I'll get you started:
1. Information can be “classified,” even if no one has classified it.
Many news reports and commentators have suggested that “information is classified by (its) nature” (as Sean Davis writes in The Federalist), even if no agency or official has classified it yet. These accounts treat “classified” as a quality rather than an action — one that is inherent, immutable and self-evident. If information is sensitive enough, it’s classified, no matter what.
When it comes to “original classification” — the initial decision to classify information — that portrayal is simply wrong. Under the executive order that governs classification, the 2,000-plus officials who have this authority “may” classify information if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to damage national security. The determination of harm is often highly subjective, and even if an official decides that disclosure would be harmful, he or she is not required to classify.
Information provided by foreign governments in confidence is different. The executive order cautions that the release of such information is “presumed” to harm national security; agency rules provide that such information “must be classified.” There is a difference, however, between “must be classified” and “is classified.” After all, when an official receives information, its source and the circumstances of its disclosure may not be apparent. This category of information is not self-identifying, let alone self-classifying.
An official who transmits that information without classifying it has violated agency rules. But the recipient now possesses information that someone else should have classified — not classified information. (Of course, classifying the information, then sending it through unclassified channels to a private email account also would be impermissible. Emails released by the State Department show that some of Clinton's correspondents dealt with this by asking to set up conversations over secure telephone lines.)
2. It’s easy to figure out whether information has been classified.
There is a common refrain that Clinton “should have known” there was classified information in emails she got, even if it wasn't marked. As commentator Andrew McCarthy put it, “Classified information ... is well known to national security officials to be classified — regardless of whether it is marked as such or even written down.”
The classification rules treat this myth as if it were true. Once information has been classified by an authorized official, anyone who retransmits it must mark it as classified, even if it was not marked when received. This is called “derivative classification,” and it can be performed by any of the 4.5 million individuals who are eligible to access classified information. They rely on “classification guides” — a kind of index of original classification decisions, mostly kept on secure Web sites — to determine what information has been classified and therefore must be marked.
Derivative classification is intended to be a straightforward, ministerial task. But the system breaks down in practice. The categories of information listed in guides are sometimes so broad or vague that they leave officials to guess whether any given piece of information has been classified. In 2009, President Obama ordered agencies to review their guides and purge outdated material, but his directive did not address the lack of specificity.
And while the number of original classification decisions is on the wane, there were still almost 50,000 new secrets created last year – on top of the 2 million created in the 10 previous years.
3. Anything classified is sensitive.
Many discussions of Clinton’s email assume that all classified information deserves to be classified, often using the terms “classified” and “sensitive” interchangeably, and that every leak of classified information is dangerous. Officials frequently make blanket statements that “unauthorized disclosure of classified information jeopardizes national security.”
In fact, the classification system is marked by discretion (intended) on the front end and uncertainty (unintended) on the back end. This lack of clear boundaries opens the door to a huge amount of unnecessary classification.
There are multiple incentives, unrelated to national security, to classify. It is easier and safer for busy officials to classify by rote rather than to pause for thought. Classification is a way for officials to enhance their status or protect agencies' turf. It can hide embarrassing facts or evidence of misconduct. There are no countervailing disincentives, as classification decisions normally go unreviewed, and agencies do not punish overclassifying. The result is massive overclassification.
4. Any mishandling of classified information is illegal.
5. Our classification system protects us from harm.
Rest at link:
5 myths about classified information