thus unable to predict changes in state motivations, nor does it reliably predict outcomes in the wake of change inspired by something(s) other than security and power.
  
  Laymen might correlate Realism to being effective for explaining IR behavior and goals among parties who have yet to fulfill what Maslow called security needs. So where does Realism fail? One example is in its inability to explain why NATO endured past the fall of the USSR. Obviously NATO still does exist, yet at the fall of the USSR, the Western European security need ostensibly ebbed, yet NATO didn't.
  
  Now, one can debate incessantly about whether the security need disappeared materially with the USSR or whether it merely evolved to include to the USSR's "buffer" nations which, in their nascent independence had ample reason to fear subsequent Russian incursion. Russia/Putin's annexation of the Crimea suggests the latter to me, though there are additional theories on why it/he did so. [4]
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Looking at the "zoomed in" image of the Black Sea, one sees the significance of the Crimea becomes readily apparent. Add to that the long tensions between Russia and the Ukraine and it's Realism seems quite effectively to explain that event. [5]
  
  Realist theorist predicted NATO's demise on the basis of there being no clear enemy for it to oppose. Obviously, their transformative speculations were wrong. NATO has adapted as an organ for maintaining the security of the "buffer" nations that have more recently joined it. Accordingly, what we observe about Realist IR theory is that it "works" when the basest of motivations prevail, but it suffers when higher level drivers take precedence. Thus the core question to ask before applying it is whether one or any actors in a given IR situation are motivated primarily by power and security. Realist theory will apply aptly to the those who are, and the more they are so moved, the better it explains and predicts behavior.
• Liberalism provides more theoretical room for interpretation of the system than Realism does. By assuming that “societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping preferences.” Liberalism solves Realism’s limitation in assuming that the same power and security concerns always motivate state interests; however, Liberal theory, like Realist theory, was unable to predict both the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
  
  Liberal theory of IR is actually a family of theories that all rest on the assumption that cooperation among states is more significant than Realists claim. In the Liberal model, Realists’ preoccupation with power and security is trumped by economic and political concerns. Liberal theorists assume that domestic societal actors, both individuals and groups, are fundamental to understanding international politics. They also focus on state (a nation's polity rather than experts') preferences in determining state behavior. Peace can be strengthened by such things as the spread of democracy, economic cooperation, and international organizations.
  
  Liberalism, like Realism, claims the power of prediction. Andrew Moravcsik states: “that systemic predictions can follow from [Liberal theories] should be obvious simply by inspecting the literature on the democratic peace.” ("Democratic peace" is a branch of Liberal theory that explains why liberal democracies have historically maintained a “separate peace” amongst themselves, meaning that liberal democracies do not fight one another.) Such states are able to maintain this peace “because they exercise democratic caution and are capable of appreciating the international rights of foreign republics.”
  
  Democratic peace theory appeared in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace. In this essay, Kant argues that republican (small "r" states are likely to avoid war because domestic actors within the states' influence policy. Citizens would be more reluctant to allow a war than would a head of state of a non-republican country because the head of state would not have to bear the hardships of war directly as citizens would. More recently, John Owen has argued that “liberal ideology and institutions” within liberal democracies “work in tandem to bring about democratic peace.” Such explanations are examples of Moravcsik’s claim that Liberalism can explain international systemic trends (in this case, the trend is sustained peace among liberal democracies).
  
  While this branch of Liberal theory is able to explain a trend in the international system, it is incapable of foreseeing changes in that trend. Snyder points out that Liberal theory of democratic peace is unable to predict “the timing of democratic transitions,” and Duffield points out that the theoretical approach was not able to “forecast with any precision the forms of active cooperation” liberal democracies would engage in after the Cold War. [6] Liberal democratic peace theory thus simply explains a historical trend rather than providing a framework in which to predict changes in that and similar international trends. Liberalism, like Realism, proves incapable of adequately explaining change in the international system.
  
  Thinking again in terms of Maslow's Hierarchy, one sees a correlation between Liberalism and the psychological tier of needs. Liberal theory's applicability, then, like that of IR Realism theory, depends on the actors' frame of mind and actual needs. The theory works quite nicely when the actors who wield state power behave -- be it in their own interest or that of their citizenry -- in alignment with the level of fulfillment attendant in Liberalism's assumptions and targets.
• Constructivist IR theory, which is a reaction to Realism and Liberalism's predictive shortcomings, focuses on state interests in terms of ideas and social discourse. Constructivism assumes the ideas and identity of actors shape state interests, which in turn transform the norms, rules, and institutions (foreign ministries, militaries, pecuniary systems, intelligence organs, etc.) of the international system. In this way, individuals’ perceptions can change the system as a whole. Constructivism, which Walt and Wendt pioneered and others have built upon, is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature [as (neo)realists maintain] or domestic politics [as neoliberals favour]. The theory also emphasizes history has an organic process of change that shapes state identity and interactions between states.
  
  Walt points out in his survey of dominant IR theories that given these constructs, “constructivism is especially attentive to the sources of change.” Koslowski and Kratochwil expand upon Walt's ideas by explaining that Constructivism views IR as a conglomeration of man-made institutions and norms. Because of this framework, actors can inflict fundamental changes on the system by changing “the rules and norms constitutive of international interactions.” They provide an explanation for the end of the Cold War (which both Realism and Liberalism have struggled to do) in terms of this Constructivist context by arguing that “Gorbachev’s decision to end the Brezhnev doctrine” reshaped norms governing the soviet bloc and consequently the whole system. Similarly, American domestic actors reshaped norms governing NATO, consequentially the whole international system.
  
  Constructivism has also been used by Thomas Risse-Kappen to explain the origins of NATO and its endurance through the Cold War. [7] He asserts that the perception of the Soviet Union as an ideological threat drove a security community based on common values and a collective identity together in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [8] This emphasis on ideas and values as the basis of explanation is a Constructivist framework. Risse-Kappen notes that the post-Cold War world has the potential to change NATO, but he is not able to offer an explanation for the change that actually happened with NATO expansion in 1997 since his work was published in 1996.
  
  Considered in the Maslow-context, Constructivism corresponds to yet another incremental "step up" among the nature of needs a state and its leaders undertake to fulfill. The advance, as before, is less of a wholesale departure from lower levels, but rather one that keeps "one foot," or at least part of one, in the prior level. As with most things IR, accurate analysis is unaided by binary notions,

(Sorry the summary image is so small. I don't have a readily available large version to paste here. The larger version in Snyder's essay is very blurry, but you can click on it to see if you can read it more ably.)​

My Stance/Thoughts
IMO, Liberalism and Realism fail insofar as they don't give enough credence to what I call the "cult of personality." Each of them talks about "the state," and that would be fine were the IR policy and actions of the states driven by what their citizens actually think be the course to chart in the relations how the states' diplomacy executed. However, outside of compartmentalized economic matters such as international trade, that is not what happens. That is so for good reason: the overwhelming majority of citizens in any country haven't the first clue about countries besides their own, other than what makes it onto the nightly news

When one looks at Russia and the U.S. in the context if IR, however, what one sees is two nations whose IR policy is very thoroughly controlled by the head of state and the foreign relations personnel in the respective governments. I see the current state of affairs as deriving largely from Putin's "stranglehold" on Russian relations and a somewhat latent tendency for Putin and American leaders to construe Russia as a smaller USSR and the U.S. as the "same old, same old."

Given my understanding of Putin the man (refer to the earlier references I provided about him), I think of Putin in much the same way I think of Trump: he simply cannot be trusted. I'm mindful of the story of NATO's expansion into Poland et al and Russia's having viewed that as a reflection of U.S. dissemblance. One can debate whether it indeed was, but looking in detail at the events that presaged those nations' joining NATO, it's hard to say that interpretation is accurate. It's easy using Constructivist theory, however, to understand why Russia/Putin might think so. Reviews of the first person accounts of the time make it clear bellicose intent resided anywhere in the minds of of the U.S. principals of the day.

Reading post #47, I can see clearly that it conforms to the Constructivist model for explaining change in IR. The thing in mind is that change needs to be catalyzed by something. I think at the moment there is no monumental mover having the scale and scope of the USSR breakup to catalyze any sort of change. Accordingly, I think either Liberal or Realist model is better suited to managing relations between the US and Russia. Were an extraordinary global event to happen, the Constructivist model would again be the better guide.

Be that as it may, I have to give credit to the Constructivist model for its tacit recognition of the role individual state actors -- principals -- have in forming IR outcomes. That recognition is essential when things are in flux and leaders, by and large, function with unfettered imprimatur.

Lastly, I noticed that post #47's author demurred from offering Constructivist steps forward, be it toward alliance with Russia or something, "anything," that is less "chilly" than is the current state of affairs between the two nations. Amid the prevailing doom and gloom of engagement deprivation, there has been a welcome recent development, with the formation of the American Committee for East-West Accord. This diverse group includes such leading figures as former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley, NYU emeritus professor of Russian studies Stephen F. Cohen, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock, and former CEO of the Procter & Gamble Co. John Pepper. In seeking to revive constructive dialogue between Moscow and Washington, the Committee listed five initial proposals:

• The Trump administration should formally join the "Normandy Four" -- France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia; a group that meets periodically to discuss regional relations (It is named the Normandy Four after meeting for the first time in June 2015 (2014?) Normandy, France.)
• The United States, NATO, and Russia should reactivate the NATO-Russia Council
• Washington and Moscow should restore the provisions of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
• Moscow and Washington should take all necessary steps to preserve the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
• Washington and Moscow should protect educational and related exchange programs.

These eminently sensible recommendations speak to the most important particular (arms control) and general (dialogue, engagement) lacunae in the relationship.



Notes:

1. Please don't misconstrue "liberalism" in this context as having anything to with what is meant in U.S. domestic politics as liberals vs. conservatives for in the realm of political theory, all Americans are liberal; the U.S., no matter what party holds sway, is a liberal democracy.
2. "Anarchy" in this context refers to the absence of some coordinating organization or structure that husbands relations between nations. It refers to an international level, not a domestic level. One might try to think of the UN as such as entity as goes non-intra-EU relations, but it lacks the "teeth" to be effective as such among Security Council countries that aren't intrinsically given to collaboration.
3. If that sounds like a zero-sum model, that's because, at the end of the day, it is.
4. Three plausible interpretations of Putin’s Crimean annexation have emerged. I don't necessarily see them as mutually exclusive because I think intelligent people -- and Putin is intelligent, "crazy" but also intelligent -- and situations are more complex than to act on just one motivating factor or another.
   
   The first -- call it “Putin as defender”-- is that the Crimean operation was a response to the threat of NATO’s further expansion along Russia’s western border. By this logic, Putin seized the peninsula to prevent two dangerous possibilities: first, that Ukraine’s new government might join NATO, and second, that Kiev might evict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from its long-standing base in Sevastopol.
   
   A second interpretation -- call it “Putin as imperialist”-- casts the annexation of Crimea as part of a Russian project to gradually recapture the former territories of the Soviet Union. Putin never accepted the loss of Russian prestige that followed the end of the Cold War, this argument suggests, and he is determined to restore it, in part by expanding Russia’s borders.
   
   A third explanation -- "Puttin as improviser”-- rejects such broader designs and presents the annexation as a hastily conceived response to the unforeseen fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The occupation and annexation of Crimea, in this view, was an impulsive decision that Putin stumbled into rather than the careful move of a strategist with geopolitical ambitions.
   Source and additional explanation
   
   
5. See the following for more perspective:
   -- Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords
   -- Russia’s Military Is a Paper Tiger in the Baltic
6. Sorry, but I don't have a free version of Duffield's paper to which I can link. I don't own the copyright, so I can't simply attach it.
7. See also: NATO as a Factor of Security Community Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe
8. Brief summaries of his paper can be found here:
   -- Summary of Risse-Kappen: Collective identity in a democratic community - From WikiSummary, free summaries of academic books and articles
   -- http://www.olivialau.org/ir/archive/kat6.pdf
9. See the following:
   -- Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How
   -- Interview With Tomasz Lis of Polish Television
   -- The President's News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague
   -- NATO’s Purpose After the Cold War
   -- Fulfilling the Founding Vision of NATO Statement 7 US Department of State Dispatch 1996
   
   Readers of my posts on USMB will note the violation of one of my core communication principles -- clear and precise messages are essential -- and note that our current president's failure to deliver many such messages is a key reason why I oppose his being POTUS. The sad outcome of vagueness in IR discussions and statements is part of what got us where we are in our relationship Russia. If Trump were indeed committed to taking a new tack with Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe he'd be far more forthcoming about the nature and extent of everything having to do with Russia, yet that's the exact opposite of what he and his core team of novices has been.

 

[Correll]

The Cold War was real and based on soviet actions and intentions.

The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone.

Putin is NOT a threat to anyone not on his borders.

There is not reason to NOT have good relations with Russia, even an alliance.

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

 

[DOTR]

I believe it would be productive for you to respond to TooMuchTime's very substantive commentary in Message #47

Oh, my. You are, intentionally or not, asking me to make exactly the kind of post that, while I don't mind making it, most members here absolutely detest. Thus, I don't know how productive it'll be to comply, but you've asked, so I'll share the framework of understanding from whence my stance on the matter issues, and then I'll identify what my stance is. I'm doing the former because:

• I'm not an international relations or diplomacy expert; thus the background information and experiences upon which I can draw to develop a stance are limited. I know enough to listen critically to discussions among IR experts, make intelligent inferences and ask thoughtful clarifying questions. But that's as far as my knowledge goes. (I also know where to look for high quality information if I need it. I shared that as part of the earlier reading list.) Thus, I am reticent to have too strong a POV, much less share it. I don't much like to discuss publicly things on which I'm at best a novice.
• You've asserted you're no pro on IR either, so I can't reasonably discuss the topic and assume you are familiar with the theoretical framework that drives how I've arrived at my position. If we are to discuss this any further, we have to at least fully understand one another's conceptual framework as goes IR, and then consider them in terms of U.S.-Russian relations and actors.

My Foundational Framework
Having only at your behest read post #47, and from it I noticed an amalgamation of theories international relations (IR) theories: Constructivism and the competing theories to which it is a response, (Neo)realism and (Neo)libralism [1]. (Some folks call the latter two "neo" and others don't. The distinction between what's "neo" and what's not is likely not relevant here, but for the sake of completeness I at least make not that there are very detailed-level distinctions one can make.)

As goes applying those theories to "solutioning" current IR (as opposed to using them to explain the past) discord, while each of them gives some credence to vicissitudes of human nature, each of them strikes me as being useful in various aspects of IR, but none of them offers an IR analogue of natural science's "holy grail," the unified theory of everything.

​

• Realism is good for explaining what is, but not so good at explaining the outcomes of or facilitating change. Realist theory of IR rests on the assumption that states in an anarchic international system [1] act out of rational self-interest to compete for power and security. Realism is able to explain that the bipolar world of the Cold War existed because of a struggle for power between the Soviet Union and the United States that was due to the lack of an international government to regulate power.
  
  Realists claim that their theory is conducive to forecasting state actions because those states carefully calculate moves based on self-interest, and those calculations can be predicted. State calculations cannot be foreseen, however, when they are based on anything other than realist assumptions. These assumptions hold that the international system is anarchic and states seek to “maximize their relative power positions over” each other. [3] Thus, the world must necessarily and always exist in a state of constant security conflict. Given this, in a Realist world, states’ calculations are always motivated by security and power. Realist theory is thus unable to predict changes in state motivations, nor does it reliably predict outcomes in the wake of change inspired by something(s) other than security and power.
  
  Laymen might correlate Realism to being effective for explaining IR behavior and goals among parties who have yet to fulfill what Maslow called security needs. So where does Realism fail? One example is in its inability to explain why NATO endured past the fall of the USSR. Obviously NATO still does exist, yet at the fall of the USSR, the Western European security need ostensibly ebbed, yet NATO didn't.
  
  Now, one can debate incessantly about whether the security need disappeared materially with the USSR or whether it merely evolved to include to the USSR's "buffer" nations which, in their nascent independence had ample reason to fear subsequent Russian incursion. Russia/Putin's annexation of the Crimea suggests the latter to me, though there are additional theories on why it/he did so. [4]
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Looking at the "zoomed in" image of the Black Sea, one sees the significance of the Crimea becomes readily apparent. Add to that the long tensions between Russia and the Ukraine and it's Realism seems quite effectively to explain that event. [5]
  
  Realist theorist predicted NATO's demise on the basis of there being no clear enemy for it to oppose. Obviously, their transformative speculations were wrong. NATO has adapted as an organ for maintaining the security of the "buffer" nations that have more recently joined it. Accordingly, what we observe about Realist IR theory is that it "works" when the basest of motivations prevail, but it suffers when higher level drivers take precedence. Thus the core question to ask before applying it is whether one or any actors in a given IR situation are motivated primarily by power and security. Realist theory will apply aptly to the those who are, and the more they are so moved, the better it explains and predicts behavior.
• Liberalism provides more theoretical room for interpretation of the system than Realism does. By assuming that “societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping preferences.” Liberalism solves Realism’s limitation in assuming that the same power and security concerns always motivate state interests; however, Liberal theory, like Realist theory, was unable to predict both the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
  
  Liberal theory of IR is actually a family of theories that all rest on the assumption that cooperation among states is more significant than Realists claim. In the Liberal model, Realists’ preoccupation with power and security is trumped by economic and political concerns. Liberal theorists assume that domestic societal actors, both individuals and groups, are fundamental to understanding international politics. They also focus on state (a nation's polity rather than experts') preferences in determining state behavior. Peace can be strengthened by such things as the spread of democracy, economic cooperation, and international organizations.
  
  Liberalism, like Realism, claims the power of prediction. Andrew Moravcsik states: “that systemic predictions can follow from [Liberal theories] should be obvious simply by inspecting the literature on the democratic peace.” ("Democratic peace" is a branch of Liberal theory that explains why liberal democracies have historically maintained a “separate peace” amongst themselves, meaning that liberal democracies do not fight one another.) Such states are able to maintain this peace “because they exercise democratic caution and are capable of appreciating the international rights of foreign republics.”
  
  Democratic peace theory appeared in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace. In this essay, Kant argues that republican (small "r" states are likely to avoid war because domestic actors within the states' influence policy. Citizens would be more reluctant to allow a war than would a head of state of a non-republican country because the head of state would not have to bear the hardships of war directly as citizens would. More recently, John Owen has argued that “liberal ideology and institutions” within liberal democracies “work in tandem to bring about democratic peace.” Such explanations are examples of Moravcsik’s claim that Liberalism can explain international systemic trends (in this case, the trend is sustained peace among liberal democracies).
  
  While this branch of Liberal theory is able to explain a trend in the international system, it is incapable of foreseeing changes in that trend. Snyder points out that Liberal theory of democratic peace is unable to predict “the timing of democratic transitions,” and Duffield points out that the theoretical approach was not able to “forecast with any precision the forms of active cooperation” liberal democracies would engage in after the Cold War. [6] Liberal democratic peace theory thus simply explains a historical trend rather than providing a framework in which to predict changes in that and similar international trends. Liberalism, like Realism, proves incapable of adequately explaining change in the international system.
  
  Thinking again in terms of Maslow's Hierarchy, one sees a correlation between Liberalism and the psychological tier of needs. Liberal theory's applicability, then, like that of IR Realism theory, depends on the actors' frame of mind and actual needs. The theory works quite nicely when the actors who wield state power behave -- be it in their own interest or that of their citizenry -- in alignment with the level of fulfillment attendant in Liberalism's assumptions and targets.
• Constructivist IR theory, which is a reaction to Realism and Liberalism's predictive shortcomings, focuses on state interests in terms of ideas and social discourse. Constructivism assumes the ideas and identity of actors shape state interests, which in turn transform the norms, rules, and institutions (foreign ministries, militaries, pecuniary systems, intelligence organs, etc.) of the international system. In this way, individuals’ perceptions can change the system as a whole. Constructivism, which Walt and Wendt pioneered and others have built upon, is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature [as (neo)realists maintain] or domestic politics [as neoliberals favour]. The theory also emphasizes history has an organic process of change that shapes state identity and interactions between states.
  
  Walt points out in his survey of dominant IR theories that given these constructs, “constructivism is especially attentive to the sources of change.” Koslowski and Kratochwil expand upon Walt's ideas by explaining that Constructivism views IR as a conglomeration of man-made institutions and norms. Because of this framework, actors can inflict fundamental changes on the system by changing “the rules and norms constitutive of international interactions.” They provide an explanation for the end of the Cold War (which both Realism and Liberalism have struggled to do) in terms of this Constructivist context by arguing that “Gorbachev’s decision to end the Brezhnev doctrine” reshaped norms governing the soviet bloc and consequently the whole system. Similarly, American domestic actors reshaped norms governing NATO, consequentially the whole international system.
  
  Constructivism has also been used by Thomas Risse-Kappen to explain the origins of NATO and its endurance through the Cold War. [7] He asserts that the perception of the Soviet Union as an ideological threat drove a security community based on common values and a collective identity together in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [8] This emphasis on ideas and values as the basis of explanation is a Constructivist framework. Risse-Kappen notes that the post-Cold War world has the potential to change NATO, but he is not able to offer an explanation for the change that actually happened with NATO expansion in 1997 since his work was published in 1996.
  
  Considered in the Maslow-context, Constructivism corresponds to yet another incremental "step up" among the nature of needs a state and its leaders undertake to fulfill. The advance, as before, is less of a wholesale departure from lower levels, but rather one that keeps "one foot," or at least part of one, in the prior level. As with most things IR, accurate analysis is unaided by binary notions,

(Sorry the summary image is so small. I don't have a readily available large version to paste here. The larger version in Snyder's essay is very blurry, but you can click on it to see if you can read it more ably.)​

My Stance/Thoughts
IMO, Liberalism and Realism fail insofar as they don't give enough credence to what I call the "cult of personality." Each of them talks about "the state," and that would be fine were the IR policy and actions of the states driven by what their citizens actually think be the course to chart in the relations how the states' diplomacy executed. However, outside of compartmentalized economic matters such as international trade, that is not what happens. That is so for good reason: the overwhelming majority of citizens in any country haven't the first clue about countries besides their own, other than what makes it onto the nightly news

When one looks at Russia and the U.S. in the context if IR, however, what one sees is two nations whose IR policy is very thoroughly controlled by the head of state and the foreign relations personnel in the respective governments. I see the current state of affairs as deriving largely from Putin's "stranglehold" on Russian relations and a somewhat latent tendency for Putin and American leaders to construe Russia as a smaller USSR and the U.S. as the "same old, same old."

Given my understanding of Putin the man (refer to the earlier references I provided about him), I think of Putin in much the same way I think of Trump: he simply cannot be trusted. I'm mindful of the story of NATO's expansion into Poland et al and Russia's having viewed that as a reflection of U.S. dissemblance. One can debate whether it indeed was, but looking in detail at the events that presaged those nations' joining NATO, it's hard to say that interpretation is accurate. It's easy using Constructivist theory, however, to understand why Russia/Putin might think so. Reviews of the first person accounts of the time make it clear bellicose intent resided anywhere in the minds of of the U.S. principals of the day.

Reading post #47, I can see clearly that it conforms to the Constructivist model for explaining change in IR. The thing in mind is that change needs to be catalyzed by something. I think at the moment there is no monumental mover having the scale and scope of the USSR breakup to catalyze any sort of change. Accordingly, I think either Liberal or Realist model is better suited to managing relations between the US and Russia. Were an extraordinary global event to happen, the Constructivist model would again be the better guide.

Be that as it may, I have to give credit to the Constructivist model for its tacit recognition of the role individual state actors -- principals -- have in forming IR outcomes. That recognition is essential when things are in flux and leaders, by and large, function with unfettered imprimatur.

Lastly, I noticed that post #47's author demurred from offering Constructivist steps forward, be it toward alliance with Russia or something, "anything," that is less "chilly" than is the current state of affairs between the two nations. Amid the prevailing doom and gloom of engagement deprivation, there has been a welcome recent development, with the formation of the American Committee for East-West Accord. This diverse group includes such leading figures as former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley, NYU emeritus professor of Russian studies Stephen F. Cohen, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock, and former CEO of the Procter & Gamble Co. John Pepper. In seeking to revive constructive dialogue between Moscow and Washington, the Committee listed five initial proposals:

• The Trump administration should formally join the "Normandy Four" -- France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia; a group that meets periodically to discuss regional relations (It is named the Normandy Four after meeting for the first time in June 2015 (2014?) Normandy, France.)
• The United States, NATO, and Russia should reactivate the NATO-Russia Council
• Washington and Moscow should restore the provisions of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
• Moscow and Washington should take all necessary steps to preserve the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
• Washington and Moscow should protect educational and related exchange programs.

These eminently sensible recommendations speak to the most important particular (arms control) and general (dialogue, engagement) lacunae in the relationship.



Notes:

1. Please don't misconstrue "liberalism" in this context as having anything to with what is meant in U.S. domestic politics as liberals vs. conservatives for in the realm of political theory, all Americans are liberal; the U.S., no matter what party holds sway, is a liberal democracy.
2. "Anarchy" in this context refers to the absence of some coordinating organization or structure that husbands relations between nations. It refers to an international level, not a domestic level. One might try to think of the UN as such as entity as goes non-intra-EU relations, but it lacks the "teeth" to be effective as such among Security Council countries that aren't intrinsically given to collaboration.
3. If that sounds like a zero-sum model, that's because, at the end of the day, it is.
4. Three plausible interpretations of Putin’s Crimean annexation have emerged. I don't necessarily see them as mutually exclusive because I think intelligent people -- and Putin is intelligent, "crazy" but also intelligent -- and situations are more complex than to act on just one motivating factor or another.
   
   The first -- call it “Putin as defender”-- is that the Crimean operation was a response to the threat of NATO’s further expansion along Russia’s western border. By this logic, Putin seized the peninsula to prevent two dangerous possibilities: first, that Ukraine’s new government might join NATO, and second, that Kiev might evict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from its long-standing base in Sevastopol.
   
   A second interpretation -- call it “Putin as imperialist”-- casts the annexation of Crimea as part of a Russian project to gradually recapture the former territories of the Soviet Union. Putin never accepted the loss of Russian prestige that followed the end of the Cold War, this argument suggests, and he is determined to restore it, in part by expanding Russia’s borders.
   
   A third explanation -- "Puttin as improviser”-- rejects such broader designs and presents the annexation as a hastily conceived response to the unforeseen fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The occupation and annexation of Crimea, in this view, was an impulsive decision that Putin stumbled into rather than the careful move of a strategist with geopolitical ambitions.
   Source and additional explanation
   
   
5. See the following for more perspective:
   -- Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords
   -- Russia’s Military Is a Paper Tiger in the Baltic
6. Sorry, but I don't have a free version of Duffield's paper to which I can link. I don't own the copyright, so I can't simply attach it.
7. See also: NATO as a Factor of Security Community Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe
8. Brief summaries of his paper can be found here:
   -- Summary of Risse-Kappen: Collective identity in a democratic community - From WikiSummary, free summaries of academic books and articles
   -- http://www.olivialau.org/ir/archive/kat6.pdf
9. See the following:
   -- Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How
   -- Interview With Tomasz Lis of Polish Television
   -- The President's News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague
   -- NATO’s Purpose After the Cold War
   -- Fulfilling the Founding Vision of NATO Statement 7 US Department of State Dispatch 1996
   
   Readers of my posts on USMB will note the violation of one of my core communication principles -- clear and precise messages are essential -- and note that our current president's failure to deliver many such messages is a key reason why I oppose his being POTUS. The sad outcome of vagueness in IR discussions and statements is part of what got us where we are in our relationship Russia. If Trump were indeed committed to taking a new tack with Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe he'd be far more forthcoming about the nature and extent of everything having to do with Russia, yet that's the exact opposite of what he and his core team of novices has been.

Good Lord a dissertation. But interesting read and new to me Thank you.

One point though. "Citizens would be more reluctant to allow a war than would a head of state of a non-republican country because the head of state would not have to bear the hardships of war directly as citizens would"

That presumes citizen power not only over government levers but opinion making organs. American liberal and Jewish interests control those organs in the US. They were aligned with the previous head of state. And they are determined to go to war with Russia. The drumbeat against Russia has been going on for years now. And the people beating the drums are in no danger of hardship.
These people are NOT aligned with our present head of state. The only way they get war with Russia is to first attack and defeat our elected president.
(Unless it is Thursday. On Thursdays they claim Trump will cause a "return to the Cold War and new arms race with Russia". )
Obama's "October surprise" was to expel Russian diplomats under the pretense that Americans were supporting Trump because of Russian mind control. It is an old trick statists use to bring citizens around to a warlike mindset. Middle eastern despots blame Israel for their woes, South American despots blame the US, and American liberals blame Russia.
The danger of war is not Russia's belligerence. The danger comes from American and British liberals desire for a scapegoat and the Jewish ethnic hatred of Russians.

 

[Aries]

The Cold War was real and based on soviet actions and intentions.

The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone.

Putin is NOT a threat to anyone not on his borders.

There is not reason to NOT have good relations with Russia, even an alliance.

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

 

[DOTR]

The Cold War was real and based on soviet actions and intentions.

The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone.

Putin is NOT a threat to anyone not on his borders.

There is not reason to NOT have good relations with Russia, even an alliance.

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Let Ukraine be a warning on three fronts sage.
(1) After the USSR fell Ukraine had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world (though C&C was problematic ). The US talked them into disarming in return for assurances they would be protected. Suckers.
(2) Ukraine is barely a viable state thanks to Russification. Similar to the Islamization of Europe and the US going on today. Immigrants are invaders. The Ukrainians have to deal with the fact that 40% of their population are ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.
(3) when you allow globalists into your country to serve their agenda using your people you suffer for it. Euromaiden was a creation of American liberals. Once they had fomented rebellion against the elected president of Ukraine they went home. John Kerry and Obama sleep snug in their mansions while Ukrainians fight their war.

 

[DOTR]

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

Why didn't that apply to Kosovo?

 

[Aries]

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

Why didn't that apply to Kosovo?

Well in all honesty, because that was a NATO backed rebellion- not a illegal land grab by a dictator. Apples and orange my friend.

 

[Correll]

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

So, such actions are a "no no" according to international law.


So, Putin didn't care about international law.

Now what? Is the UN going to do something?


Cause I'm not up for WWIII. Are you?

 

[Correll]

The Cold War was real and based on soviet actions and intentions.

The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone.

Putin is NOT a threat to anyone not on his borders.

There is not reason to NOT have good relations with Russia, even an alliance.

then why is putin still snatching land that doesn't belong to him?

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Let Ukraine be a warning on three fronts sage.
(1) After the USSR fell Ukraine had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world (though C&C was problematic ). The US talked them into disarming in return for assurances they would be protected. Suckers.
(2) Ukraine is barely a viable state thanks to Russification. Similar to the Islamization of Europe and the US going on today. Immigrants are invaders. The Ukrainians have to deal with the fact that 40% of their population are ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.
(3) when you allow globalists into your country to serve their agenda using your people you suffer for it. Euromaiden was a creation of American liberals. Once they had fomented rebellion against the elected president of Ukraine they went home. John Kerry and Obama sleep snug in their mansions while Ukrainians fight their war.

I was quite shocked when the Ukrainians gave up nuclear weapons for promises of peace.

 

[Aries]

I assume that that is a reference to the Crimea?

Answer: I don't care.

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

So, such actions are a "no no" according to international law.


So, Putin didn't care about international law.

Now what? Is the UN going to do something?


Cause I'm not up for WWIII. Are you?

Obama did something. He imposed sanctions that crashed the Russian economy. Trump will be lifting them shortly so Mother Russia can flourish once again... maybe steal some more land.

 

[Correll]

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

So, such actions are a "no no" according to international law.


So, Putin didn't care about international law.

Now what? Is the UN going to do something?


Cause I'm not up for WWIII. Are you?

Obama did something. He imposed sanctions that crashed the Russian economy. Trump will be lifting them shortly so Mother Russia can flourish once again... maybe steal some more land.

Economic sanctions is what led to Pearl Harbor.

 

[Aries]

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

So, such actions are a "no no" according to international law.


So, Putin didn't care about international law.

Now what? Is the UN going to do something?


Cause I'm not up for WWIII. Are you?

Obama did something. He imposed sanctions that crashed the Russian economy. Trump will be lifting them shortly so Mother Russia can flourish once again... maybe steal some more land.

Economic sanctions is what led to Pearl Harbor.

And appeasing land grabbers leads to world War. That's why putin is a huge threat to global balance.

 

[DOTR]

Don't Cosset the Cossacks

The Ukraine didn't fight for its independence, so it has no right to it. It was never a country before, and it won't be one much longer. The whining parasites are nothing but a colony of NYETO. Its flag tells it all: "Being Yellow Gives Us the Blues." Its "coat of arms" looks like a tennis racket.

Ukraine shouldn't have to fight off foreign invaders trying to snatch their land. It's almost like the world has already gone to war and decided those types of actions are a NO NO!

Almost like the world has gone to war, except for the any military forces deployed. Or fighting. Or declarations of war.


Soooooo, exactly NOT like the world has gone to war.

I was referring to world wars that have been started by land grabs which have resulted in the existing international laws against such aggressions.

Why didn't that apply to Kosovo?

Well in all honesty, because that was a NATO backed rebellion- not a illegal land grab by a dictator. Apples and orange my friend.

So NATO, whose genesis treaty stated it would only use force when a member country had been attacked on its own soil, is immune to this "international law"?
How's that? Regional organizations are exempt from international law?
Btw the rebellion was KLA. Not NATO. KLA was condemned as a terrorist organization by not only the UN but by the Bill Clinton state department and NATO.
UN resolution 1160 declared the KLA a terrorist organization.
But NATO bombed Serbians in defense of the KLA. And tore Kosovo from Serbia. Unilaterally.
I remember when (((William cohen))) and the media claimed there were 300,000 mass graves.
How many did we find again?