I don't see such an option and I'm not going to read the entire thing for you.
Your article actually fully supports my statements on the subject.
|
The question was, the thing no one could answer was the question of casualties and we assumed with respect to the air war that our worst night would be the first night. That you had the Iraqi forces, the air force basically full up, the air defence system in place -- that we would suffer our largest number of casualties that first night of the air war. And in fact when it was all over with I spent the night in my office at the Pentagon and I got the word when all the aircraft came back we'd only lost one airplane and it was just a phenomenal result. I could not believe that we'd done that well. Obviously we'd been enormously successful and all the training
Q: How important was the meeting with the Saudis?
Cheney: It was a very important assignment. From a military standpoint if we could not get into Saudi Arabia it was going to be very hard for us to do anything militarily other than mount a naval blockade for example
What did you say to King Fahd?
Cheney: I told King Fahd that the Iraqis were amassed on his border and we briefed him on the intelligence in terms of the size of the force that the Iraqis had already used in Kuwait. Pointed out that it was very hard for us to be able to help them unless we could get plenty of advance time 'cos it takes a long time to move heavy forces half way around the world and that timing was of the essence. That they did not have the luxury of waiting until Saddam began an invasion of Saudi Arabia and then ask for help because then it would be too late. We could not get there in time to help them if that were the case. That if he wanted help and assistance and we thought they needed it then it was important to start immediately. King Fahd had listened attentively throughout the meeting They knew exactly why we were there.
There was very little small talk, we went right straight to the issue. We had about a two-hour session, at the end of which there was a short conversation between King Fahd and his associates, the Crown Prince, the Foreign Minister, and then he turned back to me after about five minutes of discussions in Arabic and said through the interpreter, through Prince Bandar, that they were prepared to go ahead to accept the U.S. forces in the Kingdom. |
|