Can Someone Point Out How The Iran Situation is Any Better Than it was in June 2025?

Captain Creeper said:
Contra

Iran Threat Geiger Counter: A Probabilistic Approach; What is the probability that Iran will build nuclear weapons? | ISIS Reports | Institute For Science And International Security

isis-online.org isis-online.org

I note that yours is a news story while mine is an academic study.
Click to expand...
This academic study is not based on any intelligence assessment. It’s all based on open source and the most they can say is “no indication they’ve given up”.

My “news story” reported Senate testimony where the DNI gave the assessment of the US intelligence community.
 
candycorn said:
Fair enough I guess. But it is pretty obvious that whatever is in the final deal will not be worth the outlays we’ve made in blood and treasure.
Click to expand...
OP admits her thread is bullshit.

Wrap this one up folks. Major thread fail.
 
Concerned American said:
This is what the media has glossed over that lead to this.


Iran suspended IAEA inspections at several sites in February 2021, reducing the agency's access in violation of JCPOA verification measures.
onu.delegfrance.org armscontrol.org
Click to expand...
Yes, they suspended the inspections after Trump tore up the agreement. Just like North Korea did way back when Bush tore up the Clinton deal.
 
BlindBoo said:
That's not a real accurate time line for making a deliverable bomb. The first step would be to make fissionable material from the Uranium Hexafluoride they have. Remember they would not have that 60% enrichment if Benedict Donald had not torn up the JOCPA. Furthermore, they disclosed it's existence and offered it as bargaining chip in the negotiations immediately prior to the despicable surprise attack and assassination of their leaders. Both of which could be considered war crime by the Hague.
Click to expand...
Link us up to Iran offering to give up all there 60% enriched uranium that has no commercial purpose, Simp.

I say you are a liar.
 
Winston said:
Yes, they suspended the inspections after Trump tore up the agreement. Just like North Korea did way back when Bush tore up the Clinton deal.
Click to expand...
Explain why the IAEA said they have NEVER been able to confirm Iran was in compliance with Barry's EO.
 
Nostra said:
OP admits her thread is bullshit.

Wrap this one up folks. Major thread fail.
Click to expand...
We got MASSIVE inflation absorbed by the US, a MASSIVE promise of payments, restitution, and financial development to Iran from the US, and a MASSIVE outlay of money and military resources to achieve virtually nothing but reopening a previously open strait.

Failure of epic proportion.
 
citygator said:
We got MASSIVE inflation absorbed by the US, a MASSIVE promise of payments, restitution, and financial development to Iran from the US, and a MASSIVE outlay of money and military resources to achieve virtually nothing but reopening a previously open strait.

Failure of epic proportion.
Click to expand...
Link to this MASSIVE inflation?
 
This is how bad Barry Hussein's EO was..............Iran didn't even declare all the sites they were producing uranium.

So how would anyone know WTF they were doing? Add in all the declared military sites the Mullahs told Barry he couldn't inspect and you get a good idea what a shit EO that was.

Hey librards, tell us how we inspected sites we didn't even know about?




The IAEA’s second investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities began in 2018 and is focused on evidence suggesting that Iran failed to declare all nuclear materials and activities from its pre-2003 nuclear program as legally required by its safeguards agreement. The investigation does not re-open the military dimensions file: it is focused on Iran's nuclear material accountancy obligations under its safeguards agreements.

As part of this investigation, the IAEA visited three undeclared locations in 2019 and 2020. Environmental samples taken from all three sites indicated that processed uranium had been present at all three locations. Iran has yet to provide the IAEA with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at two of those sites, Turquzabad and Varamin. In a May 2023 report, the IAEA said it had no further questions regarding the third site where uranium was detected, Marivan. The IAEA assessed that Iran conducted “explosive experiments with protective shielding in preparation for the use of neutron detectors


IAEA Investigations of Iran's Nuclear Activities | Arms Control Association

www.armscontrol.org www.armscontrol.org
 
candycorn said:
As you may remember, that was when we first “obliterated” their nuke program.


As a deal has apparently been reached that will open the Strait of Hormuz but not result in any turnover of nuke material...

Can someone point out the material positive gains were made by our 100+ days of war that are markedly different than the situation we had last June?

Anyone?
Click to expand...
Leadership killed, infrastructure destroyed, China on notice that we can take them out anytime without firing a shot.
 
Winston said:
I don't need no stinkin link. Have you heard Vance this morning? Yes, Iran still has what Trump calls "nuclear dust", which is stupid. We still have to negotiate the details, rather we de-enrich the uranium in Iran, or we take it out. But neither has happened. They still have it, Trump says it is deep underground.

Click to expand...
You dodged the question, Simp.

Show us their enrichment capabilities. Uranium trapped hundreds of feet below rubble isn't it, Dumbass.
 
Winston said:
Yes, they suspended the inspections after Trump tore up the agreement. Just like North Korea did way back when Bush tore up the Clinton deal.
Click to expand...
Once again, you are misinformed.

IAEA inspectors faced increasing restrictions on their access to Iran's nuclear facilities prior to President Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. After the U.S. left the deal, these restrictions intensified, leading to significant challenges in monitoring Iran's nuclear activities.
chathamhouse.org Council on Foreign Relations
 
All of this shit is no longer a threat:


Findings​

  • Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 9 nuclear weapons, taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
  • Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in as little as two to three days.
  • Breaking out in both Fordow and the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the two facilities together could produce enough WGU for 11 nuclear weapons in the first month, enough for 15 nuclear weapons by the end of the second month, 19 by the end of the third month, 21 by the end of the fourth month, and 22 by the end of the fifth month.
  • In front of the inspectors’ eyes, Iran is undertaking the near-final step of breaking out, now converting its 20 percent stock of enriched uranium into 60 percent enriched uranium at a greatly expanded rate, although this rate cannot be sustained much longer (see below).
  • Iran has no civilian use or justification for its production of 60 percent enriched uranium, particularly at the level of hundreds of kilograms. Its rush to make much more, quickly depleting its stock of near 20 percent enriched uranium, which has a civilian use in research reactors, raises more questions. Even if one believed the production of 60 percent is to create bargaining leverage in a nuclear negotiation, Iran has gone way beyond what would be needed. One has to conclude that Iran’s real intent is to be prepared to produce large quantities of WGU as quickly as possible, in as few centrifuges as possible.
  • Not surprisingly, and in its understated style, the IAEA reiterated in this most recent report: “The significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern.”
  • Because of the greatly expanded production of 60 percent enriched uranium, the IAEA previously requested and received permission for strengthened safeguards at Fordow.
  • The IAEA also previously reported the implementation of a “strengthened safeguards approach […] at a nuclear material storage at Esfahan”, an important development given that a large amount of Iran’s 60 percent HEU and 20 percent enriched uranium stock have previously been reported to be stored at Esfahan. Exactly how much of Iran’s enriched uranium stocks are held at Esfahan, however, compared to other locations, is no longer reported.
  • The IAEA’s efforts to verify Iran’s nuclear activities, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, continue to be seriously affected by Iran’s decision last fall to withdraw the designation of several experienced inspectors. The IAEA repeatedly requested that Iran reconsider this inappropriate, political act, including in a June 2024 Board of Governors censure resolution, but Iran has not done so. The IAEA stated in its accompanying report, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran: “The withdrawal of the designation of several experienced inspectors was also not in line with the required spirit of cooperation.”
  • As of May 17, 2025, the net overall enriched uranium stock, including all levels of enrichment and all chemical forms, had increased by 953.2 kg, from 8294.4 kg to 9247.6 kg (Uranium mass or U mass).
  • As of May 17, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium hexafluoride was 408.6 kg (as measured in U mass) or 604.4 kg (hex mass). This represents a net increase in the stock in the form of uranium hexafluoride of 133.8 kg (U mass) since the previous reporting period. It does include 6.5 kg of enriched uranium (U mass) that is assessed to be enriched above 20 percent but far below 60 percent, as it was discharged from the cascade into a dump tank rather than collected as product.
  • Since December 5, Iran has been using 20 percent feedstock rather than 5 percent feedstock to produce 60 percent HEU in the two interconnected IR-6 cascades used for 60 percent HEU production since November 2022. This change led to an average monthly production of 33.5kg 60 percent HEU at Fordow during this most recent reporting period. The two IR-6 cascades used include one of which is easily modifiable to change operations and enrich uranium to higher levels.
  • Iran continued to produce 60 percent HEU from 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) feed in two pairs of interconnected advanced centrifuge cascades at the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP).
  • Adding the average monthly production of 60 percent HEU at the PFEP, which slightly increased to 4kg per month, Iran is producing 37.5 kg (U mass) or 55.5 kg (hex mass) of 60 percent enriched uranium per month on average. It could produce about 675 kg (hex mass) or 456 kg (U mass) of near 60 percent enriched uranium per year.
  • However, in multiplying its 60 percent HEU production, Iran is using significant amounts of 20 percent enriched uranium as feedstock, a rate which is not sustainable unless Iran significantly increases 20 percent enriched uranium production. It used an average of 117 kg (U mass) of 20 percent enriched uranium as feed per month, compared to an average monthly production of 14 kg.
  • This led to a reduction in Iran’s near 20 percent enriched uranium stock in the form of uranium hexafluoride of 332.3 kg (U mass), for a total stock of 274.5 kg (U mass) as of May 17, 2025.
  • At this feed and production rate, Iran could sustain the high 60 percent HEU production for approximately three months after May 17.
  • Iran now has nearly 14,689 advanced centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow, where most are deployed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).
  • Including the installed IR-1 centrifuges at the FEP, PFEP, and FFEP brings the total number of installed centrifuges to roughly 21,900. It should be noted that many advanced centrifuges are deployed but not enriching uranium, and the IR-1 centrifuges have a reduced ability to enrich uranium.
  • During the reporting period, Iran installed five new IR-4 cascades at Natanz, for a total of 23 total IR-4 cascades, 12 of which are operating.
  • Iran made no progress in this reporting period on installing the massive cascade consisting of 1152 IR-6 centrifuges.
  • The quantity of Iran’s enriching centrifuges increased during this reporting period, to approximately 18,000 centrifuges.
  • Iran has a total installed enrichment capacity of roughly 64,000 swu/year. Its enriching centrifuge capacity is less, approximately 50,000 swu/year.
  • Iran’s stockpile of near 5 percent LEU in the form of UF6 increased by 1853.4 kg (U mass) from 3655.4 kg to 5508.8 kg (U mass), or 8149.1 kg (hex mass).
  • In general, Iran has not prioritized stockpiling uranium enriched between 2 to 5 percent. This choice is at odds with Iran’s contention that its primary goal is to accumulate 4 to 5 percent enriched uranium for use in nuclear power reactor fuel. Instead, Iran has focused on producing 60 percent enriched uranium, far beyond Iran’s civilian needs.
  • The IAEA again reports that Iran will not start commissioning of the Arak reactor, now called the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), or IR-20, until at least 2025, with operation expected to start in 2026. Inspectors again did not observe any significant changes at the reactor, noting this time only minor civil construction.
  • Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) to its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the JCPOA’s additional monitoring arrangements on February 23, 2021. Iran’s actions and its refusal to cooperate with the IAEA across a wide range of monitoring issues causes the IAEA to consistently express doubt about understanding key aspects of Iran’s nuclear activities. Without the AP in place, the IAEA has neither been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran nor received updated declarations from Iran.
  • The IAEA reports that it has “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC [uranium ore concentrate], which it will not be possible to restore.”
  • The IAEA concludes that “Iran’s decision to remove all of the Agency’s equipment previously installed in Iran for JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring activities has also had detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”
  • Although the IAEA can ascertain the number of centrifuges deployed at Fordow and Natanz, it cannot know how many more Iran has made and stored or deployed at an undeclared site. A risk is that Iran will accumulate a secret stock of advanced centrifuges, deployable in the future at a clandestine enrichment plant, which would only need to house a relatively few advanced centrifuge cascades to enrich Iran’s current stock of 60 percent HEU to WGU. At the least, this situation complicates any future verification effort and contributes to uncertainty about the status of Iran’s nuclear activities and facilities.
  • Combined with Iran’s refusal to resolve outstanding safeguards violations and the program’s unresolved nuclear weapons dimensions, the IAEA has a significantly reduced ability to monitor Iran’s complex and growing nuclear program. The IAEA’s ability to detect diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and other capabilities to undeclared facilities remains greatly diminished.

Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report — May 2025 | ISIS Reports | Institute For Science And International Security

isis-online.org isis-online.org
 
15th post
Winston said:
I don't need no stinkin link. Have you heard Vance this morning? Yes, Iran still has what Trump calls "nuclear dust", which is stupid. We still have to negotiate the details, rather we de-enrich the uranium in Iran, or we take it out. But neither has happened. They still have it, Trump says it is deep underground.

Click to expand...
So you think sitting on your thumbs is more effective at stopping the terrorism and open threats and violence that Iran has forced on the world for 47 years because of your unhinged hate for the current potus, eh? You're a fool.
 
Nostra said:
Link us up to Iran offering to give up all there 60% enriched uranium that has no commercial purpose, Simp.

I say you are a liar.
Click to expand...
Since the war on Iran began, it has also emerged that on February 26, during negotiations with the US in Geneva two days before the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran, Tehran had offered to “downblend” the stockpile from 60 percent enrichment to 3.67 percent, in an irreversible process.

www.aljazeera.com

US-Iran 60-day proposal: What we know

US-Iran memorandum of understanding reportedly covers Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief and enriched uranium limits.
www.aljazeera.com www.aljazeera.com

Iran has confirmed its readiness to negotiate with the United States over uranium enrichment at the 60 per cent level, provided Washington demonstrates seriousness in lifting economic sanctions.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi said Tehran was open to discussions on enrichment to 60 per cent, but stressed that any agreement would depend on tangible steps towards sanctions relief.

www.middleeastmonitor.com

Tehran signals readiness to negotiate on 60% uranium enrichment

Iran has confirmed its readiness to negotiate with the United States over uranium enrichment at the 60 per cent level, provided Washington demonstrates seriousness in lifting economic sanctions. Ir…
www.middleeastmonitor.com www.middleeastmonitor.com

I say that was too easy.
 
Nostra said:
All of this shit is no longer a threat:


Findings​

  • Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 9 nuclear weapons, taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
  • Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in as little as two to three days.
  • Breaking out in both Fordow and the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the two facilities together could produce enough WGU for 11 nuclear weapons in the first month, enough for 15 nuclear weapons by the end of the second month, 19 by the end of the third month, 21 by the end of the fourth month, and 22 by the end of the fifth month.
  • In front of the inspectors’ eyes, Iran is undertaking the near-final step of breaking out, now converting its 20 percent stock of enriched uranium into 60 percent enriched uranium at a greatly expanded rate, although this rate cannot be sustained much longer (see below).
  • Iran has no civilian use or justification for its production of 60 percent enriched uranium, particularly at the level of hundreds of kilograms. Its rush to make much more, quickly depleting its stock of near 20 percent enriched uranium, which has a civilian use in research reactors, raises more questions. Even if one believed the production of 60 percent is to create bargaining leverage in a nuclear negotiation, Iran has gone way beyond what would be needed. One has to conclude that Iran’s real intent is to be prepared to produce large quantities of WGU as quickly as possible, in as few centrifuges as possible.
  • Not surprisingly, and in its understated style, the IAEA reiterated in this most recent report: “The significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern.”
  • Because of the greatly expanded production of 60 percent enriched uranium, the IAEA previously requested and received permission for strengthened safeguards at Fordow.
  • The IAEA also previously reported the implementation of a “strengthened safeguards approach […] at a nuclear material storage at Esfahan”, an important development given that a large amount of Iran’s 60 percent HEU and 20 percent enriched uranium stock have previously been reported to be stored at Esfahan. Exactly how much of Iran’s enriched uranium stocks are held at Esfahan, however, compared to other locations, is no longer reported.
  • The IAEA’s efforts to verify Iran’s nuclear activities, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, continue to be seriously affected by Iran’s decision last fall to withdraw the designation of several experienced inspectors. The IAEA repeatedly requested that Iran reconsider this inappropriate, political act, including in a June 2024 Board of Governors censure resolution, but Iran has not done so. The IAEA stated in its accompanying report, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran: “The withdrawal of the designation of several experienced inspectors was also not in line with the required spirit of cooperation.”
  • As of May 17, 2025, the net overall enriched uranium stock, including all levels of enrichment and all chemical forms, had increased by 953.2 kg, from 8294.4 kg to 9247.6 kg (Uranium mass or U mass).
  • As of May 17, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium hexafluoride was 408.6 kg (as measured in U mass) or 604.4 kg (hex mass). This represents a net increase in the stock in the form of uranium hexafluoride of 133.8 kg (U mass) since the previous reporting period. It does include 6.5 kg of enriched uranium (U mass) that is assessed to be enriched above 20 percent but far below 60 percent, as it was discharged from the cascade into a dump tank rather than collected as product.
  • Since December 5, Iran has been using 20 percent feedstock rather than 5 percent feedstock to produce 60 percent HEU in the two interconnected IR-6 cascades used for 60 percent HEU production since November 2022. This change led to an average monthly production of 33.5kg 60 percent HEU at Fordow during this most recent reporting period. The two IR-6 cascades used include one of which is easily modifiable to change operations and enrich uranium to higher levels.
  • Iran continued to produce 60 percent HEU from 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) feed in two pairs of interconnected advanced centrifuge cascades at the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP).
  • Adding the average monthly production of 60 percent HEU at the PFEP, which slightly increased to 4kg per month, Iran is producing 37.5 kg (U mass) or 55.5 kg (hex mass) of 60 percent enriched uranium per month on average. It could produce about 675 kg (hex mass) or 456 kg (U mass) of near 60 percent enriched uranium per year.
  • However, in multiplying its 60 percent HEU production, Iran is using significant amounts of 20 percent enriched uranium as feedstock, a rate which is not sustainable unless Iran significantly increases 20 percent enriched uranium production. It used an average of 117 kg (U mass) of 20 percent enriched uranium as feed per month, compared to an average monthly production of 14 kg.
  • This led to a reduction in Iran’s near 20 percent enriched uranium stock in the form of uranium hexafluoride of 332.3 kg (U mass), for a total stock of 274.5 kg (U mass) as of May 17, 2025.
  • At this feed and production rate, Iran could sustain the high 60 percent HEU production for approximately three months after May 17.
  • Iran now has nearly 14,689 advanced centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow, where most are deployed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).
  • Including the installed IR-1 centrifuges at the FEP, PFEP, and FFEP brings the total number of installed centrifuges to roughly 21,900. It should be noted that many advanced centrifuges are deployed but not enriching uranium, and the IR-1 centrifuges have a reduced ability to enrich uranium.
  • During the reporting period, Iran installed five new IR-4 cascades at Natanz, for a total of 23 total IR-4 cascades, 12 of which are operating.
  • Iran made no progress in this reporting period on installing the massive cascade consisting of 1152 IR-6 centrifuges.
  • The quantity of Iran’s enriching centrifuges increased during this reporting period, to approximately 18,000 centrifuges.
  • Iran has a total installed enrichment capacity of roughly 64,000 swu/year. Its enriching centrifuge capacity is less, approximately 50,000 swu/year.
  • Iran’s stockpile of near 5 percent LEU in the form of UF6 increased by 1853.4 kg (U mass) from 3655.4 kg to 5508.8 kg (U mass), or 8149.1 kg (hex mass).
  • In general, Iran has not prioritized stockpiling uranium enriched between 2 to 5 percent. This choice is at odds with Iran’s contention that its primary goal is to accumulate 4 to 5 percent enriched uranium for use in nuclear power reactor fuel. Instead, Iran has focused on producing 60 percent enriched uranium, far beyond Iran’s civilian needs.
  • The IAEA again reports that Iran will not start commissioning of the Arak reactor, now called the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), or IR-20, until at least 2025, with operation expected to start in 2026. Inspectors again did not observe any significant changes at the reactor, noting this time only minor civil construction.
  • Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) to its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the JCPOA’s additional monitoring arrangements on February 23, 2021. Iran’s actions and its refusal to cooperate with the IAEA across a wide range of monitoring issues causes the IAEA to consistently express doubt about understanding key aspects of Iran’s nuclear activities. Without the AP in place, the IAEA has neither been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran nor received updated declarations from Iran.
  • The IAEA reports that it has “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC [uranium ore concentrate], which it will not be possible to restore.”
  • The IAEA concludes that “Iran’s decision to remove all of the Agency’s equipment previously installed in Iran for JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring activities has also had detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”
  • Although the IAEA can ascertain the number of centrifuges deployed at Fordow and Natanz, it cannot know how many more Iran has made and stored or deployed at an undeclared site. A risk is that Iran will accumulate a secret stock of advanced centrifuges, deployable in the future at a clandestine enrichment plant, which would only need to house a relatively few advanced centrifuge cascades to enrich Iran’s current stock of 60 percent HEU to WGU. At the least, this situation complicates any future verification effort and contributes to uncertainty about the status of Iran’s nuclear activities and facilities.
  • Combined with Iran’s refusal to resolve outstanding safeguards violations and the program’s unresolved nuclear weapons dimensions, the IAEA has a significantly reduced ability to monitor Iran’s complex and growing nuclear program. The IAEA’s ability to detect diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and other capabilities to undeclared facilities remains greatly diminished.

Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report — May 2025 | ISIS Reports | Institute For Science And International Security

isis-online.org isis-online.org
Click to expand...
They never would have been allow to do any of that if Benedict Donald had not torn up the JOCPA.
 
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