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Good video. I don't know enough about the region or the situation to pick sides yet.
We are going to be bombarded with heart breaking stories like this from both sides until this is resolved.
Isn't this the plot to "Wag the Dog?"
its damn close though
Georgia started the damn thing by breaking the Sochi Agreement, killing Russian peace keepers who were under an international mandate also signed by Georgia and blasting the Shit out of the South Ossetian Capital.
While having internationally recogniced claims on this area (and therefor having a Casus Belli) the Georgians are still the ones who started the war. Note that having your peace keeping troops operating under an international mandate shot also gives a very clear Casus Belli to the Russians.
Link one:
BBC NEWS | Europe | Heavy fighting in South Ossetia
Link 2:
APA - Georgia starts military operations in South Ossetia
Link 3:
AFP: Heavy fighting as Georgia attacks rebel region
Note that these are "western" links, not Ria novosti.
Their apparent plan of action was to:
1: Blitz South Ossetia
2: Block/Blow up the Roki tunnel
3: Shrug off the Russian air retaliation while winning the diplomatic PR game with backing from the west.
Their problem was that they did not suceed in point 2, if they would have done it they could have won, provided that Abkhazia would chicken out from its obligations.
The Russian plan of action is likely:
1. Beat the Georgians out of South Ossetia (succeeded)
2. Let the Abkhazians beat the Georgians out of the Kodori Gorge (succeeded)
3. Destroy the Georgian military potential (pretty much succeeded)
4. Establish a much larger "security zone" around South Ossetia
5. Directly (by placing S-Vili in a Russian cell/sending him to Den Haag) or indirectly (politician who start wars and loose them have a short half life) remove S-Vili.
A fairly interesting thing about the history prior to the current conflict:
The Georgian - South Ossetian Conflict, chapter 4
full scale invasion of Georgia into South Ossetia
Lots more at site.Blaming the Victim
Putin's provocations.
by Matthew Continetti
08/25/2008, Volume 013, Issue 46
Blaming the victim is nothing new. But, in the days since Russian tanks first rolled into democratic Georgia, we have been rather surprised at the alacrity with which some--on both the left and right--have blamed that tiny country for the onslaught, and the West for encouraging Georgia's liberalization. That encouragement, it has been argued, led Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili to believe he could use military force to quell insurgents in the breakaway province of South Ossetia, thereby all but guaranteeing Russian dictator Vladimir Putin's retaliatory assault. This is not just a foolish argument, it is a pernicious one. It masks the true nature of the conflict and assumes that all the actors in this drama are moral equals. They are not.
Putin has been pressuring Georgia for years. Indeed, Russian despots have long considered the southern Caucasus, along with Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, their personal stomping grounds. There is no need to rehearse the long, complicated, and bloody history; suffice it to say that the tradition did not end with the Soviet empire. In the Caucasus, for example, Russia almost certainly had a hand in the fall of Georgian nationalist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1992, as well as that of Azerbaijan's president Abulfaz Elchibey in 1993. Both were replaced by pro-Moscow strongmen. But Russian hegemony over Georgia was upset in November 2003, when the pro-Western democrat Saakashvili came to power.
Saakashvili cuts a colorful figure. And his rise set a powerful example. The Rose Revolution that ushered in a new era for Georgia was the first of the "color revolutions" bringing youthful democrats to Russia's near abroad. That is probably why Putin, who on his borders seeks client autocracies, has done so much to undermine it. He has used Georgia's territorial conflicts with the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to weaken Saakashvili personally and undermine the Georgian people's national aspirations. To that end, Russia began to distribute passports to the Abkhazians and South Ossetians as early as 2004. It used its power to appoint Russians and pro-Moscow locals to positions in the territories' independent governments. And it built up its military presence in both places under the guise of peacekeeping operations.
At first the warfare was economic. "Trouble started brewing in 2006," writes Edward Lucas in The New Cold War, "when from March to May Russia imposed an escalating series of import restrictions, first on wine, vegetables, and fruits; then on sparkling wine and brandy, finally Georgian mineral water--at the time one of the country's most important exports." That July, Lucas continues, "Russia abruptly closed the only legal land border crossing" with Georgia. It was the equivalent of a blockade. Georgia had done nothing to provoke these punitive measures. It was Saakashvili and democracy that offended Putin.
On September 27, 2006, Saakashvili ordered the arrest of four Russian GRU officers whom he accused of plotting a coup. He paraded them in front of the cameras. Moscow was not amused. Putin recalled his ambassador from Tbilisi and, according to Lucas, "cut postal, phone, and banking links with Georgia." Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, announced a price spike specific to Georgia. The following month Putin's government began to detain and expel ethnic Georgians living in Russia--more than 2,300 of them, according to a report by Human Rights Watch.
Some were Russian citizens. "Russian authorities denied basic rights to many of the detained," the authors from Human Rights Watch wrote, "including access to a lawyer or the possibility of appealing the expulsion decision taken against them. Most were given trials lasting only a few minutes. Georgians were held in sometimes appalling conditions of detention and in some cases were subjected to threats and other ill-treatment. Two Georgians died in custody awaiting expulsion."
In March 2007, Russian military forces attacked villages in Abkhazia that had recently fallen under Georgian control. This was an illegal act, and when the United Nations investigated the incident Moscow did not cooperate. Another attack--one that failed--occurred in Georgia proper, near Tbilisi, in August 2007. Russian intransigence followed that incident, too....
Sorting out whom is to blame is certainly no easy. Both sides can muster arguments. This is why Barak Obama chose the wise course when he counciled restraint and cessation of hostilities.
McCain did the rash thing with his knee jerk belicosity.
The fact that you even bring up Chechnya speaks to the problems of Russia's arguments. That the will not tolerate 'break away republics' while encouraging the two from Georgia, sorry, doesn't fly....
To Kathianne:
The afromentioned sanctions started after a series of incidents, involving the arrest of Russian officiers on charges on Espionage and Sabotage.
These charges may not be completely unfounded (it is very difficult to access such things), however parading them before the media was a) bad style b) a provocation and c) may have been a violation of international law.
The South Ossetians promptly awnsered with some kidnappings(which is a regular occurence), the Georgians assembled their troops (partly blockading South Ossetia) and Moscow decided to show how big their economical dicks were.
Bigger than Georgias to be sure.
The actual Russian reason for the blockade may have more to do with alleged Georgian support for Tschechen Terrorists/Seperatists. The Tschetschen Fighters are divided between Nationalists who want an independent Tschetchenia and Moslem Fundamentalists who want a Caucasus under the Scharia. Strictly speaking, the nationalists are Seperatists while the muslim extremists are terrorists.
Russia was apparently unable to prove it. In general, proving that other states support terrorists/seperatist can be very difficult, as the US already experienced in Iraq.
From the Georgian point of view, Russia is (openly)supporting Seperatist inside Georgian borders, so Georgia supporting Tschetschenians could be seen as an action on the same level.
The arresting incident was a nice reason to go on with sanctions against Georgia.
If Jordania would secretly support the Iraqi insurgence (with the US knowing it but unable to prove it) and then arrest 4 American officers on "strange" Espionage charges (Let assume that the Americans would have a UN mandate like the Russians did in the Georgian case) and parade them around the country, the US would definitly impose sanctions and likely go some steps further.
Also, if economic sanctions by Russia would be legalising the Georgian suprise attack on South Ossetia, than the American Oil sanctions against Imperial Japan would have legalised Pearl Harbor.
As I already said, Georgia has a Casus Belli, there is no need to invent fictional ones. Although they (legally speaking) should have formally removed themself from the Sochi agreement before attacking.
While I understand the Georgian reasoning for striking on the start of the Olympics and just hours after declaring a cease fire, suprise was their best bet, this deed will certainly not improve Georgias reputation.
Personally, I do not like Putin, nor the state of democracy in Russia, but there is absolutly no reason to paint him blacker than he is while whitewashing S-Vili.
In addition, I trust Bush about as far as I can throw a M1A1, in my (and not only my) opinion he lied to both his allies and his congress about a Casus Belli, which significantly reduces his credibility.
Some other random comments:
-Any invasion that temporary captures the enemys capital is full scale in my book. From the military side, anything other than a full scale strike aimed at the capture of Zhinvali and the blocking/blowing up Roki tunnel would have been plain stupid too.
