Phoenall, et al,
Yes, in the grand sense, our friend "Phoenall" is correct. The
General Assembly Resolution 181(II) (Partition Plan) is not an separate authority in itself. The authority comes from the people (the Jewish Peoples right to self-determination), The Resolution had three key aspects to it.
First, it was a road map to independence; a recommended process by which the parties concerned, could establish independence that would be acceptable to the General Assembly. This road map was titled the "Steps Preparatory to Independence."
Second, if the parties agreed and followed the prescribed steps, then the UN agreed to give recognition to the states.
F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Third, the Resolution was never intended to be a "binding" resolution (a UN decree) by a mutually beneficial agreement between the agreement between the UN and the two parties (UN and the Arab State --- UN and Jewish State), and not an agreement binding between the UN and the two states of a binding agreement between the two states.
Irrelevant as the Jews used the LoN mandate of Palestine and their right to free determination to declare the state of Israel. The UN had no say in the matter, and so the passing of 181 has no outcome on the situation.
(COMMENT)
The binding application is that portion of the UN Charter that recognized that both the Arab and the Jewish people had the right to self-determination. What happened is that the Arabs rejected the notion that the Jewish People had a right equal to their own. That the land, surrendered to the Allied Powers, was somehow, by some right, their sovereign territory; theirs sovereignty and theirs alone. There is actually nothing to support that conclusion.
Further, it is to the State of Israel's advantage if the Arab Palestinians actually win the day in terms of the
international legitimacy and respect General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), and its recommended guidance. If this were to be de-legitimized in terms of Israel and its Declaration of Independence, then it would be equally de-legitimized in terms of the Palestinian's Declaration of Independence; on which they state: "Pursuant to the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conferences and on the basis of the
international legitimacy embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations since 1947;" a leg on which they base their independence.
Further, the de-legitimacy of the Resolution also then negates any May 1948 boundary assumption and thus, would no represent a limiting factor in the lost or gains of territory in respect to the outcome of the conflict in which the Israeli was the defender and the Arab were the attacking aggressor. The territory on which the Israeli assumed control was not an outcome of capture by conquest and/or war, but the outcome of a Civil War in which the Palestinians, claiming all of the former territory to which the Mandate Applied, challenged the immigrants for sovereignty and lost. In fact the Arab Palestinians still hold that claim; although not the territory.
More interesting is how the international legal community is going to define the nationality and citizenship of the Palestinians, given that many of them have lost nationality, and voluntarily acquired a new nationality, enjoyed the protection of the new nationality; THEN, declared independence.
Most Respectfully,
R