Under these Massachusetts government instructions and from what you know about the Gates case, do you think that the conduct of mr gates was considered disorderly under massachusetts law and how their Supreme court has ruled on the issue?
Page 1 Instruction 7.160
2009 Edition DISORDERLY CONDUCT
DISORDERLY CONDUCT
The defendant is charged with disorderly conduct. In order to prove
the defendant guilty of this offense, the Commonwealth must prove three
things beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant involved
himself (herself) in at least one of the following actions: he (she) either
engaged in fighting or threatening, or engaged in violent or tumultuous
behavior or created a hazardous or physically offensive condition by an act
that served no legitimate purpose of the defendants;
Second: The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendants actions were reasonably likely to affect the public; and
Third: The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant either intended to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm.
See Instruction 3.120 (Intent).
G.L. c. 272, § 53. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 404 Mass. 471, 536 N.E.2d 325 (1989)
(hazardous or physically offensive condition branch of the statute cannot be applied to political
protesters who block passage); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 368 Mass. 580, 595-599, 334 N.E.2d
617, 627-629 (1975); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 302-304, 231 N.E.2d 201, 210-211
Instruction 7.160 Page 2
DISORDERLY CONDUCT 2009 Edition
(1967), adopting Model Penal Code § 250.2(a) & (c) (1962); Commonwealth v. Lopiano, 60 Mass.
App. Ct. 723,725-726, 805 N.E.2d 522, 525 (2004) (finding no violent or tumultuous behavior where
defendant, upon being told by police that he would be summoned to court for assault and battery,
began to flail his arms and shout at police); Commonwealth v. Sinai, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 546, 714
N.E.2d 830, 833 (1999) (affirming first element of crime); Commonwealth v. Bosk, 29 Mass. App. Ct.
904, 906-907, 556 N.E.2d 1055, 1057-1058 (1990) (statute applicable to motorist who stood in traffic
lane, forcing vehicles to pass around him, while debating with police officer and refusing to return to
his car).
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. Prohibited conduct. Our disorderly conduct law seeks to
control intentional conduct which tends to disturb the public
tranquility, or to alarm or provoke others. It prohibits four
separate and distinct acts: It forbids conduct that involves the
use of force or violence. It also prohibits making threats that
involve the immediate use of force or violence. It forbids
tumultuous and highly agitated behavior, which may not involve
physical violence, but which causes riotous commotion and
excessively unreasonable noise, and so constitutes a public
nuisance. Finally, the law prohibits any conduct that creates a
hazard to public safety or a physically offensive condition by an
act that serves no legitimate purpose of the defendants.
Feigenbaum, supra; Alegata, supra; Commonwealth v. Blavackas, 11 Mass. App. Ct.
746, 749, 419 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1981).
Page 3 Instruction 7.160
2009 Edition DISORDERLY CONDUCT
2. Public. For the defendant to be found guilty, his (her)
actions must have been reasonably likely to affect the public,
that is, persons in a place to which the public or a substantial
group has access.
Alegata, supra. See Commonwealth v. Templeman, 376 Mass. 553, 537, 381 N.E.2d
1300, 1303 (1978).
3. Recklessness. A person acts recklessly when he
consciously ignores, or is indifferent to, the probable outcome of
his actions. The defendant was reckless if he (she) knew, or
must have known, that such actions would create a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, but he (she) chose, nevertheless, to run the risk and go
ahead.
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 397-401, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909-912
(1944); Commonwealth v. Papadinis, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 574-575, 503 N.E.2d
1334, 1336 (1987), aff'd, 402 Mass. 73, 520 N.E.2d 1300 (1988).
NOTES:
1. Offensive language. General Laws c. 272, § 53 cannot constitutionally be applied to language and
expressive conduct, even if it is offensive and abusive, unless it falls outside the scope of First Amendment protections,
i.e. it constitutes fighting words which by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Commonwealth v. Richards, 369 Mass. 443, 445-450, 340 N.E.2d 892, 894-897 (1976); A Juvenile, 368 Mass. at 587-
595, 334 N.E.2d at 622-627; Commonwealth v. Sinai, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 544 at 546, 714 N.E.2d at 833. See Lewis
v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970 (1974); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 92 S.Ct. 2479 (1972);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942); Blavackas, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 748-752, 419
N.E.2d at 857-859 (doubtful that public solicitation for sexual activity is disorderly conduct, which seems to require
Instruction 7.160 Page 4
DISORDERLY CONDUCT 2009 Edition
proof at least of significant risk of violence or serious disturbance). However, non-expressive disorderly conduct is
punishable even if accompanied by constitutionally protected speech or expressive conduct. Richards, supra;
Commonwealth v. Carson, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921-922, 411 N.E.2d 1337, 1337-1338 (1980).
2. Annoying and accosting persons of the opposite sex. Regarding that portion of G.L. c. 272, § 53
dealing with annoying and accosting persons of the opposite sex, see Instruction 6.600.
3. Political protesters. The acts that may constitute disorderly conduct fall into two branches: (i)
engag[ing] in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior, and (ii) creat[ing] a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor. Model Penal Code § 250.2(a) & (c)
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962). A disorderly conduct prosecution of political protesters is maintainable only under the
first of the two branches. [A]lthough conduct that is designed to call attention to a political cause, and may therefore
have a legitimate purpose, may nevertheless be criminal under the common law or by some statute, it does not
constitute disorderly conduct under [the second branch of] G.L. c. 272, § 53 because it does serve a legitimate
purpose of the actor. Feigenbaum, supra.
4. First Amendment. As to the burden of proof when there is an assertion that the defendants acts
were protected by the First Amendment to the United State Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 68 Mass.
App. Ct. 691, 864 N.E.2d 566 (2007).