I'll number my comments on your posts so that you can respond to them on a more point by point basis:
1.) In This:
http://www.usmessageboard.com/7527834-post202.html post you lectured me on your expertise and told me that I should rely on you for my information; however I am curious how you reconcile your claim of expertise with this:
http://www.usmessageboard.com/7537063-post209.html post, where you appear to be unaware that the Muslim Brotherhood not only already operates in Syria within a multi-party political coalition, but that the Muslim Brotherhood has operated in Syria for many years. All of this keeping in mind of course that you specifically chose Syria as an example with which to demonstrate your expertise. How can you claim expertise in political Islam when you dont even know the operating parameters of the single largest and most popular Islamist political party, not only in the entire Middle East, but in the entire world?
2.) In this:
http://www.usmessageboard.com/7527834-post202.html post you claimed that, based on your two camp model, one couldnt support both the opposition to the Assad Regime and the military coup in Egypt. If true then how do you account for Al Qaeda? As one of the largest non-state actors in the region Al Qaeda and its affiliates are actively engaged in providing logistical support against the Assad Regime but also was happy to see the military coup in Egypt take place against the Muslim Brotherhood. Al Qaeda hates the Muslim Brotherhood AND the Assad regime. If there are really only two camps how do you explain this divergence from your model and the large ideological and political differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda Central?
3.) In this:
http://www.usmessageboard.com/7496536-post200.html post, you claim that there are two camps in Syria. How then do you explain the low level civil conflict that exists between jihadis such as Al Nusra and the FSA which have already claimed many lives? How do you explain the large differences in their ideological and political structures as well (if they are indeed part of the same camp)?
4.) Related to the above question, how do you further explain your two camp model with the emergence of competing opposition political groups (the National Coalition, the NCC, the SNC, etc) which all utilize different tactics and emphasize different governance styles?
5.) In addition to the political party differences, if there are only two camps as you suggested then why do we not see the Kurdish nationalist groups participating in the primary opposition coalition despite their 2012 revolt?
Some dangers associated with your model:
6.) It simply isnt detailed enough. It reduces a huge global community into gross generalizations and stereotypes. Now, I dont think you do so maliciously, but as a former terrorism and conflict analyst, and as someone who is familiar with best practices within the industry, experience has shown that such categorizations are a poor methodology for the promotion of understanding and for use in the field when it comes to political dynamics and operational logistics. I dont think that you are stupid, I just think that your experience is a little different and not as targeted and is also coupled with obviously very bitter feelings about your past experiences. I understand that you have valuable insight to contribute, but you should likewise recognize the analytical industrys value and insight, and the very real experience of others. Youre not the only one who has experience in the area.
7.) How do you reconcile the Islamist BNP party of Bangladesh and the fact that it is headed by a women? Also, how does the Islamist coalitions defeat in free elections to a much more secular party fit into your model of Islamic populations under democracy (especially since the winner of the Prime Ministership was also a woman)? Bangladesh is a very religiously conservative society, but has been fast changing internally. If we were to blindly subscribe to your instance on Islamic population generalizations then Bangladesh would make no sense at all. Or how do you explain the triumph of the secular Pakistan Peoples Party in the 2008 elections over the Pakistan Muslim League and the recent and subsequent peaceful transition of power to the opposition (a coalition of the two PMLs)? You also still havent explained the existence of Senegal and Sierra Leone to me (the latter of which currently has a democratically elected Christian leader despite a Muslim majority within the country). Your model simply has so many exceptions to it that it (no offense) isnt a very good one. But all singular models attempting to place over one billion people in general arent going to be very good which is why I have had a problem with your posts concerning these topics across multiple threads. Im not out to get you, I merely strongly disagree with your methodology, one which you still havent explained the logic behind despite numerous promptings.
Some real life examples on how your generalizations may lead to poor policy formulation and missteps:
8.) Yemen. Al Qaeda operates in Yemen and is a Salafist Jihadi group. Yemen is a country that also experienced an Arab Spring uprising and a shift in internal power. According to your camp theory which you utilized in your characterization of Syria those groups against the central government would fall into the same camp, but they absolutely dont. The Houthis in the north are a much different camp from the Southern socialist opposition, and both are very different from the Eastern Salafis. Even Al Qaeda (once again also regarded as Salafi) is very different in terms of politics, and methodology than majority Yemeni Salafis. Most eastern Salafis are very passive and do not promote the Al Qaeda ideology of armed jihad against the state. Yet, if we when with your generalization of Islamist camps we would probably bomb them indiscriminately with drones like we do Al Qaeda despite the fact that there is no need to. In fact we would simply, under your models guidance, ensure an even larger and more radical opposition against us stemming from a group of persons who didnt have to be our enemy.
9.) An example of the above scenario actually happening: Somalia. Back in 2006 under Bush Jr. We utilized a national dialogue that was very similar to the one you are supporting now, so when we saw Islamists in Somalia under the ICU we screamed Al Qaeda despite the fact that they werent Al Qaeda affiliates and not only bombed them, but backed an Ethiopian invasion and occupation of the southern part of the country. The result: Al Shabaabs establishment as an independent faction and the ACTUAL creation of a strong Al Qaeda affiliate in the region. Now, having realized our mistake, we are allied with the remnants of the ICU against Al Shabaab. It was a perfectly avoidable situation but our generalizations turned it into a catastrophe for regional stability.
10.) Al Shabaab also represents an interesting example of how generalizations afford missed opportunities. Al Shabaab isnt a singular entity. In fact, it has three main divisions within itself as well as coalitional partners. Now you may simply shrug them off as being all the same or all in the same camp, but that model doesnt explain the inter-organizational violence that takes place. The violence has been so great that it lead to the deaths of a couple of the founding members of Al Shabaab not that long ago. These rifts represent cracks that we can exploit in our favor and factions that we can play off against one another in order to weaken the larger militia based hold on the southern portion of the country. Were we operating under your proposed parameters we wouldnt have seen that and would be missing a vital opportunity to improve regional security and undermine a hostile organization and Al Qaeda affiliate. Differentiation is crucial for the formation of effective policy.
11.) Jumping back to Yemen quick, I am curious how you reconcile your notion of singular Islamist jihadi ideologies and practices with the fact that we dont see the same sort of Sectarian violence in Yemen even at the hands of Al Qaeda that we do in say Iraq with the ISI? How do you explain the stark differences in operational procedures among these groups that you would claim are one and the same?
12.) you called me an idiot for claiming that all Islamist groups arent the same. The problem with your categorization of Islamist groups is much the same problem that we have seen elsewhere with your generalizations among groups: It ignores the wide diversity that is found among them both in terms of their religious ideology, political ideology, method of operations, and even method of organization. Weve seen examples of this with the clear divisions between groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda, with divisions and conflict between Al Nusra in Syria and the FSAs more moderate Islamist militias such as Suquor Al Sham, we have seen this in our own foreign policy past when it came to the ICU and Al Shabaab, and we readily see this in Yemen between AQAP and majority eastern Salafis (not to mention northern Houthi groups). But there are many other examples as well. For example you lumped Islamists in Syria together into one camp which is problematic because it 1. Ignores the large divisions between Al Nusra and the FSA 2. Ignores sharp political divides between the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and the National Opposition Coalition. And 3. Because it ignores the presence of the Islamist group Hezbollah which is fighting for the Assad Regime. Your model also doesnt explain for example, why the Muslim Brotherhood cracked down on Islamist jihadis in the Sinai when it first came into power in Egypt, or why the Egyptian Salafist Al Nour Party abandoned the Muslim Brotherhood during the coup and supported the military. There are many other examples from the historical divisions between the FIS and GSPC in Algeria and neighboring regions, to the civil conflict that erupted in Mali following the Tuareg rebellion last year. How do you defend your model in the face of such strong and sometimes violent Islamist divisions?
13.) How do you reconcile Your supposed expertise with the major mistep in this:
http://www.usmessageboard.com/7478889-post162.html post where you claimed the Muslim Brotherhood used to hold power there; also in This:
http://www.usmessageboard.com/7479176-post168.html post where you claim they held power in Algeria during the Cold War (which they didn't)?
I doubt you'll actually respond to these on a point by point basis, but I figured I'd just post them anyway just so that anyone else reading this thread can watch you dodge its contents.